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GERMAN SUMMARY 
Die vorliegende Dissertation widmet sich zwei Teilgebieten der internationalen 
Makroökonomik. Zum einen werden die Wirkungen von ökonomischen Institutionen auf die 
dynamische Entwicklung der Zahlungsbilanz und ihrer einzelnen Komponenten untersucht. 
Dieser Teil der Dissertation ist daher eher dem Bereich der ökonomischen 
Grundlagenforschung zuzurechnen. Zum anderen werden die Auswirkungen von 
Detailregelungen der Organisation föderaler Währungsunionen auf die Zahlungsströme der 
Mitglieder und den Zusammenhalt der Währungsunion betrachtet. Diese Betrachtung aus 
Sicht der angewandten Wirtschaftspolitik liefert grundlegende Erkenntnisse zur Funktion von 
föderal organisierten Währungsunionen. Kapitel 2 und 3 fokussieren auf die erste, Kapitel 5 
auf die zweite Fragestellung. Kapitel 4 verbindet beide Themenblöcke am Beispiel einiger 
Mitgliedsländer der Europäischen Union. 
Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchungen in den Kapiteln 2 und 3 bildet eine Aussage der 
Modellfamilie intertemporaler Zahlungsbilanzmodelle: Für eine Ökonomie im 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsprozess ist es optimal, die inländische (real-) 
Kapitalakkumulation durch ausländisches (Finanz-)Kapital zu finanzieren. Dadurch erhöhen 
sich im Zeitablauf Produktion, Exporte und Ersparnis, wodurch auch eine Rückzahlung der 
Kredite möglich ist. Aus dem Bereich der Neuen Institutionenökonomik und empirischen 
Tests ist weiterhin der Konsens entstanden, dass die Qualität ökonomischer Institutionen in 
einer Volkswirtschaft ebenso entscheidend für Wachstum und Wohlstand ist. Der 
Zusammenhang zwischen dynamischen Entwicklungen der Zahlungsbilanz und der Qualität 
ökonomischer Institutionen ist jedoch noch nicht erforscht. Kapitel 2 bietet daher einen 
Überblick über die theoretischen und empirischen Erkenntnisse, welche den Einfluss von 
Institutionen auf einzelne Komponenten der Zahlungsbilanz erklären. Aus der Gesamtschau 
und Einordnung dieser meist statischen Ergebnisse in die dynamische Beschreibung der 
Zahlungsbilanzkomponenten lässt sich der Einfluss der Qualität von ökonomischen 
Institutionen auf den Erfolg von Entwicklungsstrategien ableiten, welche auf ausländisches 
Kapital zum Erreichen eines höheren Wachstumspfades setzen.  
Im Detail zeigt sich, dass bessere Institutionen heimische Investitionen anregen und dadurch 
Kapitalstock und Produktivität erhöhen. Dies gilt insbesondere für ausländisches Kapital, 
welches stark auf die Qualität der heimischen Institutionen reagiert. Bezüglich der Struktur 
des Auslandskapitals reagieren Direktinvestitionen stärker als Portfolioinvestitionen und 
Kredite. Da bei Ausländischen Direktinvestitionen positive externe Effekte auf die heimische 
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Wirtschaft vermutet werden, ist dies besonders interessant. Weiterhin hat die Verfügbarkeit 
von ausländischem Kapital Einfluss auf die Exportorientierung einer Volkswirtschaft und, 
wohl noch bedeutender, auch auf die Komplexität und den Wert der exportierten Güter.  
Dies stellt die Verbindung zu Erkenntnissen aus der Handelsliteratur dar, nach denen Länder 
mit höherer Qualität einheimischer Institutionen Güter mit höherer Komplexität und höherem 
Wert exportieren. Weiterhin gibt es empirische Hinweise, dass die nationale Sparquote, 
sowohl des privaten Sektors als auch der gesamten Volkswirtschaft, positive von der Qualität 
und der Entwicklung der Institutionellen Faktoren eines Landes beeinflusst wird. Eine solche 
Studie wird in Kapitel 3 vorgestellt. Nimmt man alle diese empirischen Ergebnisse zusammen 
zeigt sich, dass Institutionen in den verschiedenen Phasen eines Schuldenzyklus 
unterschiedlich stark die Teilelemente der Zahlungsbilanz beeinflussen. Insgesamt scheinen 
gute Institutionen die Möglichkeit eines wohlstandssteigernden Schuldenzyklus zu 
begünstigen. 
Der Zusammenhang von Institutionen und Finanzierung der heimischen Konsum- und 
Investitionsentscheidung durch ausländische Mittel wird am Beispiel einiger Mitglieder der 
Europäischen Union (EU) in Kapitel 4 aufgegriffen. Es zeigt sich, dass auch innerhalb der 
stark betroffenen Länder der EU die Schlussfolgerungen bezüglich Richtung, Volumen und 
Struktur des Auslandskapitals wie sie in Kapitel 2 gezogen worden, halten. Deutlich wird 
allerdings auch, dass für die Mitglieder der Europäischen Währungsunion die Leistungsbilanz 
und Kapitalbilanz nur unzureichend die Problematik von Kapitalflucht und dem 
unglücklichen Ende eines Schuldenzyklus abbilden. Ursache hierfür sind detaillierte 
Regelungen zur Behandlung von grenzüberschreitendem, elektronischem Zahlungsverkehr 
zwischen den einzelnen Nationalen Zentralbanken. Diese sind durch die sog. „TARGET2-
Debatte“ mittlerweile bekannt. Wird dieses Problemfeld berücksichtigt, ergeben sich weitaus 
stärkere Schlussfolgerungen für die Mitglieder der Währungsunion, als für die betrachteten 
Nicht-Mitglieder.  
Hauptthema des 5. Kapitels bildet der Vergleich zwischen Europäischer Währungsunion 
(EWU) und Federal Reserve System der USA bezüglich exakt dieser Detailregelungen im 
Umgang mit grenzüberschreitenden Zahlungsüberweisungen. Der in diesem Bereich von 
anderen Autoren festgestellte Unterschied zwischen beiden föderalen Währungsunionen 
besteht darin, dass in den USA nach dem Übergang von Einlagen zwischen den 
Reservebanken der einzelnen Distrikte auch geldpolitische Aktiva übergeben werden und so 
eine Kompensation für die erhöhten geldpolitischen Verbindlichkeiten in Distrikten mit 
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Nettozuflüssen an Einlagen besteht. In der Europäischen Währungsunion ist dies nicht der 
Fall, weshalb einige Autoren darin hohe Risiken für die Kernländer der Eurozone befürchten. 
In Kapitel 5 werden neben entscheidenden, aber wenig diskutierten Aspekten der TARGET2-
Debatte und der Analyse weitergehender Änderungsvorschläge am „TARGET2 
Mechanismus“ in der EWU die Grundzüge für die Ausgleichsregelungen im Federal Reserve 
System betrachtet und mit der Europäischen Währungsunion verglichen. Es zeigt sich, dass 
für die Beurteilung letztlich drei Fragen entscheidend sind, die grundsätzlich für das Design 
von Ausgleichsregelungen für Zahlungsüberweisungssalden in föderalen Währungsunionen 
herangezogen werden müssen. Können diese Grundfragen nicht positiv beantwortet werden, 
führt ein Ausgleichmechanismus für den grenzüberschreitenden Transfer von geldpolitischen 
Verbindlichkeiten zu einer Destabilisierung einer föderalen Währungsunion und deren 
wahrscheinlichem Auseinanderbrechen.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is dedicated to two major areas in international economics, which are loosely 
interrelated from a theoretical but strongly interrelated from an economic policy point of 
view: The dynamics of the Balance of Payments at the one hand and the functioning of 
a federally organized common currency area on the other. Inspiration for the first issue 
came from the fundamental question, whether countries in earlier stages of economic 
development can improve their welfare with foreign credit and whether economic 
institutions could have a role in this process. It is therefore a more basic topic in 
economic research, which seems to be easy from a theoretical side, but the empirical 
picture is all than clear and conclusive. My thoughts and reflections over the second 
issue of this thesis have been initiated by the public and scientific discussion over 
monetary imbalances in the Euro area since 2010 and the general question over its 
cohesion. Despite this more practical focus, the general findings from my analysis of the 
detailed organizational provisions for monetary unions with a federal character are of 
basic nature. 
I have structured this thesis from a general-to-specific viewpoint and hope that the line 
of argumentation guides the interested reader from one chapter to the other. From a 
systematic perspective, the relation between the chapters could best be visualized by the 
following figure:  
  
 
Chapter 2: 
BoP dynamics  
and institutions 
 
Chapter 3: 
Savings and 
institutions 
 
Chapter 5: 
Monetary Unions 
–  
institutional 
prerequisits 
 
Chapter 4: 
Aspects of 
BoP dynamics 
 in the EMU 
Figure 1: Systematic of chapters 
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In chapter 2 I follow the idea of Siebert (1989), who develops the model-dynamics for a 
cyclical movement of the current and the financial account of an economy during its 
transition from low capital stock to its optimal capital stock values, or easier, from a 
poor to a wealthy economy. In the line of research of the intertemporal approach to the 
balance of payments (see the seminal paper of Sachs, 1981, for the earliest model 
formulation), Siebert’s paper is outstanding because he shows that such a cycle may 
evolve endogenously without active policy measures or breaks and jumps in foreign and 
domestic financing. However, in this and the later intertemporal models of the current 
account, institutions are part of the assumption on an efficient functioning of the market 
model economy. As we will see, the literature provides theoretical models which 
integrate the influence of economic institutions into the components of the current 
account, the financial account and the domestic investment decision. All these elements 
guide the dynamic movements of the Balance of Payments, but we are lacking a 
theoretical framework which is able to unify these single lines of arguments. Taking 
stock of these theoretical and empirical findings, we are able to tell how institutions 
might influence Balance of Payments dynamics, and get a hint which properties a 
unifying theoretical framework should be able to replicate. 
Whereas my efforts in chapter 2 are focused on the overall picture of the influence of 
institutions on Balance of Payments dynamics as a whole, chapter 3 is dedicated to an 
empirical estimation of the influence of institutions on aggregate savings formation. 
This aspect has barely found any remarks in the literature at all, despite the fact that 
rising savings are one of the main ingredients for a successful maturing of an economy. 
They are also crucial for a completion of a debt cycle. Therefore, this chapter fills a 
niche in the empirical literature at the one hand and integrates very well into the 
findings of chapter 2 on the other. 
The short chapter 4 is intended to connect the two preceding and the following chapter 
5. At first, the relation of institutions, the current account deficits and the sudden stop of 
foreign financing is shown for selected economies in the European Monetary Union 
during 2008 to 2012. Second, the relevance of the detailed provisions of accounting 
within the European System of Central Banks as well as its federal setup for financing 
of current account deficits in South European crisis economies is highlighted, which is 
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now known as the “TARGET2 debate”. As I draw on sections from a publication with 
erroneous and in part naïve conclusions from my side back in 2010, I have changed the 
style of writing in this chapter and highlight the most important parts, corrections and 
improvements from my standpoint today. 
In chapter 5, I focus on some neglected but nevertheless highly important aspects of this 
debate on TARGET2 balances. Especially, I follow the question whether these balances, 
arising from cross-border transfers of electronic money within the European Monetary 
Union, could be settled with a procedure comparable to the one that is used in the 
Federal Reserve System of the United States of America. This comparison of the 
detailed provisions in two federally organized monetary unions gives clear theoretical 
answers to some questions on this topic and hopefully adds some further insights to the 
necessary details on the optimal working of a common currency area. Conclusions 
round of the thesis. 
As a cumulative dissertation, this thesis consists of (parts) of five single scientific 
papers, some published and some yet in working paper form. Chapter 2 is actually an 
unpublished working paper, chapter 3 has been published as Freytag and Voll, 2012. 
Parts of chapter 4 have been published in Draper et al, 2011 and chapter 5 consists in 
some parts of Burgold and Voll, 2012 and a working paper (Voll, 2012). For a clear 
overview which writings belong to which authors and co-authors, I added a 
supplementary table in Appendix D. 
As Figure 1 shows and gets clear from the outline of the structure above, this thesis 
covers two and a half loosely connected topics. All chapters need other basic literature 
and fundamental economic ideas for an understanding of the issues. Therefore, and to 
make reading of the thesis fluent and relatively easy, I refrained from providing a single 
overview of the literature. I hope the interested reader will find my line of 
argumentation nevertheless convincing, inspiring and fun to read and the introductions 
to the single chapters guide the reader through the thesis itself.  
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2 INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
DYNAMICS: A FIRST LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION:  
The wealth of nations is mainly determined by two factors: domestic institutions and 
participation in the international division of labor. Institutions reduce uncertainty over 
possible outcomes especially in situations with incomplete information and lack of 
control. They define standards for and help to enforce agreements of exchange. 
Therefore, they determine production- and transaction costs (North, 1991, p. 97f) which 
in turn influence patterns of the production process, division of labor and international 
exchange of goods, services and factors.  
It has been observed empirically that poor institutions are associated with lower 
economic growth, for instance by Knack and Keefer (1995), lower total factor 
productivity (TFP), by Hall and Jones (1999), or lower per capita income, by Acemoglu 
et al. (2001), just to mention a few. With different instrumental variables, Hall and 
Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) can argue convincingly that causality goes 
from institutions to economic performance, despite feedback effects might also be at 
work (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Bhalla, 2007).  
Rodrik et al. (2004) argue in their seminal paper that the channel through which 
institutions cause economic development is through integration into the world economy. 
Integration into the world economy means basically two things: First, specialization in 
production of goods and services with a comparative advantage and in excess of 
domestic demand, with an exchange of the surplus against products with higher 
opportunity costs in domestic production. Second, it means integration of domestic into 
worldwide capital markets. It can be easily imagined that good institutions improve 
export performance and influence import prices and therefore demand. It is also not 
difficult to imagine that domestic institutions influence foreign capital inflows. The 
strong unbundling of the different stages in production with increased geographic 
dispersion of all suppliers in a global value chain has further leveraged the potential of 
foreign investment capital and trade since 25 years (Baldwin, 2013, p. 14ff). The 
relevance of institutions for international exchange has therefore important implications 
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on some of the results from the intertemporal model of the current account (of which the 
basic principles have been explained by von Böhm-Bawerk, 1914; for an overview on 
this model family, see Rogoff and Obstfeld, 1996) and especially the ability of a 
country to boost domestic capital formation with foreign credit and enter a beneficial 
“debt cycle” (Siebert, 1989). However, a consistent and unifying theoretical framework 
on these interrelated issues is still missing. This part of the thesis is an attempt to assess 
whether such a unifying framework makes sense from an empirical viewpoint, and 
which single aspects are crucial in describing the interrelation of institutions and 
Balance of Payments dynamics. 
The relevance of capital formation, foreign investment and trade for the wealth of 
nations gives one major starting point for the empirical analysis: The Balance of 
Payments (BoP) of countries and its single accounts. Its principles and definitions 
follow the basic economic concepts established since decades, and are today defined 
and established for easier international comparisons in the Balance of Payments and 
international investment positions manual (IMF, 2009). The BoP consists of three main 
accounts: the current account (CA), the capital account (CpA) and the financial account 
(FA)
1
. The CA shows the flows of goods and services as well as income (primary and 
secondary) between residents and non-residents of an economy, whereas the CpA 
represents the recordings in non-financial, non-produced assets (e.g. land, contracts, 
licenses) and capital transfers (provision of resources without an exchange of economic 
value as direct return, e.g. debt forgiveness, nonlife insurance claims or investment 
grants). The sum of the CA and the CpA form the net lending ability or borrowing 
needs of an economy and find their counterpart in the financial account. The latter 
shows net acquisitions/disposals of financial assets and liabilities and gives information 
how the net lending is financed or into which types of assets the net borrowing is 
invested, e.g. equity, debt instruments or other types (e.g. bank loans, derivatives, 
reserves) or which is the nature of the investment (e.g. direct investment, portfolio or 
others). In its simplified form, these relations can be written as: 
                                                 
1
  Since the international revision of the SNA in 1998, the positions in the former CpA are now 
summarized under the term Financial Account with only minor changes. This is more precise, 
because the FA includes only transactions of financial capital and not real assets, which are 
captured either in the CA or the CpA now. But it is very unfortunate, as still a lot of publications 
use the old terminology, which easily leads to confusions.  
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CA balance + CpA balance = net lending/borrowing = FA balance 
It is well known and easy to show within the System of National Accounts (SNA) that 
the sum of current and capital account balance equals the difference of gross national 
savings and gross fixed capital formation in an economy, thereby connecting the 
external relations of residents to domestic savings and investment transactions.  
(CA + CpA balance) = FA balance = savings ./. investments  
As CpA transactions can often be neglected from their relative volumes, the starting 
points for this literature review are the above cited three components: the CA balance, 
net lending/borrowing (the domestic savings-investment gap) and finally the size and 
structure of the FA. 
The main questions I follow in this survey of the (empirical) literature are: Which 
influence does the domestic institutional setting have on the dynamic development of 
any of these BoP components. Are there common patterns observable and are we able to 
tell into which direction institutional developments drive the current or the financial 
account? For this, I have divided the paper into the four following parts. The chapters 
2.2 to 2.4 focus on the interrelation of institutions with the current account, domestic net 
lending/borrowing and the financial account. Chapter 2.5 draws conclusions on the 
consistency of the findings and tries to provide a unifying framework.  
As detailed descriptions of the empirical procedure, country samples, time periods and 
used variables is of minor importance for the overall empirical picture, but would 
consume much space and not be inspiring to read, I have decided to skip the details of 
most studies in the text. I included tables with such an overview over the single studies 
in Appendix A, tables A1 to A3. 
2.2 THE CURRENT ACCOUNT – EX-IM, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS 
Economic exchanges across borders are often distorted, not only by tariffs or the like, 
but by high transaction costs often caused by a lack of contract enforcement. National 
courts might be unwilling, and international courts unable to prevent opportunistic 
behavior of the contracting parties (Rodrik, 2000, p. 179) which is a prerequisite to 
enforce agreements for exchange. Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that the channel through 
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which institutions cause growth is through integration into the world economy. From 
these arguments we can infer that institutions facilitating the enforcement of contracts in 
a country lead to higher integration into the world economy and would increase both 
exports and imports. The first question therefore is, does institutional quality have an 
influence on trade integration? 
2.2.1 INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE: IMPORTS, EXPORTS, OR BOTH? 
Jansen and Nordas’ (2004) empirical results indicate that first, institutional quality is 
associated with higher integration into the world markets, but domestic and foreign 
institutions are both relevant. Second, trade policy in form of a reduction in bilateral 
tariffs has a larger impact on integration into the world economy if the institutional 
quality in the domestic country is better. Policy measures like tariff reductions or 
preferential treatment of certain country groups would thus only be one element to 
increase trade integration and welfare. It implies also that institutional differences would 
explain one of the puzzles in international economics – the “disproportionately high 
volume of trade among high-income countries” in comparison to high-low income 
countries’ trade as predicted by models taking factor endowments into account only 
(Deardorff, 1998, p.16). Francois and Manchin (2013) confirm this hypothesis and find 
that trade flows between low income economies are only 26% of ‘would be’ trade flows 
if the average institutional level was comparable to the high income countries. Similar 
volumes of ‘missing trade’ can be observed for low-middle and middle-middle income 
countries. Trade between high and low income economies is only around 40% of the 
potential trade volumes if institutions are accounted for, according to their estimations. 
From these papers, we get an impression that current account transactions are indeed 
influenced by the institutional setting, but we don’t get knowledge about the main 
direction of the influence: Are imports or exports more affected and could we expect an 
activation or passivation of the current account based on trade flows given strongly 
improved contract enforcement by better institutional quality? 
The empirical findings of De Groot et al. (2004) show that exports are stronger 
influenced by the domestic institutional setting than are imports. Second, and much 
more interesting, is their result that countries with similar institutional levels trade more 
with each other, even if the authors control for the level of institutional quality. Their 
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dummy variable for institutional similarity between two countries is one, if the value of 
a governance indicator is within a fraction of the standard deviation of the whole 
sample. This seems at first as a very rough measure, as the same value of an indicator 
might still express very different details in the working of an institutional setting. I 
would expect that this particular result is largely driven by the trade patterns of 
developed countries, but the authors do not divide their sample into different incomes or 
differentiate their institutional similarity dummy by income groups.  
The finding of a higher importance of exporter countries institutional quality is 
confirmed by nearly all empirical studies in this field: Francois and Manchin (2013), 
Jansen and Nordas, (2004), Ranjan and Lee (2007). The conclusion we have to draw is 
that, at least in bilateral trade, exports react stronger to the domestic institutional setting 
than do imports, which hints at an activating effect of domestic institutions at the 
current account. If we accept this result for now, the next question we have to turn 
towards is: What are the exact transmission channels for exports and imports? 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) are the first who build a structural model of demand 
for imported goods where low institutional quality leads to a lack of contract 
enforcement resulting in a price markup for traded goods in the country with tenuous 
institutions. The big advantage of their structural model estimation is that it allows for 
different types of influence of insecure contract enforcement on the price markup: First, 
there is substitution within the group of traded goods, as imported goods from countries 
with common institutions such a cultural background, language or lower distance are 
expected to have a lower price markup. Behind this is the reasonable assumption that 
exporters are able to use existing institutions more effectively if the overall distance is 
lower. Second, there is a general equilibrium effect of substituting trade vs. non-traded 
goods and third, real income is reduced due to increasing prices lowering imports 
overall. As could be expected from their model setup, the quality of institutions has 
major influence on trade flows as imports from countries with low institutional quality 
are reduced. Second, not only imports from countries with poor institutions decrease, 
but the share of traded goods in total expenditure decreases, too, and more non-traded 
domestic services are consumed overall. With this channel, Anderson and Marcouiller 
replicate the effect of institutions on measured openness to trade. Additionally, their 
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model can add its part to the disproportionately high share of North-North trade. 
Overall, the paper of Anderson and Marcouiller gives us the clear theoretical and 
empirical answer how trade integration in general and particularly imports are 
influenced by lacking institutional quality in the exporting country. 
2.2.2 INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCT COMPLEXITY: HOW ARE EXPORTS AFFECTED? 
Whereas Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) focus on imports, the majority of authors 
focuses on export performance: Berkowitz et al. (2006), Meon and Sekkat (2008), Nunn 
(2007), Levchenko (2007), Ranjan and Lee (2007) and Faruq (2011). All these authors 
argue that better institutions in the export country enhance international trade in 
complex products (either counted as manufactures vs. non-manufactures or complex 
(intermediate) goods or goods with quality as important characteristic) which have 
properties that are difficult to include into contracts completely. Their argument is that 
good legal institutions in the exporter’s country reduce the incentive to breach the 
agreement by delivering a faulty good or incomplete shipment because contract 
enforcement is possible. In this regard, better institutions secure that the delivered 
good’s properties are as expected by the importer. This is particularly important for 
complex products with many differing, not easily assessable characteristics, which is in 
line with North’s (1990, p. 99f) argument that the more complex characteristics of 
transactions become, the higher is uncertainty of contract fulfillment and the more 
important institutions are. Furthermore, the importer’s only chance to satisfy its claims 
is at the domestic courts of the exporter, as most often the bulk of their assets are hold in 
the domestic country. Better institutions reduce risk and the accompanying negotiation, 
monitoring and insurance costs and therefore overall transaction costs (Berkovitz et al., 
2006, p. 364ff). Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) argue further, that institutions 
might be themselves a source of comparative advantage apart from factor endowments 
as they help the specialization and division of labor within a country itself. Therefore, 
countries with good institutions have not only lower international transaction costs, but 
also lower production costs in complex products, facilitating trade integration through 
the export channel. 
The overall empirical findings of this line of research are that countries with better 
institutions have higher exports and that, again, exporter country institutions have a 
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higher influence than importer country institutions. They also export goods which are 
more complex even if accounted for factor endowments, where complexity is measured 
by Rauch’s (1999) classification of goods2 either directly on bilateral trade flows or as 
aggregated index into final products with input-output tables (see Levchenko, 2007, for 
example). In contrast, Meon and Sekkat (2008) us a simpler approach and divide 
exports just into manufactures and non-manufactures. Whereas they can confirm that 
countries with better institutions for contract enforcement tend to export more 
manufactures, overall export volumes do not seem to be affected. The authors relate this 
to the high share of resource exporting countries in their sample. Apart from Meon and 
Sekkat’s findings, the econometric results seem to be very robust overall, as they hold 
with different econometric methods, accounting for endogeneity, different country 
samples, bilateral trade data between USA and others or bilateral trade between a panel 
of countries and over different periods of time. 
However, even if the theoretical models show strong rational for a relation of 
comparative advantage, export streams, reduced imports and institutions and the 
empirical tests of these models confirm a correlation of institutions and trade flows and 
patterns, uncovering a causal influence of an institutional improvement and 
developments in the trade flows is difficult. Nicolini and Paccagnini (2011) are the only 
to test the short term causal influence of contract enforcement on trade with a Granger 
type causality test. The simple Granger procedure first shows the expected results: 
institutional quality Granger causes trade flows. However, if cross-sectional 
heterogeneity is accounted for in the estimation procedure, the authors find no evidence 
in favor of causality from institutions to trade flows or vice versa. This might be caused 
by the choice of their institutional estimator: The authors do not use the widely applied 
rule of law or corruption indices, but two indices from the Freedomhouse Association 
on civil liberties and political rights. The relation of these indicators to contract 
enforcement and rule of law is weak at best, and I would not see their results as robust 
in this regard. On the other hand, studies using instrumental variable techniques (de 
Groot et al., 2004; Ranjan and Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2004; Meon and Sekkat, 2008) argue 
                                                 
2
  Rauch (1999) classifies product complexity according to the way these goods are traded: trade 
on organized exchanges (reference priced commodities), reference priced (those goods whose reference 
prices are quoted only in trade publications) and differentiated goods. The latter are assumed to possess 
the most complex characteristics, and therefore are the most sensitive to lacking contract enforcement. 
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convincingly that the channel goes from institutions to higher export volumes via 
complex products. 
I am tempted to guess that the difference in both findings lies in the well known 
imprecision of the institutional indicators and especially in the low within-country or 
short term variations of these indicators, which make it difficult for the econometric 
estimations to get causal influences from short term variations. As a preliminary 
conclusion, we could note that trade openness is higher in countries with better 
institutions, exports are more affected than imports and this goes through their effect on 
increases in complex exports. 
2.2.3 INSTITUTIONS AND TERMS OF TRADE IMPROVEMENT: IS THERE A CONNECTION? 
The question is, if the export of more complex products has indirect effects on the 
current account. Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) argue that relying on exports of 
goods with low complexity, that is primary products or simple manufactures, leads to a 
deterioration of the terms of trade, a hypothesis which has been confirmed empirically 
especially for the period 1970-1990. This could itself lead to a passivation of the current 
account by reducing overall export volumes and increasing import volumes due to price 
effects. Furthermore, the well-known Harberger-Laursen-Metzler (HLM) (Harberger, 
1950; Laursen and Metzler, 1950) effect states that terms of trade changes also affect 
domestic savings through an influence on real income (for one of the few empirical 
discussions of the HLM-effect and its direction, see for example Otto, 2003).  
If better institutions increase exports of complex products, which should in turn improve 
terms of trade, the CA would be activated (as exports react stronger to institutional 
developments than do imports), but also national savings could increase due to the 
HLM-effect, leading to higher net lending/lower net borrowing and supporting the 
activation of the CA by the FA.  
Empirical research on the connection between product sophistication on a detailed 
industry level and the terms of trade is relatively young field due to data limitations 
before 1990. However, the main consensus finding is that terms of trade have 
deteriorated between 1970’s and 2000 on average for developing and emerging 
economies despite increasing complexity of their exports, albeit with large deviations 
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between countries, (Sarkar, Singer, 1991; Kaplinsky, 2006; Maizels 2000; Maizels, 
2003; Saadin, 2013). The reason lies in what is discussed in the literature as ‘fallacy of 
composition’ (see Saadi, 2013, p. 635 for an overview), because many developing and 
emerging market economies have increased their exports in the same class of middle-
complex goods, often as producers of intermediate goods or easily exchangeable 
contract manufacturers for final consumer goods, which has led to increasing world 
supply causing falling world market prices. 
Therefore, an assessment of the indirect effects of better institutional quality and 
increasing exports of complex goods via the HLM-effect is not in general possible. It 
depends highly on the detailed export structure of the economy as well as the time 
preference rate and substitutions effects in the single economies as well. 
2.2.4 SUMMING UP – DO BETTER INSTITUTIONS ACTIVATE THE CURRENT ACCOUNT? 
To give a dissatisfactory but honest answer to this question: It depends. First, the 
literature is in broad agreement that improvements in institutional quality lead to better 
integration into the world economy, with causality in the long run going from 
institutions to trade. Second, the agreement is also about the fact that improvements in 
institutions have a larger effect on export volumes than on imports. The channel through 
which exports are more affected seems to be product upgrading, meaning the fact the 
better contract enforcement enables to export more complex products. For this, 
domestic institutions in the exporting country matter more than the institutions in the 
target country. Some authors even see the quality of institutions as the source for 
comparative advantage in production of complex goods. This speaks for larger increases 
of export volumes than for imports when institutions improve and therefore an 
activation of the current account. 
On the other hand, for an activation of the current account to happen via the trade 
channel, the current account should determine the financial account (on this empirical 
relation, see section 2.3.1), which is against the assumptions of the by now standard 
model of the BoP, the intertemporal optimization approach. But this type of causality 
would not be necessary, if increases in exports of complex products lead to an 
improvement in the terms of trade and the HLM-effect holds. In such a case, real 
income would increase with better terms of trade which leads to increases in national 
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savings, narrowing the domestic savings-investment gap and leading to passivation in 
the financial account, which corresponds to an activation of the current account. This 
case seems to be very specific to each country, depending on the intensity of 
competition in the range of products a country is exporting (which influences the terms 
of trade) and the domestic circumstances influencing the savings-investment decisions. 
This aspect is part of the next section. 
 
2.3 S-I: THE SAVINGS-INVESTMENT GAP AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
In the previous chapter, I surveyed articles which search for an influence of institutions 
on trade flows and on the current account. As a preliminary result, an activating effect is 
reasonable, as exports react stronger to institutional improvement than do imports. The 
question is now, if the empirical papers looking at the savings-investment relation find 
corresponding results. Corresponding in this case means: net lending should decrease, 
net borrowing increase with institutional upgrading, which needs a stronger reaction of 
national savings than gross fixed capital formation on the institutional development. 
Without revealing too much at the beginning, this seems unlikely.   
2.3.1 REMARKS ONTO THE PRIMACY OF INTERTEMPORAL OPTIMIZATION VS. EXPORT 
DETERMINACY OF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
I have to make two remarks at the beginning: First, the empirical papers using reduced 
form equations to look at the current account from the intertemporal perspective claim 
to explain the savings-investment gap, but utilize the current account balance as the 
dependent variable. This is reasonable from the perspective of the IMF’s BoP manual 
and the whole framework of the system of national accounts. However, in this system, 
savings are calculated as a residual after many other variables are recorded first. From 
the intertemporal approach of the CA we know that the actual consumption and saving 
decision is the target variable, and residuals are exports- and imports which is exactly 
the other way round. In a perfect (model) economy, this would not matter. But if the 
“real world” decisions of the economic actors do not correspond bye and large to the 
ideas in the various versions of the intertemporal model (that is mainly forward looking 
intertemporal optimization under insecurity) and that exports are for example rather a 
driving force of national savings than the other way round, using the current account 
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balance (Ex-IM) as indicator for an optimizing net savings behavior (the savings-
investment gap) of an economy is misleading.  
The first point, that exports are rather a driving force of national savings follows from 
Maizels (1968) arguments for an alternative form of the savings function and has found 
some empirical validation especially for developing and emerging economies (see Kim, 
1990; Sergi and Vit, 2004; Sinha, 1999, Wilbur and Hague, 1992).  
The second point is, that for the CA balance to be an indicator of the (intended) savings-
investment decisions of the economic actors in a country, the intertemporal model 
should hold as the main explanatory model of current account dynamics itself. 
However, the present value tests of the intertemporal model show usually a bad fit to 
current account movements (see for example Gosh, 1995; Bergin and Sheffrin, 2000; 
Nason and Rogers, 2006; Sheffrin and Whoo, 2002) which hints at the possible 
influence of other aspects than intertemporal optimization (for example Maizels 
hypothesis or omitted variables) in their econometric tests. A (non-linear) influence of 
institutions on the CA balance could be part of this omitted varibales. 
The literature on causality tests between the current and the financial account 
differentiates this issue further. A common finding is that the FA drives the CA in 
emerging economies, whereas it is more often the opposite direction of causality in 
industrialized countries (see Yan and Yang, 2011, p. 30ff for an overview). If we 
analyze empirical studies using reduced form equations and the CA balance as 
dependent variable to explain the savings-investment  gap, we have to keep this in 
mind.  
2.3.2 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SAVINGS-INVESTMENT GAP APPROXIMATED BY THE 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
Panel studies researching the determinants of the current account from a savings-
investment perspective have spurred since the seminal paper of Debelle and Faruqee 
(1996) (see Chinn, Prasad, 2003). However, most papers concentrate on the issues of 
financial development, financial reforms and free movement of capital and less on 
general economic institutions.  
15 
 
In policy advice and country case studies, taking account of institutional aspects 
influencing the savings-investment dynamics are common since the 1990s (see 
Dluhosch et al., 1996, pp. 141ff for example). However, the first to include the common 
institutional indices as explanatory variables in multi-country econometric studies have 
been Chinn and Ito in 2007. Like Gruber and Kamin (2008) later, they are interested in 
the determinants of global current account imbalances before 2007, despite I would say 
the interest lies more in the special case of US current account deficits and its 20 year 
old relation to the Asian economies. Whereas Gruber and Kamin (2008), de Santis and 
Lührmann (2009) and Kerdrain et al. (2011) argue that institutional quality should 
increase domestic investments itself and find supporting coefficients in their 
econometric tests, Chinn and Ito’s (2007) hypothesis is that institutions enabling 
contract enforcement are just a binding constraint coming into effect only through 
financial market liberalization. Their variable capturing legal institutions has a 
significant and negative effect on the current account in developing and emerging 
economies, meaning increased net lending from the rest of the world. But there are 
interaction effects with the level of financial development and financial account 
openness: For emerging and developing countries, higher development of the domestic 
financial sector is associated with a passivation of the CA only for countries with legal 
quality in the highest 10%-percentile. In case of medium to low institutional quality, 
financial development leads to an activation of the CA.   
Ca’Zorzi et al.’s (2012) interest lies also on the explanation of global imbalances prior 
to 2007 with a focus on the compatibility of the fundamental determinants of current 
account balances and their developments in the early 2000’s. By applying model 
simulations over 14 dominant explanatory variables from the literature, they find that 
institutional quality is one of the consistent explanatory variables for the CA balance, 
albeit usually with low (negative) coefficients, stating that higher institutional quality is 
associated with smaller surplusses/larger deficits of the current account because of 
increased domestic investment (Ca’Zorzi et al, 2012, p. 1325ff).  
Overall, the empirical literature on institutions and current account determinants from 
the savings-investment perspective hints at resulting CA deficits if institutional quality 
is relatively high. The most common argument given is that countries with higher rule 
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of law, lower corruption and market friendly regulation are attractive to domestic and 
foreign investments, increasing gross fixed capital formation, whereas high levels of 
corruption and lack of contract enforcement lead to capital flight.  
2.3.3 INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON AGGREGATE SAVINGS FORMATION 
I have looked at the empirical picture for the relationship of the current account balance 
and institutions from the savings-investment perspective in its aggregate. For a deeper 
understanding it is reasonable to research the institutional influence on its single 
components, namely the aggregate national savings at the one side and gross fixed 
capital formation – simply real investments – on the other. For savings and investments, 
a separation into private and public parts is necessary, as public saving/investment 
decisions are driven by political economy aspects different from the private actor’s 
calculus.  
Aizenman et al. (2007) find as a side-result of their empirical work on the relationship 
between foreign and domestic financing that volatility of aggregate national savings is 
lower the better domestic institutional quality is, which they explain to be the 
mechanism institutions influence long term growth by providing a stable basis for 
financing domestic investment. Concerning aggregate savings, there exist only three 
studies considering the influence of the general institutional setting on gross national 
and aggregate private savings formation. Chinn and Ito (2005, p.12 ff.) have a look on 
savings determinants in the working paper version of their 2007 published paper, 
unfortunately not for private but overall national savings. They find no individual 
influence of their used indices for legal quality, but an interaction effect with the 
openness of the financial account and institutional quality. Depending on the quality of 
institutions, an open financial account and development of the private financial sector 
reduces gross national savings in their estimates if institutional quality is within the 10% 
highest percentile, but increases national savings below. This holds for industrial as well 
as emerging economies and shows a non-linear, highly dependent relationship difficult 
to uncover in empirical studies 
Swaleheen (2008) takes a look at the interrelation of corruption, national savings and 
capital flight and finds that corruption reduces gross national savings, but that gross 
domestic savings are unaffected. The explanation Swaleheen provides for this is that 
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corruption is associated with higher capital flight and therefore national and domestic 
savings are affected differently. These findings are consistent with the result of Chinn 
and Ito (2007) as mentioned above, where openness of the financial account and 
financial sector reform is associated with a gap between domestic savings and 
investments only if institutional quality is high.   
Freytag and Voll (2013, see Chapter 3 below) show that better rule of law (as measured 
by the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW)-subindex) and the quality of governance 
(as measured by a subindex from the International Country Risk Guide, ICRG)) have a 
positive influence on aggregate national and aggregate private savings formation, even 
if the usual explanatories from the literature on aggregate savings formation (like 
demographics, per capita income, financial market development, etc.) are controlled for. 
They argue that the cause, especially in developing and emerging economies, is the 
influence of quality of institutions on perceived uncertainty over the general path and 
success of the economy as well as the individual income (Freytag, Voll, 2013, pp. 476ff, 
see section 3.2 below). This idea is supported by micro-econometric evidence from 
Shapiro and Wu (2011), who argue that the amount of individual savings depends not 
only on uncertainty and consumption smoothing, but also on individual fatalism in 
general and the expectation of individuals that saving can improve their future situation 
in particular. Especially in countries with relatively high poverty, inequality and low 
quality of institutions, such fatalist viewpoints might be common and prevent 
households and small business enterprises from savings formation.  
To sum up the few papers researching the relationship on institutions and aggregate 
savings formation, I have to say that savings are less directly determined by the 
institutional surrounding than I would wish for clear conclusion. However, there are 
hints that aggregate savings are influenced positively with the quality of institutions in 
developing and emerging economies alone. When it comes to its interrelation with 
financial development and openness to world capital markets, countries with relatively 
good institutions seem to have lower national savings when their financial markets 
develop. The next step from now would be to take a closer look on the determinants of 
gross fixed capital formation (aggregate investment) and the influence the institutional 
setting might have on it. 
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2.3.4 INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND ITS INTERRELATION 
Besley (1995, p.905-906) summarizes the three main arguments, why the quality of 
institutions might have impacts on (private) investment. First, strong property rights 
protect from expropriation (Demsetz, 1967) and prohibitive taxes and makes therefore 
returns better calculable for investors. Second, such institutions are the basic ingredients 
for the functioning of capital markets and the enforcement of contracts, therefore the 
contractual barriers for carrying out investment projects are reduced. At third, 
institutions which enable contract enforcement facilitate economic transactions; they 
increase the benefits from individual trades and the corresponding returns. 
The first author to take an empirical look at the influence of the institutional setting on 
investment was Mauro (1995). While controlling for the standard determinants of 
investments, he finds that a higher level of corruption lowers total investment in an 
economy, independent of the setting of “high bureaucratic efficiency” or “low 
bureaucratic efficiency”. Mauro interprets this as a rejection of the idea that corruption 
speeds up inefficient governance systems (“greasing the wheels”) and could be seen as a 
positive institution in specific cases. The general results of his study have been 
confirmed by a number of following studies. Dawson (1998) shows that total 
investment to GDP ratio is influence by economic institutional quality, but not by 
political institutions. Furthermore, he finds that a higher initial level as well as an 
improvement of economic institutions exerts a positive influence on aggregate 
investment.  
In contrast to these studies, de Haan and Siermann (1998) do not find an influence of 
economic freedom on total aggregate investment; de Haan and Sturm (2000) confirm 
this previous with the same method and slightly increased sample size. In strong 
contrast to both studies are Dawson’s (2003) findings. He shows granger causality 
running from improvement in economic freedom (EFW) to increases in gross fixed 
capital formation, but that rule of law and quality of bureaucracy are not the driving 
components, rather these are price stability, the size of government and freedom with 
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respect to goods and financial markets
3
. To conclude, it is very unfortunate that Dawson 
does not apply his estimation to private sector investment, but to total investment. It 
might well be that the results for private sector investment differ fundamentally from 
public sector investment or the mix of both, especially as in many emerging and 
developing economies the majority of investment is financed by the general government 
sector, which includes state owned enterprises.  
Knack and Keefer (1995) find that institutional indices capturing aspects of rule of law, 
corruption and bureaucratic quality, are significant explanatories of real private 
investment, but variables capturing political instability, like political assassinations or 
coups d’état are not. Campos et al. (1999) argue that it is not corruption per se which 
counts, but its predictability and stability. Their research is motivated by the 
contradiction of high rates of corruption in many Asian economies and the parallel high 
rates of (private) investment. They first confirm that corruption reduces total and private 
investment, but that corruption which is predictable in its patterns has a less damaging 
influence. With predictable, the authors mean that the firms can be sure to reach a target 
by a certain amount of bribe or not, which can be constructed from the questionnaire of 
the World Development Report on corrupt practices (Campos et al., 1999, p. 1062). 
Aysan et al. (2008) look at private investment in Middle East and North Africa. They 
show that lacking political accountability seems to be a major driver of the very low 
private investment rate in MENA, especially in comparison to other developing regions.  
Gwartney et al. (2006) use the aggregate EFW index as a measure of institutional 
quality and show the level of institutional quality as well as its improvement over 10-
year periods are positively related to private investment rates (Gwartney et al, 2006, pp. 
260-263). Interestingly, their results for the LDC-subset of their data have only slightly 
higher coefficients in comparison to other developing and emerging economies. I would 
tend to interpret this along the line that institutions matter strongly, but other aspects of 
the investment climate, like market size as measured by per capita income and 
infrastructure, become limiting factors. In a next step, the authors interact private 
investment and the EFW index to observe productivity effects of institutions on 
                                                 
3
  Note that that Freytag and Voll, 2013 (see Chapter 3) find exactly the other institutional variables 
to be significant in explaining savings formation. This hints at the complexity of the interrelation of 
specific institutions on the savings-investment gap and therefore the current account. 
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investment and find that the productivity of investments is influenced by the 
institutional setting, which might account for higher investment rates because of higher 
returns. Furthermore, Gwartney et al. show that public investment is less productive 
than private investment even in an environment of low institutional quality, but the 
difference is again dependent on the institutional quality. This study has touched a 
number of questions, and has especially interrelation of public and private investments 
given the overall institutional setting at the one side and causality of institutional quality 
to investment on the other, which I will present in the next section.  
2.3.5 THE INTERRELATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT VOLUMES 
DEPENDING ON THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
From the point of view of this literature survey, my interest lies in the question if 
crowding-in or crowding out of private investment takes place due to public investment, 
and if this is dependent on institutional aspects. This could be expected to have an 
influence on total gross fixed investment and therefore the dynamic development of the 
savings-investment gap. From an economic development perspective, most scholars 
focus on the question if public and private investments are complements or substitutes 
and how this influences productivity, capital accumulation and economic growth. 
Keefer and Knack (2007) document that public investment as a share of GDP as well as 
a fraction of total investment is higher in countries with bad institutional surrounding. 
Grigoli and Mills (2011) extend Keefer and Knack’s (2007) work by panel estimations 
and find even an inverse relationship between public investment and institutional 
quality. Both pairs of authors suggest that governments in low-quality environments use 
public spending as a vehicle for rent-seeking and corruption. This leads to an 
overprovision of public investment spending in size and quantity of projects (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 1997) as well as low efficiency of public investments in such an environment 
(Everhart, Sumlinski, 2001, p.14 ff). On the other hand, the authors note that increased 
public investment is used and as a compensation for the shortage of private investment 
in low institutional quality environments. As the questions whether public spending 
crowds out private investment is highly relevant, Everhart and Sumlinski (2001) show 
that the crowding-out effect of public investments is dominating in economies with low 
institutional quality, whereas in higher institutional environments it is the crowding-in 
effect. Daude’s and Cavallo’s (2011) finding support these results. First, higher public 
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investment lowers private investment in their sample, which means a crowding out of 
private by public investment spending. Second, private investment rises with better 
institutional quality as their institutional indicators have correct signs and are highly 
significant. Third, and most importantly, their interaction term of public investment and 
the institutional indices is positive and significant, saying that better institutional quality 
mitigates the crowding-out effect of public on private investments. 
To conclude this section, private and public investments are both strongly influenced by 
the institutional setting, but with different signs and magnitudes. Private investment 
rises with better institutional quality, whereas low institutional quality enables 
politicians to gain rents by public investment projects, therefore public investment is 
higher in low than in high institutional surrounding. The probability that private 
investment is crowded in by public investment is higher, the better the institutional 
quality is.  
For our topic of interest – the influence on net lending of the economy as a whole - we 
have to conclude that better institutional quality leads to higher gross fixed capital 
formation, because private investments rise in direct response to improvements of 
institutions and crowding out by public investments is reduced simultaneously. This 
over-compensates the lower public investment rates in better institutional countries. If 
savings remain constant, this corresponds to the idea of a debt cycle and of developing 
countries and welfare maximizing intertemporal optimization, which invest into their 
own capital stock by foreign credit in their process of catching up. 
2.3.6 CONCLUSION: THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS ON THE SAVINGS-INVESTMENT 
GAP AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
The empirical results given in the literature hint at reduced net borrowing and increased 
net lending effect of improvements in institutional quality and therefore a deterioration 
of the current account balance from the savings-investment perspective. The main 
argument is in the increased attractiveness of countries with higher institutional quality 
towards private investment and private gross fixed capital formation, which leads to 
higher borrowing needs of the economy as a whole. The few papers studying the effect 
of institutional surrounding on aggregate national savings and aggregate private savings 
formation hint on the other side on a positive effect of institutional quality on savings 
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formation at the one hand. But as the domestic financial markets develops itself along 
the general institutional setting and offers larger possibilities for consumption 
smoothing and credit financing, aggregate (private) savings do not rise as fast and 
strong as aggregate investment. This result is confirmed by studies using the current 
account balance as an indicator of the savings-investment gap as well as from studies 
researching aggregate private capital formation. Furthermore, institutional quality seems 
to encourage crowding-in of private investment by public investment, rather than 
crowding out in case of lower institutional quality. The net effect of improvements in 
the institutional surrounding is positive for total investment, because public investment 
is not able to substitute the private investment volumes in less free and secure market 
economies.  
 
2.4 THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT AND INSTITUTIONS:  
The findings of the previous chapter in mind, one question becomes obvious: If private 
investments increase with amended institutions as well as the savings-investment gap, 
the question is now which type of foreign capital is attracted and if this has repercussive 
effects on the current account (with respect to exports) and sustainability of the current 
account dynamics. There exists a broad line of literature capturing this particular topic 
by looking at the structure and dynamics of the financial account. 
As in chapter 2.3 on the savings-investment gap, it is again necessary to recognize a 
different calculus of private and government market actors and the potential influence of 
institutions on the underlying capital flows. FDI and other equity-investment are mostly 
caused by private actors, whereas debt flows to developing and emerging economies 
contain often large parts of ODA (official development aid) or government backed 
guarantees and are therefore heavily influenced by political considerations (Alesina and 
Dollar, 1998). This is important to distinguish with respect to the quality of institutions, 
as I have argued in the previous chapter that private investment is negatively influenced 
by ailing institutional quality. By contrast, there are some hints in the empirical 
literature that official flows are unaffected by the institutional setting, for example it 
seems as if more corrupt regimes receive more ODA (Alesina and Weder, 1999). 
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2.4.1 INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS: IS THERE A RELATION? 
Whereas Lothian (2006) documents that sound institutional structures are main 
determinants of overall capital flows from rich to poor countries, data availability for a 
differentiation of capital flows into private and official flows is often lacking or 
inconsistent. Alfaro et al. (2008) argue that equity flows are mostly private and use 
them therefore as an approximation of total private inflows. They show that the main 
explanatory of these capital flows is their variable capturing institutional quality. This 
holds even if controlled for financial market development, financial account openness 
and various other determinants of investment flows as well as endogeneity of actual 
institutional environment depending on settler mortality or colonial origins as proposed 
by Acemoglu et al. (2001). Faria and Mauro (2009) put their focus on the interrelation 
of the structure of foreign investment capital, the probability of economic crisis and 
institutional quality. For this, they analyze the composition of the (foreign) capital stock 
values. Better institutional quality is significant in explaining equity investment stocks, 
whereas the remaining liabilities (loans, bonds etc.) are significantly determined by low 
values of institutional quality. These results hold over a broad set of robustness tests like 
alternative estimators, endogeneity of institutions and change in the time period. 
Papaioannou (2009) shows corresponding results for international bank lending. 
According to his estimations, institutional quality dominates other pull-factors for 
international bank loans. Concerning FDI inflows, the literature on the role of 
corruption and institutions for FDI is overwhelming. Papers before 1995 find no effect 
of corruption on FDI, whereas papers looking at the period between 1990 up to the 
latest years find mostly that bad institutional quality reduces FDI inflows. I will try to 
present below the more elaborate results and studies to my best knowledge. Without 
revealing too much, we can say that in contrast to official flows, private capital inflows 
are influenced by the institutional setting as expected, but with different magnitudes. 
2.4.2 INSTITUTIONS AND CAPITAL INFLOWS: WHICH TYPES SEEM TO BE MORE 
AFFECTED? 
Albuquerqe (2003) argues that FDI has a lower risk of expropriation than other types of 
liabilities as much of the value of FDI is of an intangible nature (technology, brand 
names, organization and managerial skill) and thus difficult to expropriate. I would 
argue that this is only the smaller part of the reason, rather I would add that the case of 
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expropriation is more difficult for FDI, especially ‘greenfield’ FDI, than for bonds or 
loans. Borrowers of loans or bonds can simply stop payment of interest or redemption. 
For the investor to demand repayment, often the national courts have to be called, which 
can be easily influenced by domestic politicians or bureaucrats in countries with low 
institutional quality. In contrast, direct investment projects require case-specific actions 
to squeeze out the foreign proprietaries. Licenses have to be withdrawn, customers or 
suppliers have to be set under pressure, and violations of local laws have to be 
constructed artificially.  From the viewpoint of corrupt practices as a characteristic and 
consequence in environments with low institutional quality, Wei (2001, p. 19) gives an 
argument which seems plausible from a general viewpoint: Direct investors can insure 
themselves against political risk by World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA), a channel which is not available to bank loans and bonds. 
Furthermore, bilateral investor protection treaties have been signed between many 
industrial and developing countries for exactly the same reason, decreasing the risk of 
expropriation of FDI further.  
I would add that for FDI projects to get operational, the investor has often build good 
contacts with governments and bureaucracies, local or regional, at the one hand, which 
insulates him in part from expropriation. This holds even more so in case of corruption, 
as the involved host country parties have the choice between a one-time income from 
expropriation and continuous income streams from bribes. From insurance theory, a 
deductible could reduce this problem from a foreign investor’s point of view further, 
which seems to be confirmed by Smarzynska and Wei (2000), who find that direct 
investors switch more to joint ventures with local partners instead of fully owned 
greenfield investments in corrupt environments, which is confirmed by Du et al. (2012) 
for FDI in China, for example. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) and 
Albuquerque (2003) confirm these arguments as they document no or a negative 
relationship between the share of FDI in total capital inﬂows and institutions and ﬁnd no 
or a negative relationship with high institutional quality. However, especially in case of 
Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias this might be driven by their small sample and short 
time span. For a more elaborated critique, see Wei (2001, p. 23, footnote 11) 
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On the other hand, FDI usually bring much larger involvement of investors in 
comparison to portfolio investors or bank loans, as the former need to have regular and 
repeated contact to host country governments and bureaucracies (for establishment of 
business, different permits, acquisition of land sites or immobiles etc.). This places 
direct investors into higher sensitivity to corrupt practices, low quality of bureaucracy 
and weak political accountability, as they are more often affected. To my impression, 
the overwhelming part of the literature tends towards this position. Second, direct 
investments have to be seen as sunk costs to a large part and therefore ex post target of 
corruption, which increases the ex ante risk from the investor’s viewpoint (Wei, 2001, 
p. 20). Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) and Li and Resnick (2003) provide evidence for this 
viewpoint as they document relatively large effects of different institutional indicators 
on FDI stocks. At last, Wei (2001, p. 20) hints at the probability of large international 
financial institutions to be bailed out in times of economic crisis, which reduces the risk 
of investments by loans and bonds further, whereas FDI projects can not expect a 
bailout. Given all these arguments and the high financial risk involved for the single 
investors, I would tend to the perspective that worse institutions and higher corruption 
lead to a lower share of FDI on total external liabilities (Faria and Mauro, 2004, p. 5; 
Wei, 2000a, p. 315ff)   
Wei’s publication series (Wei 2000, Wei 2000a, Wei 2001, Wei and Wu 2001) focusses 
on the basic question how corruption, as representing increased risk and bad 
institutional quality, affects FDI investments. Two main aspects are in the focus: First, 
does corruption reduce inward FDI? Second, does it change the composition of capital 
flows from relatively stable FDI towards more volatile and crisis-prone capital flows 
like loans or bonds (Wei, 2000, p. 303f)? At first, Wei (2000, 2001) finds that 
corruption is associated significantly with lower FDI stocks in the host countries. 
Second, international capital is tilted towards a higher loans/FDI ratio in countries with 
higher corruption if data for private bank lending is used as an indicator for loans. Wei 
and Wu (2000, p. 18f) add to the picture that the ratio of portfolio-type to FDI 
investment is also increasing with the incidence of corruption.  
Garibaldi et al. (2002) have a regional focus on transition economies from Europe and 
the former Sowjet Union and find that for this sample, general governance indicators do 
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not seem to influence FDI flows but corruption does. On the other hand, governance 
quality affects the portfolio investment per capita significantly negative with relatively 
huge coefficients. These finding would fit the conjecture of the “greasing the wheels” 
hypothesis, as knowing how to play the corruption game insures against lacking rule of 
law ( However, I have to note that their results might be driven by their choice of the 
estimation equation, as they use a dynamic specification with the lagged FDI/portfolio 
volume as one dependent variable. As the variation of the institutional indicators is 
relatively low within the country over time, using the lag-specification might bias 
results. This could only be justified if international investors would make their decision 
to invest in the next year dependent on last year’s investments.  
In their meta-analysis, Bloningen and Piger (2011) use Bayesian model selection 
techniques to detect the probability of certain explanatories to explain FDI stocks. 
Overall, they find only low probabilities for institutional determinants for explaining 
FDI volumes. However, this would not invalidate the findings of studies having the 
share of FDI to other liabilities as a dependent variable. Second, they reject a large 
number of potentially relevant determinants, like trade openness, business costs, credit 
market development and infrastructure as variables with low probability and leave the 
usual gravity variables and labor endowment as most strong predictors of FDI stock 
volumes. This seems to me as if their meta-technique is very restrictive and strongly 
supports variables with very general explanatory power  for most aspects of 
international economic integration at the cost of explaining country-, time- or sector-
specific characteristics.  
Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) show that the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation 
and to domestic private investment is higher in countries with better institutional quality 
and lower corruption. Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2011) take a look at the 
interrelation of FDI, its dependence on domestic institutions and their interrelation with 
domestic private investment. For this, they simply divide the countries into groups of 
high vs. low domestic institutional quality depending on the sample mean. They 
confirm the finding of sensitivity of aggregate private investment and FDI towards 
institutional quality. More interesting, they show in a System GMM framework that 
first, FDI crowds out domestic private investment, which means that aggregate 
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investment rises by less than FDI, a result already well-established in the empirical 
literature (see Fontagne (1999), p. 10 for an overview). Second, crowding out is higher 
in high institutional quality regimes than in lower ones. This shows not only the 
complementary but also competitive relation between foreign and domestic investment. 
However, from our above paragraphs, we know that controlling for foreign loans or 
other liabilities might be necessary to get a convincing argument. With the above results 
in mind, we get directly to the next question relating the financial account to the current 
account: Does the availability of foreign finance and the composition of financial 
inflows have an influence on components of the current account?  
2.4.3 FOREIGN CAPITAL AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE  
The question whether foreign capital, and especially FDI, causes exports or export 
performance causes FDI and foreign capital inflows, is intensely debated since 30 years 
now (for an overview, see Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). The most likely answer is 
again that it depends on the specific micro-economic strategies and targets of firms as 
well as macroeconomic factors and endowments (see Fontagne, 1999, p. 13-18). 
Defever and Suedekum (2014) follow the arguments of Carlucci and Fally (2012) that 
the availability of foreign financing has strong impacts on the complexity of goods 
which are exported and provide actual evidence. They find that the export structure 
develops more towards higher complexity if foreign finance is available. Unfortunately, 
they do not distinguish between different types of finance that is between FDI, portfolio 
or other liabilities. Harding and Javorcik’s (2012) target this issue. Their study has two 
remarkable results. First, they show that sectors strongly targeted by FDI have a higher 
growth in their unit value of exports than non-target sectors and this is not caused by 
increased overall investment in the particular sectors but by FDI. On the other hand, the 
authors do not find evidence that the increase in unit values is stronger in sectors 
producing complex goods versus simpler products according to Rauch’s (1999) 
classification, but that final products show stronger increases in unit values than 
intermediates. Unfortunately, the authors do not control for institutional aspects in the 
host countries. 
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Concerning FDI, the question most interesting from our perspective is, if market 
seeking FDI are more probable or if more export-oriented, comparative advantage 
seeking FDI occur if the institutional quality is relatively good. Unfortunately, the 
literature barely touches this question. Hakkala et al. (2008) argue that corruption has 
different effects with regard to horizontal (market seeking) and vertical (comparative or 
cost advantage seeking) FDI. They find robust evidence in Swedish firm level data that 
vertical FDI targeting the local markets are significantly reduced in corrupt 
environments, whereas the relation of FDI targeted at costs advantages (to sales back to 
Sweden or the rest of the world) and corruption is not robust to different controls and 
estimation techniques. Ito (2013) does not control directly for institutional quality in his 
study on the determinants of export oriented FDI. However, he finds that trade costs 
significantly reduce export oriented FDI stocks. As lacking institutional quality 
increases trade costs (see section 2.2.1 above), this might be taken as indication that 
lailing institutional quality reduces export oriented FDI. 
2.4.4 CONCLUSION: THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT AND INSTITUTIONS 
The empirical literature shows a strong effect of good institutional quality on capital 
inflows, which is not surprising given the risks faced by potential investors and 
informational asymmetry present especially in foreign investment projects. It also 
corresponds to results of Chapter 2.3 on the savings-investment gap, that poor 
institutional quality reduces domestic (private) investment overall. This finding holds 
for all types of private foreign investment, but with differing magnitudes. The 
connection from the composition of the financial account to the structure of the trade 
balance as part of the current account lies in the influence of foreign capital on the 
export value or the complexity of exported goods: Availability of foreign finance 
facilitates production of more complex goods and exports in general.  
Concerning FDI, as the most discussed and often from domestic policy making most 
wanted type of foreign investment, the results are quite mixed. At the one hand, 
empirical findings show that overall FDI are deterred by ailing institutions, and foreign 
capital stocks tend more to non-equity types of liabilities. However, it is not clear if this 
comes from the fact the market-seeking FDI are stronger reduced by corruption and bad 
institutions than comparative advantage seeking FDI, reducing FDI stocks in many but 
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not all countries. The reason lies in the fact that the higher risk of FDI projects can to 
some extend be insured by MIGA or are otherwise protected under bilateral investment 
treaties. For a conclusive picture, more country-level evidence and panel-data evidence 
is needed, if the necessary data is hopefully available in some years. 
 
2.5 BOP DYNAMICS AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS – WHAT HAVE WE 
LEARNED? 
The starting point and inspiration for this literature review was the conjecture of the 
intertemporal approach to the Balance of Payments, that it is optimal for countries with 
insufficient volumes of domestic savings to finance their capital accumulation by 
foreign capital, which helps to achieve higher growth rates and faster convergence to the 
long-term growth path. From an aggregate viewpoint, foreign credit can only be repaid 
by exports of goods and services. To produce these exports three preconditions have to 
be fulfilled: First, large parts of the foreign capital have to be invested. Second, the 
economy has to produce goods for which there is demand on the world market, which 
means in general using the countries comparative advantage to integrate into the world 
economy and don’t use actual exports to finance actual imports only. Third, aggregate 
domestic savings have to increase to narrow the savings-investment gap, which also 
means to produce in excess of actual consumption. With this, I have described a cyclical 
movement of the CA and the CpA balance, which follows Sieberts’ idea of a beneficial 
debt cycle. Other parts of the literature hint at the dominating role of institutions for the 
integration into the world economy – a necessary precondition for this debt cycle – and 
long term growth in general.  Based on the literature I have reviewed in this paper, I 
would tend to the fact that better institutional quality facilitates the above described 
form of an ideal debt cycle. The quality of institutions seems to determine the success in 
transition to different stages of this dynamic development of the economy, which 
displays itself in the CA, the FA and the domestic savings-investment gap.  
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Figure 2: The influence of institutions on national debt cycle dynamics 
 
 
 
First and as expected, better institutions encourage aggregate investments, increasing 
production capital and productivity. This holds also for foreign private capital inflows, 
which seem to react strongly to the quality of domestic institutions. Relating to the 
structure of this external capital, the literature hints into the direction that FDI are more 
negatively affected by ailing institutional quality than are other types of liabilities. As 
FDI are supposed to created spillovers to the economy as a whole, in contrast to other 
types of financing, this is especially notable. On the other hand, the availability of 
foreign financing in general, be it direct equity or loans and bonds, has influences on the 
characteristics of export goods in an economy: the easier foreign finance is available, 
the higher the complexity of exported goods.  
  
Source: Following Kindleberger, 1963, p. 460 with own adaptions and additions 
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This gives us the connection to the findings in the trade literature, which concludes that 
countries with better domestic institutions export higher complex goods, which means 
export upgrading and a potential escape from the Prebish-Singer trap for developing and 
emerging economies. Finally, there are some findings in the empirical literature that 
national (private) savings are also positively influenced by improvements in the 
institutional setting. For the fulfillment of a beneficial debt cycle, this would be the last 
element, as rising domestic savings in excess of domestic investment are necessary to 
complete a beneficial debt cycle. 
In Figure 2, I have tried to give an abstract picture on how institutional quality 
influences the BoP dynamics as I would summarize it from this literature review so far. 
Phase I stands for a low institutional quality, low income economy. Savings and 
aggregate investment are low, exports are focused on primary and other non-complex 
products. The domestic capital leaves the country due to high corruption and lacking 
investment opportunities, itself a consequence of ailing institutions, which causes a 
small CA surplus and FA deficit. Increasing quality in institutions marks the start of 
Phase II. Domestic investment rises and the country gets attractive for foreign capital. 
The foreign investors try to utilize the comparative advantage of the economy for 
exports, most likely in the low-wage, simple products sector, where exports start to 
increase. This contributes to income growth and enables domestic savings formation to 
rise. Together with increasing foreign capital inflows this leads to high investment and 
imports of capital goods. Strongly improved institutional quality increases the 
availability of foreign finance, FDI projects and production networks develop. As a 
consequence, the export structure starts to upgrade towards more complex products or 
products with higher unit export values during this Phase III. The transition to export 
surplus starts, as the rising incomes in the private sector enable higher aggregate private 
saving rates and household consumption remains still low. During Phase IV, continuous 
income growth changes the habits of the citizens and consumption adopts. Savings 
decrease, also because the development of the domestic capital markets is now 
facilitated by institutional quality. Both exports and imports are stable at high levels; 
integration in the world economy is strong. From the end of Phase IV on, further 
improvement of the institutional quality might have no conclusive effect. Some 
countries could run moderately high saving rates but very low investment, causing CA 
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surpluses like for example Germany, other EMU members or Canada etc. Other mature 
economies might have very low saving rates and moderate investment rates, causing a 
FA surplus like the USA. Further upgrading of the institutional environment is not 
decisive for the course of the BoP dynamics from there on. The influence of institutions 
on the BoP dynamics lies in the earlier stages of the economic development process. 
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3 INSTITUTIONS AND SAVINGS IN DEVELOPING AND EMERGING 
ECONOMIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the long run, the domestic capital stock has to be financed by domestic savings. This 
is an important constraint, since economic development depends on investment in 
human and physical capital. As is shown by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and is well 
established in the literature,
4
 domestic savings and investment are highly correlated. In 
the short and medium runs, foreign borrowing can be used to finance the capital stock, 
but domestic savings have to rise in the long run to repay this debt.  
The development literature has focused on the role of institutions in explaining 
economic growth in developing and emerging countries. In the last two decades, an 
intense debate on the influence of democratic and/or market-friendly institutions on 
economic growth has taken place.
5
 Overall, the theoretical arguments are convincing, 
but empirical evidence is mixed. Most importantly, the channels through which 
institutions affect economic performance are still unclear. Our aim is to assess one of 
these channels, the link between institutions and savings, with a focus on developing 
and emerging economies. As the savings decision is directed at the future, it is 
reasonable to assume that it will be influenced by the institutional setting shaping a 
country’s overall economic development.  
Developing and emerging economies are of special interest for this particular topic, as 
savings rates there are often low or volatile, and the institutional setting is not as stable 
as in high-income countries. Furthermore, our focus on non-OECD countries enables 
us, at least in part, to circumvent the problem of parameter heterogeneity likely to be 
present in the empirical analysis (Eicher and Leukert, 2009). For this purpose, we 
created a unique database of about 60 countries covering almost three decades. This 
research is novel insofar as the literature on aggregate savings and its drivers 
concentrates on macroeconomic variables. These are quite well explored, whereas 
institutions have not been used to explain savings in a cross-country comparison. 
                                                 
4
  See Apergis and Tsoumas (2009) for a detailed survey. 
5
  See Glaeser et al. (2004) for a short and critical overview. 
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On an aggregate national level, capital formation can be financed by foreign lending or 
domestic savings. Especially for developing and emerging economies in their early 
stages of economic development, foreign lending to build up the capital stock may be an 
optimal alternative to savings, according to the theory of the debt cycle (Siebert, 1989; 
Kindleberger, 1963). In reality, debt cycles have been completed very rarely; only a few 
examples exist, e.g., the United States from the late 19
th
 century to the early 1970s. The 
empirical growth literature shows that foreign (and in particular public) debt affects 
growth negatively. However, Paldam and Freytag (2011) find some evidence that the 
ability of a government to transform foreign debt into higher growth rates depends on 
the institutional setting. 
We can think of at least three channels through which institutions can affect growth: 
first, by encouraging investments; second, by supporting economic efficiency; and third, 
by determining savings. Institutions can play quite a different role in attracting (foreign) 
investments than in domestic savings formation. Experience with foreign (direct) 
investment suggests that good institutions help to attract such funds (and foster growth 
indirectly). Similarly, good institutions may support domestic wealth formation and 
investment by promoting own savings. However, the opposite may well be possible: 
poor institutional quality may require saving for precautionary reasons, leading to larger 
buffer-stocks, as individuals’ expected incomes are exposed to considerable downside 
risk.
6
 Therefore, instead of a positive correlation between institutions and savings, one 
may well expect a negative one. To tackle the issue in a structured form, we focus on 
two institutional questions: first, is there a general role for institutions in savings 
formation? Second, which roles do different institutions play in saving decisions? For 
this purpose, we distinguish between higher-order institutions, such as the democratic 
components of a constitution, and lower-order institutions, such as property rights and 
other aspects of the concept of ‘economic freedom’. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops theoretical 
considerations with respect to the institutional drivers of savings and presents the main 
hypothesis. Section 3.3 briefly discusses the empirical literature on aggregate savings. 
                                                 
6
  Note that some buffer stock savings are held in form of goods like real estate, gems, gold or 
jewelry. These are not counted as savings in the Systems of National Accounts, but as consumption 
or investment.  
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Section 3.4 is devoted to a short description of the dataset and the estimation methods 
considered. In section3.5, our hypotheses are tested empirically using a comprehensive 
set of developing and transition countries over almost three decades. Conclusions round 
off the paper. 
 
3.2 INSTITUTIONS AND SAVINGS: A THEORETICAL PRIMER 
The key to understanding aggregate national savings is the individual savings decision. 
The drivers of private savings on the micro level, especially for private households or 
single individuals, have been well researched since Milton Friedman’s (1957) seminal 
work. Friedman states that permanent components of income shape savings, which are 
ultimately aimed at consumption smoothing, whereas Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) 
focus on the consumption needs of households over the individual lifecycle. Zeldes 
(1989) and Deaton (1991) argue instead that a large part of savings is related to credit 
constraints if individuals face uncertainty and are impatient. Following this path, Carroll 
(1997) hints at the role of accumulated savings as a buffer-stock reserve.  
Figure 3: Institutional factors influencing aggregate savings 
Source: own contribution 
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From these microeconomic approaches, two elements influencing the savings decision 
can be extracted: the ability to save and the willingness to save. The ability to save is 
constrained by the overall state of development of an economy, e.g., the share of people 
near the poverty line or access to banks and other savings institutions.
7
  
For our purpose, it seems more promising to analyze the factors influencing the 
willingness to save,
8
 determined by impatience and uncertainty. As saving means 
consumption postponement, institutional factors influencing ‘impatience’ become 
relevant. Figure 3 summarizes the potential transmission mechanism for institutions on 
aggregate savings. First, a regulatory framework that eases credit constraints may play a 
role.
9
 Second, as savings are the residual of an individual’s decision to consume, a 
consumer-oriented (liberal) regulatory environment can influence aggregate savings 
formation too. Another determinant of the willingness to save is uncertainty. Economic 
uncertainty can be reduced by governmental interventions into markets, e.g., through 
social security systems or administered prices. In this case, a small and market-friendly 
government sector would lead to more savings, everything else being equal. Note also 
that in this case, a ‘big bad government’ might lead to inefficiency and slower growth 
influencing savings in the opposite direction.  
But perceived uncertainty is not related only to macroeconomic instability, i.e., risk of 
unemployment and income shocks. It is also related to ‘latent’ uncertainty induced by 
the institutional setting. Such a setting potentially allows a wide range of economic 
risks (like long-term economic stagnation, the repeal of economic reforms or privileges 
and, finally, expropriation and loss of social status) to evolve in the future for many 
individuals. Better institutional quality should therefore reduce perceived uncertainty 
and, thereby, buffer-stock savings. On the other hand, the aforementioned risks are 
existential because savings and their returns might not be appropriated at all when these 
latent risks finally emerge from ‘bad institutions’. The opportunity costs of today’s 
consumption decline in this case. From such a fatalist’s viewpoint, saving is not an 
                                                 
7
  This may partly explain why some studies find an effect of urbanization on savings, as there are 
more banking branches available in towns than in rural areas (Sen and Athukorala, 2003). 
8
  This is closely related to the ‘time preference’ concept, but as the latter has an exact definition with 
certain assumptions in microeconomics, we do not use this term here. 
9
  This includes also a well-functioning system of land property registration because of collateral 
requirements and is therefore related indirectly to public administration and rule of law. 
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option in a bad institutional environment, and better institutions might encourage 
savings. 
We regard the rule of law and the quality of property rights as core institutions, 
influencing politically induced uncertainty. Additionally, corruption may have an 
influence on the de facto application of written law. For instance, it determines whether 
the rule of law applies to all economic agents and, if so, to what extent. To our 
knowledge, only one study by Swaleheen (2008) exists that incorporates these 
considerations, with a focus on corruption, into an analysis of aggregate savings 
formation. 
Here an interesting distinction seems appropriate, namely, between ‘higher-order’ 
institutions and ‘lower order’ institutions. The former can be called political, the latter 
economic institutions. Higher-order institutions can influence economic welfare only 
indirectly through the adoption of a set of market friendly economic institutions. 
Lawson and Clark (2010) call this the ‘Hayek-Friedman hypothesis’, which states that 
politically free societies will either develop market-friendly institutions or have to 
restrict political freedoms over time.  
Concerning our topic of interest – the savings decision – one can hardly argue that 
democratic participation is directly decisive with respect to the microeconomic 
interrelations of economic uncertainty and impatience. If a dictator adopts the rule of 
law for the economic sphere in his country and builds up credibility in this respect, we 
expect the same effects on savings there as for a more democratic environment. 
Whether economic freedom and political repression can stand together over a longer 
horizon is not the focus of our paper. In this context, lower-order institutions, like the 
rule of law and property rights, as well as the concept of economic freedom may be 
more relevant and thus more likely to be observed directly in empirical testing.  
Having said this, we derive a core hypothesis about the role of institutions in savings 
formation: ‘higher-order’ institutions are not directly relevant for savings in developing 
countries and emerging economies, whereas ‘lower-order’ (economic) institutions have 
a direct impact on savings formation. 
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3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW: INSTITUTIONS, GROWTH AND SAVINGS DETERMINANTS 
3.3.1 INSTITUTIONS AND GROWTH 
For 20 years, the literature on empirical growth has discussed the role of institutions in 
the development process. Whereas theoretical arguments are convincing, the empirical 
debate is stuck (see the difference between Hall and Jones, 1999 and Glaeser et al., 
2004, for example). Two results have emerged. First, market-friendly institutions are 
positively associated with economic performance (see de Haan et al,. 2006 for a 
survey). Second, other, more fundamental drivers exist for market-friendly institutions. 
One part of this literature (see Acemoglu et al., 2001; Glaeser et al., 2004, for example) 
tracks the quality of economic institutions back to deterministic climatic factors or early 
human capital endowments. As mentioned above, other authors argue that a ‘hierarchy 
of institutions’ exists (Williamson, 2000; Persson, 2004; Eicher and Leukert, 2009, 
amongst others), such that a set of political institutions favorable to a more democratic 
environment helps to develop a market-friendly institutional environment. From this 
viewpoint, a set of ‘higher-order’ (political) institutions determines the adoption of 
‘lower-order’ (economic) institutions. In this study, we have adopted this distinction, 
too. 
3.3.2 DRIVERS OF AGGREGATE SAVINGS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
We take a brief look at the empirical literature on aggregate savings formation in a 
cross-country comparison. shows the expected determinants of savings as proposed by 
consumption theory and summarizes empirical findings from different macro-panel 
studies. These results form the basis for our control variables and our baseline model. 
We thereby ensure that our database is robust and reliable, and that our model is well 
specified. 
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Table 1: Empirical determinants of aggregate savings 
category variable expected 
sign 
empirical 
findings
a,b 
behavioral persistence lagged savings + + (1, 5, 6, 7) 
income and growth income level, actual + + (1, 3) 0 (2) 
growth of income, actual +/- + (1, 2, 3, 6, 7) 0 (5) 
productivity growth +/- + (4) 
terms of trade, % change + + (1, 4, 5, 7) 0 (2) 
rates of return and 
macroeconomic un-
certainty 
inflation rates - + (1) 0 (2, 4, 5, 6) 
real interest rates - - (1, 3, 4) 0 (5, 6, 7) 
political stability + 0 (3) 
political assassinations - 0 (3) 
domestic borrowing 
constraints 
broad money growth /private 
credit growth 
- - (1) 0 (7) 
foreign borrowing 
constraints 
current account balance + + (3, 6) 
development of 
financial sector 
Broad Money/GDP or M2/GDP 
or private sector credit/GDP 
- 0 (1) + (3) –(6, 7) 
fiscal policy public saving - - (1, 3, 4, 6) + (7) 
public sector surplus - - (2, 5) 
public consumption - - (2, 5) 
social security system social expenditures - - (3) 0 (6) 
demographics old age dependency ratio - - (1, 7), 0 (4) 
young age dependency ratio - - (1) 
dependency ratio - 0 (2, 5, 6) – (3) 
urbanization - - (1, 3) 
wealth and income 
distribution 
income concentration + - (3) 
wealth/GDP - 0 (2, 5) 
a) (1) Loayza et al. (2000), Table 4, column 7; (2) Masson et al. (1998), Table 2, column 4; (3) 
Edwards, 1996, Table 2; (4) de Serres and Pelgrin (2003) Table 5, column 3; (5) Haque et al. 
(1999), Table 5 and Table 6, column 6; (6) Schroten and Stephan (2005) Table 3; (7) Terrones and 
Cardarelli (2005), Table 2.2, column 2; 
b) Significant coefficients are indicated by a ‘+’ or ‘-‘; insignificant findings are indicated by a zero. 
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The dependence of savings on its past levels can be supported with two arguments. First, 
consumption and saving are shaped by habits and show considerable inertia (Alessi and 
Lusardi, 1997). Second, as a result of the intertemporal optimization calculus of rational 
individuals, consumption will be changed only after an economic shock or new information 
becomes available. Therefore, consumption can be modeled as an AR(1) process (Hall, 1978). 
The influence of income and productivity growth on aggregate savings is somewhat 
ambiguous: on the one hand, and according to Modigliani’s life cycle theory (Modigliani 
1966, p. 167), faster income growth can lead to more aggregate savings. On the other hand, 
consumption may increase today if income growth in the future is anticipated correctly 
(Tobin, 1967). Intuitively, one can expect that savings rise with level of income too, as at very 
low levels of per capita income, satisfying basic consumption needs does not leave money 
available for savings. However, beyond a certain threshold, neither consumption theory nor 
macro-empirical evidence predicts a definite role for per capita income in aggregate savings 
formation. 
Demographic factors are likely to influence gross national as well as aggregate private 
savings, as predicted by the life cycle model: if the old age dependency ratio rises, dissaving 
out of accumulated wealth is likely. The conventional view of the role of the youth-
dependency ratio anticipates a negative sign: children are not productive workers and 
consumption expenditures rise in the child-rearing stages of the lifecycle (Higgins, 1998). 
Furthermore, strong family ties can be a substitute for precautionary savings in cases where 
capital market development is very poor, as seen in many developing countries (Gersovitz, 
1991, p. 401f.).
10
 Therefore, national savings are found to be lower in countries with larger 
youth dependency ratios. 
Public consumption enters private savings in a direct way, since private national savings is the 
difference between national and general government savings. The central argument put 
forward for the theoretical influence of the public on private savings is that of ‘Ricardian 
equivalence’ (Barro, 1974). However, the opposite reaction of private consumption to public 
savings can be based on other common factors, i.e., business cycles. Note that a very weak 
reaction of aggregate private savings to public budget deficits nearly leads to the equivalent 
reaction of gross national savings to government savings, giving the government some 
influence in boosting savings in the short term. 
                                                 
10
  On the other hand, actual micro-evidence challenges this view: if lifetime income is dependent on 
investment in education, parents try to save money when the children are young and use these funds to 
finance higher education when their children enter adulthood (Chamon and Prasad 2010). 
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Concerning real rates of return, theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence are inconclusive. 
The real interest rate is also a function of inflation (in terms of the Fisher equation), with 
effects on national savings beyond the interest rate channel. As higher inflation rates are often 
correlated with greater price volatility, the inflation rate in general serves as a proxy of 
macroeconomic stability. Thus, inflation contributes to macroeconomic uncertainty, which 
should shift precautionary savings upwards. 
The problem of credit constraints has also been tested on the macro level. If national capital 
markets are less developed, intermediation between lenders and borrowers is costly. In this 
case, consumption smoothing by lending is not possible for many citizens on an individual 
basis, and the precautionary savings motive drives national savings upwards (Edwards, 1995, 
p. 23). Quite the contrary, a developed domestic financial market may also provide incentives 
to save larger fractions of income, as it offers better risk-return profiles and reduces 
transaction costs for potential savers (Sen and Athukorala, 2003). As presented in section 
2.3.3 above, Chinn and Ito (2005) find such a relation in low-institutional quality 
environments. Concerning integration into the global financial market, it is especially argued 
that fuller integration leads to lower national (private) savings, as foreign borrowing 
constraints are lifted. Usually, the current account balance is used as a proxy for worldwide 
capital market integration (Schmidt-Hebbel et al., 1992).
11
 
  
                                                 
11
  We do not use a measure of the current account balance, like some earlier empirical studies. It can easily 
be shown that in this case the actual savings rate is estimated by a fraction of its own value, as the current 
account balance nearly equals gross national savings – our dependent variable – minus gross capital 
formation. More importantly, the usual way of interpreting the current account balance as an international 
borrowing constraint is not correct, as this would mean, in a cardinal interpretation inherent in every linear 
estimation framework, that current account surpluses are a sign of strong borrowing constraints and only 
current account deficits are a sign of borrowing ability. Whereas the latter should hold on average, the first 
aspect clearly does not. 
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3.4 ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
3.4.1 DATASET DESCRIPTION 
Next, we briefly introduce the data and econometric techniques that we use to test our 
hypothesis. We created a database comprising a wide range of developing countries and 
emerging economies over the time span from 1980 to 2007.
12
 Data for gross domestic product 
and real growth rates and productivity are from the Penn World Tables 7.0 from August 2011 
(Heston et al. 2011). Data for gross national savings and government savings are from the 
World Bank database and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) government finance 
statistics. As the dependent variable, we use gross national savings and gross national private 
savings in relation to GDP. The latter are calculated from a national accounts perspective as 
the difference between gross national savings and general government net lending (‘public 
savings’) in each year.13  
3.4.2 ESTIMATION MODEL CHOICES 
The underlying macroeconomic dataset makes the choice of a fixed effect panel data model 
reasonable. However, intertemporal consumption theory (Hall, 1978), macro-empirical 
evidence and first tests for the autocorrelation of residuals in a fixed effect framework suggest 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable.  
In a fixed effect model, including the lagged dependent variable biases the coefficient 
estimates downwards (Nickell 1981). A second – and much more important – problem with 
fixed effect approaches is that variables with relatively less variation over time in comparison 
with their cross-sectional variation (see Table A 4 in the Appendix) are highly correlated with 
the unobserved country-specific (fixed) effect.
14
 Therefore, country dummies in a pooled OLS 
or the within-transformation of a fixed effect (FE) model reduce the variation available to 
identify the coefficients of institutional variables remarkably. 
Furthermore, in our macro-estimation framework, endogeneity problems and 
heteroscedasticity associated with country differences are present. These endogenous relations 
can bias the estimation results. The current standard method of first differencing and using a 
generalized method of moments estimator (GMM) tries to handle both problems of Nickell 
bias and endogeneity and is stated to be consistent with heteroscedasticity (Arellano and 
                                                 
12
  A list of countries is given in the appendix. 
13
  A broad description of the other control variables including their sources and treatment can be found in the 
appendix; our institutional variables are described in section 5. 
14
  Sobel and Coyne (2011) hint at this problem indirectly with their analysis of the time series properties of 
different institutional indicators. 
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Bond, 1991). The GMM approach relies on using lagged values of the explanatory variables 
as instruments to circumvent endogeneity between the explanatory variables themselves and 
the individual error term, as well as feedback effects from and to the explained variable. 
However, as in all instrumental variable estimations, possibly weak instruments might lead to 
less efficient estimates. 
Our preferred method is the system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimator instead of the 
differenced GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The system GMM estimator not only 
improves the precision of the estimates but also reduces the small sample bias in comparison 
with the differenced GMM. For reasons of better small sample behavior explained in Bond 
(2002, p.150ff), we use the one-step system GMM estimator
15
 with robust standard errors, as 
proposed by Windmeijer (2005). 
In our estimation we assume that only the demographic variables, the oil balance, and the 
institutional indices are given exogenously
16
 and enter the model with their original values, 
whereas all other variables are treated as endogenous. Of these variables, we use the second 
lags as instruments in the differences and the levels equations.
17
 The lagged dependent 
variable is treated as predetermined.  
To check the validity of these instruments, we perform Hansen’s J-test18 and the difference-in 
Hansen test for the exogeneity of selected instrument subsets. The Hansen test basically 
checks whether the residuals of the instrument variable estimation are uncorrelated with the 
instruments used under the null ‘the instruments are exogenous’, and therefore whether the 
exclusion of the instruments from the original regression is justified. Overall, the number of 
instruments increases quartically in t, and so does the number of moment conditions. As the 
Hansen test is weak, with the tendency never to reject the null if T is large, we reduce the 
number of utilized instruments by stacking the instrument matrix of the GDP growth rate, 
inflation rates, as well as government savings and domestic credit to the private sector, as 
proposed by Roodman (2006, p.22; 2009, p. 148). We further reduce the instrument count in 
our robustness checks by splitting the sample into different time periods. However, in our 
                                                 
15
  We use the xtabond2 routine of Roodman (2006) for the STATA software package. 
16
  We relax the assumption of exogenous institutions in our robustness analysis; see our Table 5. 
17
  Note that, in their seminal paper, Loayza et al. (2000) treated all variables as predetermined, using not 
second but first lags as instruments, thereby improving the efficiency of their estimates considerably at the 
cost of coping with the endogeneity problem. 
18
  An alternative test would be the Sargan test. As this test is not robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity, 
it very often fails to reject the null of inappropriate instruments in our case. This may, for instance, also 
explain why this standard test is also not reported in Terrones and Cardelli (2005). 
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robustness analysis we also try to relax these assumptions and hence use the complete 
instrument set to get greater efficiency in coefficient estimation. Especially the latter results 
can be interpreted as an endorsement of our model specification. 
In a first step, we run a simple regression on our savings variables as well as on most relevant 
control variables (demographics, GDP, real GDP growth, inflation, the oil trade balance). To 
detect outliers, we calculate Cook’s Distance for every observation and exclude countries for 
which the distance measure exceeds 4/N at least once, as proposed in many textbooks. This 
drops five countries from our sample (Kuwait, Angola, Congo, Rwanda and Libya). Looking 
at the reasons for outlier behavior in these cases, we find war, civil war and natural disasters 
to be explanations. To ensure we get a reliable picture of savings behavior in one country – 
and not just a single snapshot – we also drop countries with fewer than 10 consecutive 
observations. Overall, this gives us a basic sample of 54 emerging and developing countries, 
with a total of 790 observations. Note that owing to fewer observations in some of the other 
control and institutional variables in the later regressions, the sample size is reduced for some 
regressions.  
We do not include real per capita GDP in our regressions: as Table 5 shows, in itself it is 
insignificant as an explanatory variable. In addition, it makes other, theoretically and 
empirically well-founded variables insignificant. Finally, there is only a weak theoretical 
foundation in inter-temporal consumption optimization models as well as inconsistent 
macroeconomic evidence for the empirical salience of the level of income. Therefore, we 
return to this issue in our robustness checks at the end of the next section. We further abstain 
from including time dummy variables as, first, these are insignificant for all years and, 
second, they expand the instrument matrix in our system GMM framework considerably and 
render Hansen test statistics meaningless, because these never reject the null of instrument 
exogeneity.  
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3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 BASELINE MODEL AND CORE HYPOTHESIS 
In this section, we discuss the results of the estimations. We start with a baseline model, 
containing the controls suggested in the literature and test for different institutional indices 
thereafter. In section 3.6., we discuss the robustness of our results and summarize the main 
findings. 
For our baseline models we chose a set of variables that in the empirical literature has been 
found to have substantial power in explaining aggregate savings. This includes the lagged 
savings rate, demographic factors (old age and youth dependency ratios), the actual growth 
rate, annual inflation, three-year average inflation, the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP 
(capturing the development of the credit market), government savings to GDP, and the oil 
trade balance (capturing the special influence of oil exporting or oil dependent economies as 
well as terms of trade effects due to energy price movements, to some extent). As we can infer 
fromTable 2, the FE estimation
19
 often yields coefficient estimates and significance levels 
comparable to the system GMM models, but only in cases of variables with larger variations 
over time, and not for variables with high persistence. The latter (demographics, credit to the 
private sector) coefficients are biased due to multicollinearity and correlation with the 
country-specific fixed effect. As our institutional variables of interest also have high 
persistence (see Table A 4 in the Appendix), we abstain from further use of fixed effects 
estimations. Therefore, our preferred baseline specifications are those from the models (2) for 
gross national savings and (6) for our aggregate private savings measure (Table 2). The AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests point to the feasibility of using the system GMM. Moreover, the Hansen test 
does not reject the exogeneity of our chosen instrument set, as does the difference-in Hansen 
test for single variable instruments (see Table A5 in Appendix B). Overall, our control 
variables, in particular the lagged dependency ratios and growth, have expected signs and 
sizes, and match previous empirical findings.
20  
We can further see that more domestic credit to the private sector is associated with higher 
gross national and private savings ratios, which is somewhat counterintuitive to the credit-
constraints argument. However, note that in emerging economies credit expansion in an 
immature credit market does not necessarily mean a lifting of borrowing constraints for 
                                                 
19
  We have also tested an FE version with year dummies. No year dummy has been significant. The change 
in coefficients is well within the range of the standard errors in the model without year dummies, so we 
excluded them for comparability with the system GMM estimations. Results are, of course, available upon 
request. 
20
  See, for example, Loayza et al. (2000, p. 173, model no. 6) or Terrones and Cardelli (2005, Table 2.2). 
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private households, who might still be lacking collateral, but improves the financial situation 
of (private) companies. Therefore, an inflation-neutral expansion of credit to the private sector 
also means the enlargement of investment opportunities in usually underdeveloped credit 
markets and possibly gives rise to consumption postponement to finance prospectively 
profitable projects or purchases of expensive durable consumer goods. In our regression 
entering indexes of economic freedom as explanatory variables, we will return to this issue of 
credit constraints.  
An interesting point relating to money and credit expansion is inflation, because its effects on 
savings remain unclear theoretically and empirically. In our sample, current inflation drives 
savings upwards, whereas (three-year) average inflation drives it downwards. This is in itself 
a new and interesting result that previous studies on this issue have not found. Whereas higher 
current inflation may hint at economic uncertainty and thus raise buffer-stock savings 
(Carroll, 1992, for example) or give economic agents surprisingly more money than planned 
for consumption (Deaton, 1977), higher inflation in the long run reduces purchasing power 
and the ability to save. Nevertheless, inflation rates are more significant for gross national 
savings rates than for private savings; we therefore should be careful with our interpretation. 
This brings us to a general problem in many of our following estimations, as our model 
performs relatively well with gross national savings but is somewhat less consistent for 
aggregate private savings. Overall, our baseline models are compatible with the literature and 
provide some further hints at the roles of other control variables. 
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Table 2: Baseline model estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dependent variable: GNS GNS GNS GNS PrSav PrSav PrSav PrSav 
method FE sys-GMM FE sys-GMM FE sys-GMM FE sys-GMM 
lagged dependent 
variable 
0.531*** 0.436*** 0.522*** 0.580*** 0.457*** 0.388*** 0.447*** 0.524*** 
(0.0490) (0.104) (0.0527) (0.133) (0.0424) (0.119) (0.0466) (0.132) 
youth dependency 
-0.0987** -0.161*** -0.0689 -0.199 -0.107** -0.166*** -0.0779 -0.194 
(0.0380) (0.0566) (0.0428) (0.127) (0.0456) (0.0610) (0.0483) (0.139) 
old age dependency 
0.159 -0.552*** -0.164 -0.371** -0.0256 -0.565** -0.337 -0.361* 
(0.307) (0.194) (0.410) (0.181) (0.345) (0.220) (0.520) (0.196) 
real GDP per capita, log 
  
 
2.454 -2.942 
  
2.399 -2.876 
  
 
(1.736) (3.828) 
  
(2.012) (3.997) 
real GDP growth 
0.0941*** 0.175** 0.0807*** 0.209** 0.0874*** 0.132 0.0747** 0.152 
(0.0304) (0.0849) (0.0300) (0.0853) (0.0309) (0.117) (0.0314) (0.119) 
government savings 
(./.deficit) 
0.216*** 0.193 0.220*** 0.129 -0.514*** -0.377** -0.515*** -0.291 
(0.0604) (0.119) (0.0622) (0.120) (0.0637) (0.168) (0.0646) (0.199) 
oil/fuel trade balance 
0.339*** 0.255*** 0.339*** 0.308** 0.342*** 0.258*** 0.343*** 0.310** 
(0.0517) (0.0591) (0.0507) (0.123) (0.0566) (0.0598) (0.0559) (0.131) 
domestic credit to the 
private sector, % of GDP 
0.0132 0.0501** -0.000125 0.0546** 0.0354** 0.0616** 0.0222 0.0743** 
(0.0169) (0.0251) (0.0168) (0.0277) (0.0171) (0.0293) (0.0188) (0.0323) 
inflation rate 
0.0967*** 0.143*** 0.100*** 0.125** 0.0581** 0.0725 0.0623*** 0.0241 
(0.0259) (0.0496) (0.0253) (0.0521) (0.0225) (0.0480) (0.0224) (0.0569) 
3 year average inflation, 
excl. actual year 
-0.0619*** -0.0880** -0.0627*** -0.0816* -0.0488** -0.0419 -0.0497** -0.0185 
(0.0209) (0.0393) (0.0212) (0.0465) (0.0228) (0.0462) (0.0231) (0.0563) 
observations 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 
countries 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
R2-within 0.489 
 
0.492   0.472 
 
0.474   
R2-between 0.830 
 
0.840   0.787 
 
0.788   
R2-overall 0.777 
 
0.775   0.699 
 
0.702   
min. years 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
max. years 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
av. years 14.63 14.63 14.63 14.63 14.63 14.63 14.63 14.63 
AR(1)-test, probability   0.000970 
 
0.000973 
 
0.000269 
 
0.000193 
AR(2)-test, probability   0.867 
 
0.940 
 
0.874 
 
0.656 
Hansen-test statistic, prob   0.348 
 
0.293 
 
0.499 
 
0.425 
Sargan-test statistic, prob   0.125 
 
0.000709 
 
0.102 
 
0.000172 
number of instruments   41   43   41   43 
1) constant not reported 2) bold values indicated 99% and 95% significance levels. 3) ***(**)(*) indicate 99% (95%)(90%) 
significance values. 4) Numbers in brackets are the corresponding t-values in case of the FE estimations and z-values in case of 
System GMM 5) FE: fixed effect model estimation, robust standard errors; Sys-GMM: system GMM estimation, panel specific 
heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors 
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3.5.2 HIGHER-ORDER (POLITICAL) INSTITUTIONS 
Here we consider the basic hypothesis and refer to ‘higher-order’ institutions. We claim that 
savings are not influenced by ‘latent political uncertainty’, that is, political institutions do not 
influence savings behavior directly. Various indices that try to capture the manifold 
dimensions of these ideas exist. We decided to utilize two sources, mainly for their longer-
term availability over several countries and their general acceptance in the institutions and 
growth literature. For ‘higher-order’ political institutions, we chose the variable ‘Constraints 
on the Chief Executive’ from the PolityIV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) and the 
‘imputed Freedom House – Polity2’ measure of democracy, constructed by Hadenius and 
Teorell (2005). Both are taken from Teorell et al. (2011). Whereas the first variable captures 
the constraints imposed on the decisions of the highest executive branch and therefore 
captures checks and balances in a country, the latter also captures democratic participation. 
Hadenius and Teorell (2005) show that this measure outperforms its constituent parts. These 
are the Freedom House indices on press liberty and civil rights, as well as the revised, 
combined PolityIV variable, which indicates a more democratic or autocratic regime. We 
decided to use both of these variables, because they span two different dimensions of 
‘modern’ types of political regimes and also because their correlation coefficient is relatively 
low, being only 0.29 (see Table A 6 in the Appendix) 
As shown in Table 3, a direct effect of ‘higher-order’ institutions on aggregate savings 
formation cannot be supported by our dataset and estimation method. As suggested in the 
hypothesis, it seems plausible that political institutions are ‘too far away’ to influence the 
savings decision directly on a year-to-year basis. A change in political circumstances can have 
an effect on the economic institutions that influence micro behavior indirectly. This is in line 
with the first part of the ‘hierarchy of institutions’ hypothesis, which denies a direct effect on 
economic performance. In addition, including the lagged dependent savings variable hides a 
longer run relationship, as the variations in the political variables in the short term are not 
directly matched by corresponding variations in savings. 
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Table 3: Higher-order (political) institutions  
  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
dependent variable: GNS GNS PrSav PrSav 
lagged dependent 
variable 
0.406*** 0.434*** 0.347*** 0.381*** 
(0.105) (0.104) (0.124) (0.122) 
youth dependency 
-0.143** -0.158*** -0.151** -0.164*** 
(0.0597) (0.0578) (0.0646) (0.0626) 
old age dependency 
-
0.538*** -0.546*** -0.566** -0.560** 
(0.198) (0.194) (0.225) (0.224) 
real GDP growth 
0.205** 0.179** 0.185* 0.141 
(0.0843) (0.0856) (0.111) (0.116) 
government savings 
(./.deficit) 
0.206* 0.191 -0.414** -0.389** 
(0.116) (0.119) (0.166) (0.168) 
oil/fuel trade balance 
0.271*** 0.257*** 0.280*** 0.262*** 
(0.0609) (0.0590) (0.0676) (0.0640) 
domestic credit to the 
private sector, % of 
GDP 
0.0610** 0.0527** 0.0730** 0.0661** 
(0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0302) (0.0303) 
inflation rate 
0.129** 0.142*** 0.0653 0.0719 
(0.0503) (0.0497) (0.0502) (0.0484) 
3 year average inflation, 
excl. actual year 
-
0.0826** -0.0866** -0.0406 -0.0401 
(0.0393) (0.0394) (0.0450) (0.0465) 
constraints on chief 
executive 
0.0922 
 
0.102 
 (0.333) 
 
(0.391) 
 
democratic participation 
  -0.00251 
 
-0.0169 
  (0.217) 
 
(0.253) 
observations 763 790 763 790 
countries 52 54 52 54 
min. years 9 9 9 9 
av. years 14.67 14.63 14.67 14.63 
AR(1)-test, probability 0.00137 0.000914 0.000668 0.000331 
AR(2)-test, probability 0.832 0.855 0.964 0.918 
Hansen-test statistic, 
prob 0.514 0.353 0.531 0.572 
number of instruments 42 42 42 42 
1) constant not reported 2) bold values indicated 99% and 95% 
significance levels. 3) ***(**)(*) indicate 99% (95%)(90%) significance 
values. 4) Numbers in brackets are the corresponding z-values  
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3.5.3  LOWER-ORDER INSTITUTIONS 
The second part of the hypothesis states that ‘lower-order’ or economic institutions have an 
impact on savings. We chose three indicators to approximate this concept. The first is 
subgroup two from the Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW, Gwartney and Lawson, 
2009). This index covers the issue of property rights (judicial independence, military 
interference in justice and politics, intellectual property rights). The second indicator is the 
quality of governance index from the International Country Risk Guide (, ICRG), which itself 
is a mixture of perceptions of corruption, the rule of law and the quality of bureaucracy. 
Finally, we use the rule of law index from the World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI, 
Kaufmann et al., 2009). The last two indices are taken from the Quality of Governance 
Database from April 2011 (Teorell et al., 2011). The three indices are highly correlated 
(around 0.8, see Table A 6 in the Appendix), as can be expected since they all claim to 
capture comparable aspects of governance. One problem in our estimations might be the 
indices’ relatively high persistence over time, which might hinder the extraction of any 
significant effect given our large number of control variables. This can lead to identification 
problems and, finally, inflated standard errors, especially as our age dependency ratios and 
per capita GDP controls have comparable inertia and are correlated with our institutional 
variables. As can be seen inTable A 4 in the Appendix , especially the WGI of the rule of law 
has a very low ratio of within to between variation, whereas the EFW property rights and the 
ICRG indicator have an even larger within-variation relative to their means or the between 
variation, especially in comparison with our GDP or old age dependency variable. 
For the rule of law and the protection of property rights to influence precautionary (aggregate) 
savings formation, they have to alter perceived uncertainty. On the one hand, a strong rule of 
law reduces ‘latent’ uncertainty about changes in the economy’s fundamental principles. It 
may also lay the foundation for continuous economic growth, thereby reducing precautionary 
motives for accumulating buffer-stock savings. On the other hand, rule of law and stable 
property rights give incentives for wealth accumulation. Saving incentives are strengthened if 
the general path of the economy is somewhat certain. If there is a risk of expropriation by the 
government, a risk of general policy change or social unrest in the case of a growth 
breakdown, consumption today rises or saving materializes more in the form of purchases of 
durables. Therefore, the direction of the effect of these three indicators on savings is unclear 
ex ante. 
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Table 4: Lower-order (economic) institutions: Property Rights and Rule of Law 
 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
dependent variable: GNS GNS GNS PrSav PrSav PrSav 
lagged dependent 
variable 
0.567*** 0.429*** 0.297 0.472*** 0.337*** 0.285 
(0.0798) (0.107) (0.207) (0.103) (0.112) (0.196) 
youth dependency 
-
0.108*** 
-
0.165*** 
-
0.272*** -0.117** -0.173*** 
-
0.259*** 
(0.0393) (0.0504) (0.0905) (0.0518) (0.0586) (0.0981) 
old age dependency 
-
0.393*** 
-
0.617*** 
-
0.890*** -0.433*** -0.662*** 
-
0.870*** 
(0.122) (0.175) (0.283) (0.168) (0.208) (0.295) 
real GDP growth 
0.106* 0.221** 0.108 0.0717 0.237** 0.141 
(0.0630) (0.0875) (0.158) (0.110) (0.105) (0.175) 
government savings 
(./.deficit) 
0.214** 0.208* 0.595*** -0.256 -0.399** -0.146 
(0.0982) (0.123) (0.226) (0.159) (0.158) (0.222) 
oil/fuel trade balance 
0.232*** 0.257*** 0.286*** 0.250*** 0.276*** 0.293*** 
(0.0495) (0.0635) (0.0811) (0.0634) (0.0687) (0.0765) 
domestic credit to the 
private sector, % of 
GDP 
0.0176 0.0150 -0.00160 0.0349 0.0304 0.0135 
(0.0274) (0.0319) (0.0433) (0.0321) (0.0346) (0.0449) 
inflation rate 
0.172*** 0.160*** 0.00825 0.0978 0.0672 -0.0250 
(0.0541) (0.0530) (0.142) (0.0692) (0.0488) (0.149) 
3 year average inflation, 
excl. actual year 
-
0.116*** -0.129** -0.0385 -0.0748 -0.0670 -0.00323 
(0.0369) (0.0543) (0.0639) (0.0456) (0.0616) (0.0785) 
EFW: property rights 
quality 
0.964*** 
 
  1.063** 
 
  
(0.355) 
 
  (0.479) 
 
  
country risk: quality of 
governance 
  1.128***   
 
1.236***   
  (0.374)   
 
(0.446)   
World Bank: rule of law 
  
 
2.522* 
  
2.385* 
    (1.305)     (1.442) 
observations 651 715 447 651 715 447 
countries 43 49 54 43 49 54 
min. years 9 7 5 9 7 5 
max. years 25 24 9 25 24 9 
av. years 15.14 14.59 8.278 15.14 14.59 8.278 
AR(1)-test, probability 0.00256 0.00196 0.0180 0.000306 0.000450 0.0387 
AR(2)-test, probability 0.0964 0.747 0.890 0.0472 0.748 0.883 
Hansen-test statistic, 
prob 0.455 0.667 0.308 0.361 0.807 0.414 
number of instruments 42 42 42 42 42 42 
1) constant not reported 2) bold values indicated 99% and 95% significance levels. 3) 
***(**)(*) indicate 99% (95%)(90%) significance values. 4) Numbers in brackets are the 
corresponding  z-values 5) sys-GMM: System GMM estimation, panel specific 
heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors 
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 First, we find a significant and positive relationship between our property rights indicator 
(subgroup two of the EFW index) and gross national as well as private savings (see Table 4, 
models 13 and 16). Well defined and enforced property rights seem to drive savings upward, 
which would help developing countries and transition economies directly in financing capital 
formation. Unfortunately, again, the transmission channel is unclear, but strong property 
rights may encourage savings for later investments into (small and large) business projects, 
own houses or other consumer durables. In addition, we have used the WGI on the rule of law 
(Kaufmann et al. 2008), which we do not find to be significant in our model specifications. 
This can be attributed to little time-wise variation in (and very limited time span of) this 
indicator (see Table A 4 in the Appendix). 
As another indicator of the rule of law and property rights protection, the ICRG index 
combines law and order, corruption, and bureaucracy into one aggregate measure. This 
variable is positive and significant, indicating that better governance is associated with larger 
gross national and private savings in our sample (see Table 4, models 15 and 17). 
As corruption is part of the ICRG indicator, we cross-check the result for corruption with the 
World Bank governance indicator on the control of corruption and the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index (both from Teorell et al., 2011), and the results are 
not significant. Note that these indicators have very limited time coverage and comparability 
over time, which might influence the results. But overall, corruption does not seem to 
influence savings formation, which is in contrast to Swaheleen (2008). Thus, the results of the 
ICRG index may be driven by its property rights and judicial independence elements, as is 
confirmed by our solitary EFW indicator on property rights and the rule of law. 
If we interpret the coefficients of the institutional variables in a cardinal and causal way, the 
long-run effect of a 10% rise in the EFW index on property rights or the ICRG country risk 
measure would increase the gross national savings rate by around 20% if all values are around 
the mean.
21 
For our sample mean country, a 10% change of the EFW indicator for property 
rights (ICRG indicator) from 4.8 (4.9) to around 5.3 (5.4) is associated with an increase in the 
gross national savings rate from 21% of GDP to around 25.5% in the long run, everything else 
being equal. Note that the short-run coefficients for our lower-order institutions are 
surprisingly large from our point of view. 
                                                 
21
  The calculation of the long-run coefficients is based on a simple autoregressive distributed lag model with 
one lag of the dependent and zero lags of the additional variable. In this case, the long-run effect is simply 
the ratio of the estimated coefficient divided by one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable. 
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3.5.4  ECONOMIC FREEDOM AS A SPECIAL FORM OF A ‘LOWER-ORDER INSTITUTION’ 
We now take a closer look at the concept of economic freedom, a frequently used measure of 
institutional quality (Gwartney et al., 2013). In general, economic freedom is ‘the right of 
property ownership, freedom of movement for labor, capital and goods; and […] absence of 
government coercion or constraint of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for 
citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself’ (Beach and Kane, 2008, p. 40f.). The guarantee 
of property rights is, in our view, a crucial element of economic freedom, which 
predominantly influences perceived economic uncertainty. Other elements of a free economic 
order may have an additional impact on uncertainty or impatience.  
We select the following indicators covering these aspects: from a domestic policy perspective, 
we choose subgroup one, size of government, from the EFW index (Gwartney and Lawson, 
2009) to capture market interventions through government enterprises, subsidies and taxes. As 
stated in section3.2, the effect of government interventions on savings is unclear a priori.  
Concerning general domestic market regulation, we use subgroup five from the same source 
as an overall index of goods, credit and labor market regulations. One can argue that less 
regulation increases uncertainty for single actors and thus precautionary savings. Moreover, 
less-regulated markets might also provide better matches of demand and supply. As a result, 
individuals may become more impatient and prone to consume more currently, thus lowering 
savings. The last indicator for domestic market regulation is the financial reform index of 
Abiad et al. (2008). Here we would of course expect less regulation to be associated with 
lower private savings, which has been confirmed, for example, by Bandiera et al. (2000)
22
.  
Overall, our results are not unambiguous (see Table A 7 in the Appendix) First, we find 
negative and significant effects of the ‘size of government’ on national and aggregate private 
savings, which, in a causal interpretation, would mean that ‘bigger governments’ lead to more 
savings. But in the private savings regression, some control variables lose their explanatory 
power, so we do not stress this point further. For the overall regulation of goods, factor and 
financial markets, we do not find any significant effects. Finally, our separate indicator of 
financial market regulation, from the financial reform index, seems to drive down private 
savings, as expected. However, as most control variables change coefficients and significance 
levels, we skip this point too. To conclude, we do not find significant and robust effects of a 
                                                 
22
  Note that the results of Chinn and Ito (2005) hint at increasing savings for lower regulation, if institutional 
quality is low. I did not have knowledge on this empirical study when I formulated these hypothesis. 
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more liberal market order and other concepts of economic freedom on aggregate savings 
formation.  
 
3.6 ROBUSTNESS 
3.6.1 ALTERNATIVE AND ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES 
When estimating our baseline model, we also test for several variables discussed in the 
empirical literature on aggregate savings formation. These include broad money to GDP, M2 
or quasi-money to GDP and domestic credit supplied through the banking sector, the real 
exchange rate, net foreign aid flows, the fuel trade balance, population density and urban 
population proportion, real interest rates (all from the World Bank database), population 
growth rates, productivity growth, average GDP growth rates (all from Heston and Summers, 
2011) and the net foreign asset position
23
 (from Milesi-Ferretti and Lane, 2006) in its lagged 
values and first differences. All of these are inconsistent in their coefficient signs and barely 
and/or seldom significant over comparable model specifications. Therefore, we did not 
include them into our baseline models. 
In our first robustness test, we relax all our restrictions on the instrument count, which is 
necessary to enable the Hansen tests for detecting possible non-exogeneity of the instruments. 
The restrictions mean that only the first or second lags of the variables are entered, which 
lowers the efficiency of the previous estimates. Information contained in further lags has been 
ignored so far. In Table 5we present the results for models dropping the stacking of the 
instrument matrix and using all available lags for our control variables as instruments. This 
increases the instrument count, as for every observation and year, a single instrument is used, 
which leads the Hansen test to fail in its ability to detect non-exogenous instruments. As we 
already know from our previous analysis and the accompanying tests, the chosen instrument 
set is generally exogenous. As can be seen from Table 5 (models 25-28), the EFW index for the 
quality of property rights and the ICRG index for the quality of governance remain strongly 
significant without changing their signs. In addition, the coefficients of our control variables 
behave as expected. Moreover, the significance levels rise markedly owing to the improved 
efficiency of a larger instrument set. We regard this as an endorsement of our initial model's 
specification.
                                                 
23
  See the extensive and very inspiring research project by Christiansen et al. (2009). 
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Table 5: Robustness 1: Enlarged instrument set; GDP as control variable  
  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
dependent variable GNS GNS PrSav PrSav GNS GNS PrSav PrSav 
lagged dependent 
0.811*** 0.804*** 0.797*** 0.785*** 0.812*** 0.805*** 0.796*** 0.785*** 
(0.0317) (0.0296) (0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0315) (0.0289) (0.0363) (0.0355) 
youth dependency 
-0.0388*** -0.0575*** -0.0424*** -0.0600*** -0.0438*** -0.0664*** -0.0361** -0.0587*** 
(0.0140) (0.0165) (0.0145) (0.0169) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0177) (0.0194) 
old age dependency 
-0.161*** -0.217*** -0.179*** -0.224*** -0.155*** -0.208*** -0.185*** -0.225*** 
(0.0516) (0.0648) (0.0497) (0.0667) (0.0515) (0.0646) (0.0533) (0.0698) 
real GDP growth 
0.137*** 0.100*** 0.0817** 0.0702** 0.133*** 0.0937*** 0.0856** 0.0711** 
(0.0352) (0.0350) (0.0389) (0.0314) (0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0388) (0.0324) 
government savings (./.deficit) 
0.153*** 0.151*** -0.209*** -0.230*** 0.162*** 0.166*** -0.220*** -0.232*** 
(0.0548) (0.0510) (0.0790) (0.0829) (0.0542) (0.0480) (0.0744) (0.0763) 
oil/fuel trade balance 
0.127*** 0.114*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
(0.0237) (0.0274) (0.0310) (0.0329) (0.0244) (0.0290) (0.0332) (0.0374) 
domestic credit to the private 
sector, % of GDP 
0.00861 0.00344 0.0146 0.0102 0.00904 0.00433 0.0140 0.0100 
(0.00809) (0.00806) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.00813) (0.00836) (0.0116) (0.0121) 
inflation rate 
0.132*** 0.126*** 0.0860*** 0.0706*** 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.0867*** 0.0708*** 
(0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0323) (0.0321) (0.0258) (0.0256) 
3 year average inflation, excl. 
actual year 
-0.102*** -0.0993*** -0.0668*** -0.0655*** -0.102*** -0.0997*** -0.0675*** -0.0654*** 
(0.0229) (0.0216) (0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0230) (0.0214) (0.0184) (0.0179) 
EFW: property rights quality 
0.362** 
 
0.554***   0.388** 
 
0.521***   
(0.164) 
 
(0.189)   (0.158) 
 
(0.162)   
country risk: quality of 
governance 
  0.409*** 
 
0.594*** 
 
0.460*** 
 
0.586*** 
  (0.145) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.141) 
real GDP per capita, log 
  
  
  -0.200 -0.353 0.243 0.0512 
        (0.290) (0.282) (0.388) (0.400) 
observations 651 715 651 715 651 715 651 715 
countries 43 49 43 49 43 49 43 49 
min. years 9 7 9 7 9 7 9 7 
max. years 25 24 25 24 25 24 25 24 
av. years 15.14 14.59 15.14 14.59 15.14 14.59 15.14 14.59 
AR(1)-test, probability 0.000748 0.000777 4.29e-05 5.13e-05 0.000736 0.000793 4.13e-05 5.07e-05 
AR(2)-test, probability 0.0557 0.897 0.0596 0.497 0.0576 0.866 0.0570 0.498 
Hansen-test statistic, prob 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
number of instruments 651 715 651 715 651 715 651 715 
1) constant not reported 2) bold values indicated 99% and 95% significance levels. 3) ***(**)(*) indicate 99% (95%)(90%) significance values. 4) Numbers in brackets are z-
values in case of system GMM 5) Sys-GMM: System GMM estimation, panel specific heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors 
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Including real GDP per capita as control variable is a general means of macroeconomic model 
testing. In our baseline models, doing so changes coefficients and significance levels 
substantially. This can be attributed to the problem of inefficient instruments. When real GDP 
per capita is entered into our model without restrictions on the instrument set, all control 
variables and our institutional variables behave as expected, but per capita GDP itself remains 
insignificant (see Table 5, models 29-32). Thus, excluding it from our initial model 
specification seems justified. Real GDP per capita itself is insignificant throughout all 
estimations. Additionally, the test on an AR(2)-process of the residuals fails to deny the non-
existence of such behavior in four cases. Therefore, the system GMM method should not be 
applied to this model's specification at all. However, both the sign and significance levels are 
unchanged for the EFW measure of property rights regime and the overall quality of 
governance, so our results appear robust.  
The most interesting aspect here is the change in coefficients for the lagged dependent 
variable and our institutional variables. First, the magnitude of the coefficient increases 
substantially, giving our model a much longer memory with heavier weight for past than for 
recent influences. This is fairly reasonable given the fact that we enter more lags as 
instruments. Second, the coefficients for our lower-order institutions fall by about 50%, 
hinting at a much smaller and more plausible short-term impact of institutional changes on the 
savings rate. Note, on the other hand, that the long-term multiplier for both variables stays at a 
factor of about two, as in our initial model specifications 
We also include regional dummies as exogenous variables,
24
 identifying sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Middle East and North Africa, Latin and South America as well as South-eastern Asia. 
These regional dummies capture climatic, geographic and cultural differences. Whereas 
different cultures may vary in impatience, climatic factors may influence income levels and 
growth directly. In model specifications with the reduced as well as the full instrument set, 
many of our independent variables, including the age dependency ratios and real GDP per 
capita, lose their explanatory power. The estimated coefficients on the regional dummies take 
values between -1.7 and -9.9 and are often significant, but the accompanying changes in the 
constant term hint at an interaction between both effects. The behavior of these regional 
coefficients is far too similar for a meaningful causal interpretation. This may be one reason 
why all macro-panel studies on the issue of aggregate savings formation have abstained from 
including such regional dummies. 
                                                 
24
  Results not reported; they are available upon request. 
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Only in specifications with the full instrument set do our two institutional variables (EFW 
subgroup two and the ICRG indicator) maintain their significances, signs and coefficient 
sizes. Whether this is an issue of over-instrumentalization or signifies true influences is 
unclear. When we enlarge our instrument set only slightly (keeping the stacking of the 
instrument matrix, but using two lags instead of one as instruments), most regional dummies 
retain their explanatory power, many control variables still miss it, and our two institutional 
variables measuring property rights exhibit weak statistical significance. 
3.6.2 ALTERNATIVE TIMING AND MODELING 
In the subsequent robustness check (see Table 6), we change the time periods of our sample. 
We divide the sample into two intervals: 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2007. Because of limited 
data availability, we drop our initial first period (1980-1989) which allows us to expand the 
instrument set slightly (two lags instead of one, but we stack the instrument matrix). As a 
result, some of the control variables lose their explanatory power in estimations with the 
restricted instrument set, which could result from more macroeconomic stability following the 
year 2000, and thus less variation in some of the macroeconomic variables. The results for our 
control variables improve somewhat when we allow for more lags as instruments. In most 
regressions, the coefficient on the ICRG indicator is significant and of the expected sign, 
whereas subgroup two of the EFW index exhibits more explanatory power in the private 
savings regression for the first (1990-1999) period. Against this background, we do not reject 
the conclusion that the impact of the rule of law and property rights on aggregate savings 
formation can be found over the two periods and seems to be time independent.  
An alternative model specification for our institutional variables would be to treat them as 
endogenous rather than as exogenous variables. Under that assumption, the same 
idiosyncratic error can influence savings and the institutional variables simultaneously. By 
using the second lags of the institutions as instruments, this effect is overcome. One of the 
main arguments in the institutions and growth literature is that growth and institutional 
development have common determinants or, following the argument put forward by Bhalla 
(2008), growth produces a middle-income class that demands institutional quality. GDP and 
institutions may therefore be determined simultaneously. Thus, we include GDP per capita as 
a control variable this model specification. Our institutional variables enter with their second 
and later lags as instruments for the actual values. As can be inferred fromTable 7, treating our 
two institutional indices as endogenous in this way does not change the overall results.
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Table 6: Robustness 3: Different time periods: 1990-1999; 2000-2007 
  (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) 
  1990-1999 2000-2007 
dependent variable GNS GNS PrSav PrSav GNS GNS PrSav PrSav 
lagged dependent 
0.540*** 0.653*** 0.392*** 0.524*** 0.276** 0.221 0.298** 0.109 
(0.159) (0.118) (0.144) (0.119) (0.120) (0.145) (0.149) (0.152) 
youth dependency 
-0.102* -0.0889 -0.128* -0.0995 -0.276*** -0.385*** -0.244** -0.435*** 
(0.0592) (0.0592) (0.0755) (0.0686) (0.0991) (0.119) (0.100) (0.131) 
old age dependency 
-0.305* -0.276 -0.469** -0.343 -0.954*** -1.262*** -0.852*** -1.410*** 
(0.170) (0.233) (0.227) (0.287) (0.299) (0.352) (0.302) (0.394) 
real GDP growth 
0.241*** 0.215* 0.206** 0.152 0.130 0.234*** 0.0760 0.256*** 
(0.0899) (0.111) (0.0970) (0.124) (0.111) (0.0861) (0.114) (0.0988) 
government savings (./.deficit) 
0.0656 -0.0452 -0.569*** -0.549*** 0.530*** 0.419** -0.190 -0.397** 
(0.173) (0.208) (0.124) (0.164) (0.144) (0.181) (0.165) (0.183) 
oil/fuel trade balance 
0.235** 0.189** 0.263** 0.207* 0.255*** 0.252*** 0.260*** 0.289*** 
(0.105) (0.0879) (0.125) (0.110) (0.0831) (0.0718) (0.0863) (0.0809) 
domestic credit to the private 
sector, % of GDP 
0.0397 0.0261 0.0630** 0.0537** 0.0116 -0.0796 0.0348 -0.0855 
(0.0257) (0.0268) (0.0249) (0.0235) (0.0525) (0.0672) (0.0540) (0.0790) 
inflation rate 
0.248*** 0.222*** 0.198*** 0.0859* 0.0347 0.0573 -0.000516 -0.0155 
(0.0644) (0.0391) (0.0736) (0.0520) (0.125) (0.132) (0.116) (0.114) 
3 year average inflation, excl. 
actual year 
-0.128** -0.141*** -0.0553 -0.0329 0.0370 -0.0690 0.0617 -0.0487 
(0.0507) (0.0369) (0.0665) (0.0451) (0.0919) (0.0744) (0.0970) (0.0871) 
EFW: property rights quality 
1.285*** 
 
1.773***   1.149** 
 
0.966*   
(0.424) 
 
(0.591)   (0.534) 
 
(0.530)   
country risk: quality of 
governance 
  0.726* 
 
1.002**   2.130** 
 
2.337** 
  (0.374)   (0.399)   (0.829) 
 
(0.968) 
observations 274 292 274 292 308 327 308 327 
countries 43 49 43 49 47 49 47 49 
min. years 1 1 1 1 4 5 4 5 
max. years 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
av. years 6.372 5.959 6.372 5.959 6.553 6.673 6.553 6.673 
AR(1)-test, probability 0.0575 0.00460 0.0410 0.00154 0.00971 0.00650 0.0149 0.0135 
AR(2)-test, probability 0.0515 0.467 0.204 0.837 0.0566 0.877 0.151 0.963 
Hansen-test statistic, prob 0.410 0.407 0.629 0.479 0.645 0.518 0.546 0.757 
number of instruments 46 46 46 46 40 40 40 40 
1) constant not reported 2) bold values indicated 99% and 95% significance levels. 3) ***(**)(*) indicate 99% (95%)(90%) significance values. 4) Numbers in 
brackets are the corresponding  z-values in case of system GMM 5) Sys-GMM: System GMM estimation, panel specific heteroscedasticity adjusted standard 
errors 
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Table 7: Robustness 4: Treating institutions as endogenous 
  (42) (43) (44) (45) 
dependent variable GNS GNS PrSav PrSav 
lagged dependent 
0.812*** 0.805*** 0.796*** 0.785*** 
(0.0315) (0.0289) (0.0363) (0.0355) 
youth dependency 
-0.0438*** -0.0664*** -0.0361** -0.0587*** 
(0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0177) (0.0194) 
old age dependency 
-0.155*** -0.208*** -0.185*** -0.225*** 
(0.0515) (0.0646) (0.0533) (0.0698) 
real GDP per capita, log 
-0.200 -0.353 0.243 0.0512 
(0.290) (0.282) (0.388) (0.400) 
real GDP growth 
0.133*** 0.0937*** 0.0856** 0.0711** 
(0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0388) (0.0324) 
government savings 
(./.deficit) 
0.162*** 0.166*** -0.220*** -0.232*** 
(0.0542) (0.0480) (0.0744) (0.0763) 
oil/fuel trade balance 
0.133*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
(0.0244) (0.0290) (0.0332) (0.0374) 
domestic credit to the 
private sector, % of GDP 
0.00904 0.00433 0.0140 0.0100 
(0.00813) (0.00836) (0.0116) (0.0121) 
inflation rate 
0.132*** 0.125*** 0.0867*** 0.0708*** 
(0.0323) (0.0321) (0.0258) (0.0256) 
3 year average inflation, 
excl. actual year 
-0.102*** -0.0997*** -0.0675*** -0.0654*** 
(0.0230) (0.0214) (0.0184) (0.0179) 
EFW: property rights 
quality 
0.388**   0.521***   
(0.158)   (0.162)   
country risk: quality of 
governance 
  0.460*** 
 
0.785*** 
  (0.134)   (0.0355) 
observations 651 715 651 715 
countries 43 49 43 49 
min. years 9 7 9 7 
max. years 25 24 25 24 
av. years 15.14 14.59 15.14 14.59 
AR(1)-test, probability 0.000736 0.000793 4.13e-05 5.07e-05 
AR(2)-test, probability 0.0576 0.866 0.0570 0.498 
Hansen-test statistic, prob 1 1 1 1 
number of instruments 651 715 651 715 
1) constant not reported 2) bold values indicated 99% and 95% significance 
levels. 3) ***(**)(*) indicate 99% (95%)(90%) significance values. 4) Numbers in 
brackets are the corresponding  z-values  5)  System GMM estimation, panel 
specific heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors 
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3.6.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
In our baseline models from Table 2, we use control variables established in the 
microeconomics and macro-empirical literature on savings formation. The results are in line 
with existing empirical research, in that old and young age dependency ratios, past savings 
behavior, per capita GDP growth, oil abundance and size of the domestic financial market 
have the expected signs and are significant. A new and interesting peripheral aspect is the 
differential influence of average (anticipated) inflation versus actual contemporaneous 
inflation rates. 
We proceed with adding higher-order institutions relating to constitutional constraints on 
politics. As expected and proposed by the institutional growth literature, we cannot find a 
direct link between these political institutions and the actual savings rate. However, as higher-
order institutions influence the adoption of a certain set of lower-order economic institutions, 
there may well be an indirect effect that we cannot detect given our modeling approach.  
The institutions and growth literature also has found that economic freedom influences 
economic performance directly. Uncertainty and impatience theoretically may be affected by 
economic freedom, driving the savings rate in opposite directions, with an undetermined 
overall effect. Our findings from the models as given in Table A 7 in the Appendix could be 
interpreted as showing such inconsistent behavior. 
But what is most important, we find that the quality of property rights and low country-
specific risks of expropriation have a positive effect on savings, not only in the long run, but 
also in the short run. On average, we find a short-run multiplier for the hypothetical mean 
sample nation of between 0.4 and 1, meaning that a 10% rise on the scale measuring country-
specific risk or economic freedom can lead to a 4% to 10 % increase in the national and the 
private savings ratio, respectively. The long-term multiplier as given by our system GMM 
method might even be twice as large. This effect is relatively stable over a number of model 
specifications, including the addition of other control variables like GDP and regional 
dummies (as proxies for climatic or cultural factors), a change in the instrument set, as well as 
treating these institutional variables as endogenous instead of as strictly exogenous. 
However, one shortcoming may be our modeling choice. As saving rates strongly depend on 
some stationary as well as unstable factors, cross-sectional analyses of country averages or 
just long-term growth rates, as used in the institutions and growth literature, are meaningless. 
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This forces us to choose a dynamic panel data model, which, on the other hand, conceals 
long-term relationships because many control variables are persistent over time. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzes the drivers of savings in developing and transition countries. Human 
and physical capital accumulation – as well as an economy’s institutional framework – drive 
long-term growth. Domestic savings are an important determinant of additions to the capital 
stock. The literature on institutions and growth argues that the institutional setting influences 
economic prospects through productivity growth and investment. In our view, institutions 
may additionally influence the formation of savings. This is a transmission channel for the 
impact of institutions on long-term growth, which has been neglected so far. 
Microeconomic theory sees uncertainty and impatience as the main drivers of individual 
savings, which can explain the observed deviations of saving rates from the predictions of the 
lifecycle theory. The macro-empirical literature on domestic savings formation has not tested 
for these ideas, but focuses on the drivers of lifecycle savings and credit constraints. First, we 
argue that, from an individual’s perspective, the general institutional setting of a country 
influences perceived or ‘latent’ uncertainty with respect to the overall political and economic 
environment. It is through this channel that the institutional setting of an economy influences 
aggregate savings. Second, we show for a set of developing and emerging economies that 
aggregate national and private savings indeed seem to be influenced by indicators of country-
specific institutions.  
We do not find direct effects on national and private savings formation associated with 
higher-order institutions imposing constitutional constraints on politics. This is in line with 
the theory of the ‘hierarchy of institutions’. Furthermore, we do not find consistent evidence 
for some aspects of the concept of economic freedom. The reason may be that impatience and 
uncertainty are affected simultaneously, each having opposite effects on the savings rate.  
We find evidence that property rights and the rule of law influence national and private 
savings formation. The effect of the quality of property rights is positive, significant and 
consistent throughout various robustness tests. Whereas it cannot be ruled out that stronger 
property rights reduce uncertainty and therefore should also reduce individual and aggregate 
savings, the opposite line of reasoning seems more plausible and is supported by our research: 
strong property rights and enforcement of the rule of law are essential for the long-term 
62 
 
development of an economy from an individual’s perspective, making the accumulation of 
wealth appealing for private companies and individuals. This leads to higher national and 
aggregate private saving rates. 
We hope that the discussion on this issue has just begun. The necessity of choosing a dynamic 
panel estimation method restricts us to a relatively small number of control variables and 
empirical models. This approach makes it difficult to detect the longer, but steadier, influence 
of institutional settings on many economic variables, including the savings ratio. Overall, our 
results seem plausible, as drivers of savings are manifold. However, a theoretical model that 
relates savings formation to institutions is lacking so far. Important empirical questions are 
also waiting to be answered. Does the macro-evidence also hold for micro-data on saving 
rates? Can the results be confirmed by other estimation approaches? Do household or 
business savings react more strongly to the institutional setting? The results of this paper are 
at least encouraging and will hopefully lead to more detailed research on these important 
questions. 
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4 ASPECTS OF CURRENT ACCOUNT DYNAMICS IN THE EURO AREA – THE 
ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT, TARGET2 LIABILITIES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In mid-2009, I have started to write a minor part in a policy brief on institutional aspects 
of the current account deficit in South Africa and the danger of a sudden stop of foreign 
capital inflows in light of the global financial crisis. The paper has finally been 
published in March 2011 as Draper et al., 2011. The aim of the policy brief was to 
assess the situation of the South African economy. The authors decided for the content 
of one chapter to compare the situation of CA deficits in South Africa with the situation 
of countries in Europe which have been hit by the crisis and had huge CA deficits prior. 
From the point of knowledge we have on this topic by now, maybe the authors should 
have chosen other or additional countries and time periods for a good overall 
comparison. As the publication process went on, they had to update the figures and data 
up to mid-2010 and it became clear that some of the conclusions from 2009 came under 
pressure during the following year. Now, in 2014 and some additional research from my 
side later, I have to add several aspects to this small chapter and even withdraw from 
some conclusions of my first short analysis of the FA.  
In end-2009, the development of the current accounts in Europe did hardly show any 
worrisome aspects and certainly no strong danger of a sudden stop or reversal by pure 
comparison of the aggregate data. Much of the reduction in foreign financing, as could 
be seen from the financial account and financial sector capital flows, could be attributed 
to the financial sector hording liquidity in response to the financial crisis that began to 
spread over the global economy in end of 2008. From the structure of the FA, some EU 
countries have been marked as “endangered” countries, facing potentially adverse 
effects of a sudden stop. The data update in 2010 showed more of these dangers, but 
data was still lacking to get a clear picture overall. Especially for the South-European 
economies, it was not until the seminal publication of Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) 
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that one could realize why the data was masking the type of sudden stop of foreign CA 
financing especially for the South-European countries one would have expected to see. 
This publication is part of my research curriculum, and the content and conclusions 
serve as a good connection between chapters two and three of this thesis and the 
following larger chapter five. It gives insights into the interrelation of institutions, CA 
deficits, the structure of foreign financing and the role of detailed organizational 
provisions influencing the working of a monetary union. It stands furthermore for the 
first steps of my interest in the topic of CA deficits and the question of its influence 
factors.  
Relating to the issue of institutional influences on Balance of Payments dynamics, we 
can learn two points: First, the pre-crisis boom of capital inflows in the selected 
European economies and especially the structure of investments fit very well into the 
results from the literature review on institutions and foreign investments from chapter 2, 
especially sections 2.3 and 2.4. Second, the necessary rebalancing of the economies 
after 2008 and the extent to which they had to cope with economic crisis and capital 
outflows shows significant influence of investors’ perceptions of the institutional 
setting, like in Greece, Hungary, or Romania. It is furthermore an example of how the 
institutional environment shapes the potential to turn domestic investment with foreign 
credit into a successful export-upgrading strategy, helping to follow ideal debt-cycle 
dynamics like the Estonian case. 
In the next sections, the parts already published in Draper et al. (2011, pp. 3-10) are 
critically analyzed and contrasted against today’s perspective. The citations are given in 
italic letters followed by comments and corrections. All figures and data have been 
updated to actual values and do not show the values from mid-2009 and mid-2010. 
4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNT REVERSALS AND SUDDEN STOPS IN THE EU 
Concerning the level of the current account deficit in South Africa and the European 
economies with high CA deficits, Draper et al. had written:  
“As the comparison […] shows, the South African current account deficit is and has not 
been excessive by international standards. In contrast to the economic up-swing 
between 2002 and 2007, it rather seems quite modest. Both high income countries like 
Spain and Greece and fast developing ones like Bulgaria or Estonia have had much 
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higher deficits on average and in peak since 2002. Therefore, the question of 
sustainability must be answered carefully.”  
Much of the following parts of the whole paper focused on the careful assessment of the 
South African case, but the authors made a short analysis of the potential problems of 
the EU countries, too. The space requirements for publication of course prevented a 
deep country analysis for every case, so they focused largely on the composition of the 
financial account and the utilization of this foreign capital to increase domestic 
consumption or investment, which is a standard part of the analysis of current account 
sustainability (IMF, 2009, p. 228). Despite the authors were hinting at potential 
problems, it was still a too optimistic and a bit naïve analysis from a today’s 
perspective. 
“To get a better impression of the sustainability of a current account deficit and the 
economic results, we briefly analyze the current and financial account composition of 
selected Eastern European countries and comment on their sustainability.” 
In what followed, Draper et al. did a short comparison on the level of the current 
account deficits of the nine EU economies and South Africa. They also noted the 
maximum and average CA deficits during 2001 to 2008 and classified the countries into 
two categories, whether they experienced a sudden stop of current account financing or 
not. In 2010, Draper et al. had based this assessment on the CA turning from deficit into 
surplus from one year to the next, which put Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and 
Lithuania on the list of victims of sudden stop of foreign financing. But this criterion 
kept Greece, Italy and Spain off the list of countries with current account reversals. 
Turning from high deficits directly into a CA surplus is a far too strict measure for a 
reversal of capital flows, and I would like to repeat this exercise now by using Edwards 
(2002) two criteria for CA reversals. Edwards (2002, p. 45) defines a reversal if either 
the CA deficit has decreased by 3% in one year or over a three year period. By using 
this categorization, all of the nine countries have experienced a sudden stop of external 
financing and capital flight (see Table 8). The smaller economies where most hit 
directly in 2008 and 2009 as a consequence of drying up of international liquidity and 
foreign financing, experiencing extreme reductions in their current account deficits of 
around 5-8% per year on average and excessive reversals of capital flows, but with 
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relatively short duration of only one or two years, despite high average and high 
maximum current account deficits preceding 2007. Greece and Spain as European 
Monetary Union (EMU) members had a longer period of deficit reduction with around 
2% per year and for Italy, we can observe only a relatively moderate adjustment over 2 
years which corresponds to its minor CA deficits between 2001 and 2007. The 
conclusion one could draw from this is, that EMU members are better insured against 
capital flight and current account reversals even if their deficits pre-2007 might have 
been comparable to other EU but non-EMU members. 
Table 8: Current account deficits to GDP, sudden stop in selected EU economies 
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Bulgary -10.6 -25.2 -23.1 -8.9 -1.5 0.1 -0.8 1.9 '09-'10 5.4 7.4 
Estonia -11.4 -15.9 -9.2 2.7 2.8 1.8 -1.8 -1.1 '08-'09 8.2 11.9 
Greece -8.5 -14.6 -14.9 -11.2 -10.1 -9.9 -2.4 0.7 '09-'13 2.0 3.8 
Hungary -7.4 -7.3 -7.3 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 3.1 '09 7.2 7.1 
Italy -0.7 -1.3 -2.9 -1.9 -3.4 -3.0 -0.3 1.0 '12-'13 1.1 0.9 
Latvia -13.3 -22.4 -13.2 8.6 2.9 -2.1 -2.5 -0.8 '09 11.0 21.8 
Lithuania -8.0 -14.4 -12.9 3.7 0.1 -3.7 -0.2 1.5 '09 11.8 16.7 
Romania -7.9 -13.4 -11.6 -4.2 -4.4 -4.5 -4.4 -1.1 '09 3.8 7.4 
Spain -6.0 -10.0 -9.6 -4.8 -4.5 -3.7 -1.2 0.8 '09-'13 2.2 4.8 
Source: Eurostat, 2014; grey areas highlight the period of current account reversal according to Edwards (2002) 
 
4.3 FOREIGN INVESTMENT, THE STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
Concerning the individual economic circumstances relating to the probability of strong 
and persistent CA problems, Draper et al. had written a short paragraph on the different 
countries, with a focus on the structure of the flows of foreign capital as given in the FA 
statistics:  
“The surplus in the financial account of the South-Eastern European countries Bulgaria 
and Romania has been driven by FDI in exceptionally large parts. From 2008 on, 
tendencies of overheating could be observed in both countries: strong wage increases 
(European Commission, 2009, pp. 52 and 98) go hand in hand with declining shares of 
capital goods and rising shares of consumer goods in total imports, indicating a less 
sustainable utilization of the current account deficit. As a consequence, domestic 
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demand and thus imports plummeted during the economic downturn, lowering the 
current account deficit considerably. Regarding the financial account, net foreign 
investment shrank. Backed up by a well-capitalized banking system, strong foreign 
reserves and the commitment of foreign banks to keep their levels of exposure, neither 
country experienced strong capital outflows (EBRD, 2009), although a slight reversal in 
2010 can be observed due to overall economic slowdown (EBRD, 2011).”  
For Bulgaria, their analysis seems too optimistic. Despite the high share of FDI on total 
financial inflows was maintained and net FDI flows have been positive up to 2013, the 
European Commission (2014) finds that CA adjustment is structurally and not cyclical, 
caused by deleveraging of financial institutions (which can be seen from Figure 4 below 
with net negative flows of portfolio investment and loans) in accordance with 
considerable drop of investment in construction and manufacturing which has been 
exaggerated between 2004 and 2008. However, the main factors seen in the adjustment 
process are a case for structural economic policy, and less institutional aspects 
interesting from the first part of this thesis. 
The point the authors overlooked in mid-2010 was the fact the Romania had applied for 
Balance of Payments assistance in 2009, of which the main credit lines have been 
disbursed between March 2010 and June 2011. They amount to 5 bn. Euro by the EU 
backed up by additional 15 bn. from IMF credit lines and other assistance programs. 
Because the data available in 2010 was only up to the 2nd quarter of 2010, the financial 
account did not show unexpected compositions of flows. Furthermore, Romania 
experienced a huge currency depreciation of about 30% in 2009 as a result of the 
sudden stop of capital inflows and capital flight. This realignment had moderating 
influences on the CA in the following years. Despite the European Commission (2013, 
p.25ff) hints at the role of quality of bureaucracy and public administration which is in 
need to improve, other institutional aspects are slowly improving or at least stable at a 
low level according to the Economic Freedom of the World indicators (EFW, Lawrence 
et al, 2013) and the World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI, Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
The low level of institutional quality speaks against the relatively high share of FDI on 
total financial inflows pre-2007, if we take the results from my survey in section 2.4 of 
this thesis into account, albeit one could argue that the main driver of FDI have been 
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low labor costs and the relatively stable institutional setting guaranteed by the 
membership in the EU.   
“Looking at the Baltic countries, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, net portfolio 
investments were negative in most years, indicating that inhabitants of these countries 
invested in the rest of the world according to their risk-diversification strategies. On the 
other hand, there is a stable net inflow of FDI. Thus, we can not state that the capital 
surpluses have been highly speculative in general. During the financial turmoil, Latvia 
and later Lithuania experienced a reversal of short term capital inflows [as indicated by 
negative net other liabilities, usually bank loans], as non-residents withdraw their 
deposits at domestic banks [and interbank-loans have been cancelled]. Due to the well-
capitalized banking sector, commitment of foreign banks and high foreign reserves, all 
three countries have been able to maintain their currency arrangements [in contrast to 
Hungary and Romania]. As very small open economies, domestic demand and 
investment is highly dependent on economic development in Europe and remains still 
weak (ERBD, 2009). Estonia has tried to avoid some problems of a small [open] 
economy by adopting the Euro in early 2011.” 
For the Baltic countries, Draper et al.’s analysis from mid-2009 and 2010 still holds true 
in general. Interestingly, a regional study from the European Commission among central 
and east European countries highlights the significant influence of relatively low levels 
of corruption in attracting FDI for Estonia, especially in comparison to the two other 
small Baltic states (Grigonyte, 2010, p. 4ff). Furthermore, the European Commission 
hints at the fast restructuring of the Estonian economy, turning from CA deficits to 
surpluses by considerable export upgrading in the manufactures sector (Lamine, 2010, 
p. 4ff). This interpretation is again in line with the findings of chapter 2 of my literature 
survey and on the influence good institutions on foreign financing and on export 
upgrading and export performance. 
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Figure 4: Structure of the financial account in selected EU economies
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Hungary, the former showcase of an East-European transition economy, suffers from 
political distress and structural problems like high public deficits (IMF, 2009). From 
2006 on, short-term oriented capital inflows dominated over FDI. […] Hungary has 
become one of the early and most prominent victims of the financial crisis in Europe. 
Mass capital flight in early 2009 and strong exchange rate depreciation was the 
consequence of lost trust in the government’s ability to cope with the financial crisis. 
Since then, the Hungarian currency has regained its pre-crisis level, but investor 
sentiments are still weak (ERBD, 2009 and 2011). 
It is especially Hungary which is a good case study for the arguments of an influence of 
institutional insecurity on foreign capital as given in section 2.4. Since 2007 and 
especially 2010, investor sentiment for Hungary has decreased because of insecurity 
over government interventions, not only into the market process, but also into the legal 
system (European Commission, 2014a, p. 43ff). The European Commission especially 
criticizes “[T]hat the loss in competitiveness has taken place mainly until 2009-2010 
and that it was to a large extent driven by the deterioration in the policy-environment. 
[Investors] mention legal stability as well as the predictability of economic policy as 
primary weaknesses in the economic framework.” (European Commission, 2014a, p. 
48). For example, the WGI show a continuous weakening of rule of law, control of 
corruption and regulatory quality between 2007 and 2012, the last year actually 
available (Figure 5). The IMF (2014) and the European Central Bank (2014, p.190ff and 
p. 323ff) hint at the institutional aspects as potential risks for investment and growth. 
For example, the ECB recommends that “The government should actively seek to 
improve foreign investor sentiment by […]respecting the existing contracts between 
private parties […] and guarantee certainty in the implementation of private contracts” 
(European Central Bank, 2014, p. 194). 
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Figure 5: WGI of Hungary 
 
 
 
 
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010), data update September 2013 
 
4.4 THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT, TARGET2 LIABILITIES AND SUDDEN STOP OF 
FOREIGN FINANCING 
Despite a detailed analysis of the Hungarian case, especially the interrelation of 
institutional quality and (foreign) private investment, would be interesting, it is more 
suiting for this essay to put the focus on Greece, Italy and Spain, as a focus on these 
countries serves as the connection to the following chapter 5. For these countries, 
Draper et al. had written in 2011: 
“In contrast to the Baltic countries, the three South-European countries Greece, Italy 
and Spain have been more worrisome from the beginning, as their current account 
deficits were financed mainly by portfolio investments and came along with net FDI 
outflows in many years. […] As members of the European Monetary Union, the three 
countries have been saved from capital flight and exchange rate troubles until 2008” 
From our knowledge today, there are some important elements in the above paragraph, 
relating to the earlier and later chapters of this thesis. First, Greece, Italy and Spain have 
relatively high shares of Portfolio (debt and equity) and loan financing and low shares 
of FDI, as can be seen from Figure 4. They are at the same time the countries with the 
highest corruption according to the CPI (Transparency International, 2013) within the 
group of countries with EMU membership in 2001 (EMU2001). They also have 
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significantly lower values in some institutional indices as given by the EFW 2007 
index, that is their EFW rating is below one standard deviation from the mean of the 
EMU2001 group for rule of law, freedom to trade internationally and markets 
regulation, a picture which is confirmed if we use the WGI instead (Table 9). This is 
again (and surprisingly obvious) in accordance with the findings on the structure on the 
financial account from the literature survey above, stating that ailing institutions lead to 
lower FDI shares in financing and higher bond and especially loan financing (section 
2.4.2).  
Table 9: Institutional indicators for Greece, Italy and Spain, 2007 
  
EFW 2007, data update 2012 (0-7; higher 
is better) 
WGI 2007, data update 2013 (-2.5 - +2.5, 
higher is better) 
  Rule of law Trade Regulation Rule of law Corruption Regulation 
Greece 6,72 7,61 5,86 0,84 0,25 0,90 
Italy 5,96 7,90 6,50 0,44 0,31 0,92 
Spain 6,96 7,73 7,10 1,13 0,99 1,21 
EMU2001 8,17 8,18 6,92 1,41 1,46 1,42 
s.d. 
EMU2001 1,13 0,38 0,58 0,48 0,72 0,34 
EMU2001: average for the member states of the European Monetary Union as of 2001; s.d. standard deviation 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010); Lawrence et al. (2013) 
 
But from a today’s perspective, Draper et al.’s interpretation in 2011 of the slow 
decrease of the current account deficit, which they interpreted as absence of large 
amounts of capital flight, was lacking the information regarding specific internal 
accounting regulations in the European System of Central Bank (ESCB), which is now 
known as part of the TARGET2
25
 debate. The mechanism of TARGET2 and some 
implications are part of chapter 5 of this thesis. For now it is sufficient to note that 
TARGET2 balances are an indicator of excess money creation of a national central bank 
in the EMU and its subsequent transmission into other EMU member states in response 
to redemption of foreign capital or lack of foreign credit to finance imports. Taking 
account of TARGET2 liabilities, the assessment of a moderate reversal of foreign 
capital inflows and a steady adoption of the CA has to be examined anew. 
  
                                                 
25
  Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System. 
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Table 10: Current account to GDP and sudden stop without TARGET2 liablities 
  av
e
ra
g
e 
'0
1
-
'0
7
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
re
v
er
sa
l:
 3
%
 
(s
ta
rt
-e
n
d
) 
a
ve
ra
g
e 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 
/y
ea
r 
m
a
x
 
d
ec
li
n
e/
ye
a
r 
Greece -8.5 -7.2 -4.4 -5.2 7.0 -1.4 -2.4 '08-'12 7.5 12.2 
Spain -6.0 -3.9 -9.6 -4.2 -3.6 8.1 14.6 '09-'12 9.8 11.7 
Italy -0.7 0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.1 9.4 3.8 '10-'12 5.1 9.4 
Source: Eurostat, 2014; grey areas highlight the period of current account reversal according to 
Edwards (2002) 
 
For this, it is necessary to account for TARGET2 liabilities in the FA balance and the 
CA balance over a year for the three economies and to calculate the new values relative 
to nominal GDP. This gives us the “potential” CA balance values which are in 
accordance with the economies external budget constraint, if transfers of domestically 
created money into other EMU member states via TARGET2 would not have been 
possible (which is the case for non-EMU members). Applying Edwards (2002) method 
for identifying CA crises as above changes our judgment on the severity of the stop in 
foreign financing. As we see from Table 10 and the maximum decline in one year there, 
now all three countries show values of necessary CA adjustment of around 10%, which 
is dramatic given the size of the economies relative to the smaller Baltic and South-East 
European economies with same reductions. Second, the average values of reduction per 
year in comparison to the average pre-2007 are between 5% and 10%. Even using my 
first criterion in 2010 for a sudden stop, a change from CA deficits to surplus within one 
year, Greece would have experienced this harsh event in 2010 and Spain and Italy in 
2011 in this contra-factual scenario (neglecting how realistic this could have been from 
the real economy’s side). 
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Figure 6: Structure of financial account flows w/o TARGET2 liabilities, bn. of Euro. 
Source: Eurostat, 2014 
 
From a BoP perspective, TARGET2 balances are booked in the financial account under 
the item ‘other investments, monetary authorities’ and can therefore relatively easy be 
traced if one knows what to look for. The aggregate figures for FDI, portfolio 
investment and other types of investment, which I have presented in the 2011 paper and 
are repeated with actual data above in Figure 4, however hide this important point. If we 
account for the position of net assets/liabilities in the statistical item ‘other investment, 
monetary autorities’ of the FA, we get a better picture of the form of (private) capital 
flight that occurred in the three South-European countries between 2008 and 2012 
which is shown in the graphs of Figure 6. 
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In these graphs, the grey dotted bar shows “other types of investment” (non-FDI and 
non-(equity and security types of)portfolio investments). Pre-2007, this position 
included mainly loans of banks and other financial institutions. The dark dotted bar 
shows ‘other types of investment’ if ‘other types of investment, liabilities, monetary 
authorities’  is subtracted. The difference between the two bars shows the amount of 
TARGET2 liabilities on “other types of investment” and gives a feeling for the extent to 
which flight of foreign capital out of the financial sector of these economies has been 
refinanced by TARGET2 and the national ECBs. For Greece, the year 2010 shows net 
FDI and portfolio capital flight and barely net other inflows (largely official transfers by 
the IMF and EU), which has been offset by TARGET2 liabilities. The private capital 
leaves the country if possible. The same holds for 2011. For 2012, the numbers are 
blurred by the massive aid programs and official debt restructuring, which is why the 
axis for Greece is cut at +/-50 bn. Euro. The true figures for 2012 in Greece correspond 
to portfolio capital flight in height of -77 bn. Euro, offset by around 110 bn. Euro of 
official assistance programs but only minor TARGET2 liabilities. For Spain, a 
superficial analysis of the financial account would show a change in the passive side of 
the FA, with private capital flight in FDI and portfolio investment but increased loans 
and other types beginning in 2011. If we account for TARGET2 liabilities, one can see 
that all types of private capital run away from the Spanish financial market, including 
loans and other investment types. The same holds for 2012 and we can easily tell the 
same story for Italy in 2011 to 2012 from the graphs.  
Looking at the figures from Table 10 for the necessary current account adjustment and 
the replacement of private foreign capital by newly issued money, as shown in the 
structure of the FA, gives a good feeling for the extent to which the monetary union has 
first facilitated risky capital allocation pre-2007 (in comparison to the non EMU-
members) and the stabilizing effect of the EMU onto the members economies in the 
short run after 2007. This might be the reason, why even Sinn and Wollmershäuser 
(2012) as the main proponents of critical arguments against the TARGET2 mechanism 
repeatedly stated that the TARGET2 mechanism as an emergency tool is unwanted, but 
“there are reasons to believe that the ECB policy was right in the short term because 
markets were dysfunctional…” (Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012, p. 477). One could 
discuss if the markets were dysfunctional, or if market actors were individually rational 
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with suboptimal welfare consequences, leading to a potential coordination failure. What 
gets clear is that knowledge on the detailed provisions of accounting between the 
national ECBs is relevant for an assessment of the severity of a CA crisis in the EMU. 
The following chapter 5 will touch this issue again and get deeper into the question how 
such detailed provisions could possibly be designed and which consequences this would 
have on the cohesion of the EMU. 
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5 TARGET2 BALANCES, REFORM AND THE COMPARISON WITH FED’S 
ISA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The technical term „net claims within the Eurosystem“, describing a balance sheet item 
of a central bank of the Euro area, has gained considerable attention in the public and 
the scientific community, starting with the first article by Sinn and Wollmershäuser 
(2011). These so called TARGET2 claims constitute net foreign assets of the German 
taxpayer which could be at risk in case of a breakup of the Euro area. In August 2012, 
these claims reached its maximum value, adding up to around 752 bn. Euro, with Spain 
being the largest (approximately 434 bn. Euro) and Italy the second (approximately 289 
bn. Euro) largest debtor. Since 2012, this balance sheet item of the German Bundesbank 
is declining and has lost now (August 2014) 40% in comparison to its previous heights. 
The underlying cause of the unprecedentedly high TARGET2 balances is the 
combination of low collateral requirements of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
monetary policy and capital flight from the so called GIIPS
26
 countries. The evolving 
insecurity between the financial institutes in Europe and following breakdown of 
interbank financing in 2008 can be seen as trigger for the repatriation of funds back into 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) core countries
27
. But from 2010 on, TARGET2 
balances show the underlying mistrust of financial market participants into the 
credibility of economic policy actions in the GIIPS, fear of government insolvency or 
even an exit from the EMU. At least in this part of the discussion, critics and defenders 
of the actual TARGET2 mechanism are sharing one opinion (see de Grauwe and Ji, 
2013 vs. Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2011, p.41). The disputes in the literature hint at the 
differing evaluation of the TARGET2 mechanism, either as a moderating element in the 
political and economic convergence or as a vehicle for maintaining the huge economic 
imbalances within the EMU.  
                                                 
26
  Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portgual, Spain 
27
  In conjunction with Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, p.5), we define the core countries as the 
TARGET2-net claimants Germany, Finland, Luxembourg and The Netherlands, whereas the 
peripheral countries correspond to economies with (large) TARGET2 liabilities, mainly the GIIPS 
countries. 
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We will not take part in this line of the discussion, as it is full of value judgments, good 
economic arguments from both sides and high insecurity in the range of thinkable 
scenarios for the further development of the EMU. This part of the thesis will touch 
three main aspects. Section 5.2 summarizes the discussion on the issue of TARGET 2 
and gives an introductory overview on the mechanics of TARGET2 balances, which are 
necessary to understand the following parts. It introduces also some aspects which seem 
to be relevant for a well-founded economic judgment. It is shown that TARGET2 
debtor countries are not necessarily also the beneficiaries of the transactions that cause 
the excessive balances. Second, it is argued that TARGET2 liabilities are not to be seen 
as loans from a legal perspective. Lastly, it is reminded that the whole TARGET2 
system can be circumvented by cash payments, which would enable the large financial 
institutions to elude possible cost increases induced by a reform of TARGET2. Section 
5.4 goes into a detailed analysis of the risks associated with the claims against the 
ESCB, which the TARGET balances simply represent. From this detail it will become 
clear that TARGET2 balances are approximately one half of the potential losses in case 
of an exit of one member from the EMU. 
Section 5.5 analyzes critically the known proposals for a reform of TARGET2 
accounting mechanism. In general, various alternative compensatory mechanisms are 
thinkable. To our knowledge, the different modifications that have been discussed in the 
scientific community so far can be categorized into three groups: 
1. Penalty interest rates including risk-premiums 
2. Mandatory limits to potential losses 
3. Pre-specified provisions for loss-sharing in the case of an exit from the EMU 
It is shown that the proposals are not likely to reduce the balances without interrupting 
the cross-border payments. This contradicts the explicit provisions in Article 127 (2) 
TFEU specified objective of the Eurosystem as well as Article 63 (2) TFEU. They 
would also likely increase the possible doubts about the survival of the monetary union 
in times of economic crisis. In case of a strict and consistent implementation of one of 
the proposals, it is to be expected that a breakup of the monetary union will be enforced 
without a political coordination. As a predetermination of the distribution of future exit 
costs, the proposed TARGET2 modifications appear to us incomplete, because they do 
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not account for other positions of the central bank balance sheet. Since TARGET 
balances are only one part of the negotiations in the future relations between the then 
former EMU members, TARGET2 modifications constitute provisions for loss-
allocation accruing from monetary policy. These can and will most likely be (over-) 
compensated by corresponding agreements in other areas of future cooperation in the 
wake of the breakup negotiations. 
Section 5.6 takes up a detailed aspect, namely the assertion by Sinn and 
Wollmershäuser  (2011, p. 48ff) that the United States Federal Reserve (Fed) system 
has something comparable like a well-functioning settlement mechanism for payment 
transfer balances, which the EMU just has to copy. The main question is, why it works 
in the US system and if it could work in the actual EMU framework.  Overall, the 
analysis hints at three main questions which have to be answered for a positive 
assessment:  
1. Is it ensured that there exists always a sufficiently large volume of assets eligible 
for settlement, be it in normal economic circumstances and times of turmoil as 
well? 
2. Can the central banks get ownership of such assets in the course of their regular 
monetary policy operations? 
3. Is it ensured that the financial sector does not have to rely on the national 
(regional) central banks as their lender of last resort (in times of systemic 
financial crisis) over an extended period of time? 
We will show that the US system works relatively smoothly because the supposedly 
harsh restriction of Interdistrict Settlement Account (ISA) settlement is accompanied by 
many counterbalancing mechanisms, focusing on the impact of the central 
implementation of monetary policy, the management of the monetary assets in a single, 
common portfolio and the monetary policy focus of the Fed on federal bonds - as well 
as other side aspects - in comparison to the ESCB.  
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5.2 A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
5.2.1 HOW THE DISCUSSION EVOLVED 
In February 2011, Hans-Werner Sinn (2011a) described TARGET2 balances as "a kind 
of overdraft" whose limitation was not provided for because it has not been reckoned 
with such huge and persistent increases. In June, Sinn (2011b) spoke of TARGET2 
claims as "sort of transfer" through which the ECB is practicing a hidden bailout. The 
balances showed that private loans from EMU core economies to the periphery 
countries are replaced through public loans. The peripheral countries financed their 
current account deficits in this way. For the NCBs of the core, and especially for the 
German taxpayer, this increased the liability risks for potential losses of their central 
bank (Sinn, Wollmershäuser, 2011, p. 33). 
In response to the TARGET2 critiques, the German Bundesbank explained the increase 
in its monthly report of March 2011 in the balances with "tensions in the money 
market" and "problems in the banking sector in the Euro area” (Bundesbank, 2011, p. 
35). TARGET2 balances are seen as an indicator for a "changed distribution of 
refinancing operations in the Euro area". She made particular note that TARGET2 
balances are not independent risks and that losses from monetary policy operations are 
allocated on the basis of the capital key of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), regardless at which National Central Bank (NCB) the losses occur. Willem 
Buiter et al. (2011), Karl Whelan (2011), Ulrich Bindseil (2011) and others argued 
vigorously against the evaluation of Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011), particularly 
against the supposed function of financing of the current account, the relevance for 
losses in the Bundesbank balance sheet and the recommended reforms of the TARGET2 
system.  
5.2.2 WHY DO THE TARGET2 PROVISIONS DO NOT CONTAIN A SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISM BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL CENTRAL BANKS? 
With the establishment of the ESCB and the introduction of the Euro as the common 
currency, the participating countries have committed to create an institution for the 
settlement of cross-border payments to ensure at all times within the EMU, that one 
currency unit in a region is equivalent to the same currency unit in a other member 
region. According to Garber (1998, pp. 8 ff) the design of TARGET[2] (automatic 
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cross-border payment transfers, daily clearing, but no settlement) represents the 
technical institution to ensure this principle and prevent speculative attacks within the 
Euro area (as in the case of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 
1992/93). It was specified in the agreements on the European Union that the ESCB 
decides centrally on the measures of monetary policy considering the whole currency 
area (European Union, 2012, Article 14.3) and the NCBs have to implement them 
without large discretion. The NCBs have no longer the right to interrupt or disturb 
otherwise cross- border payment flows with reference to their own monetary stability, 
as it was the case in the ERM. 
Since the obligation to defend the fixed exchange rate with currency reserves and the 
legal basis to stop cross-border payments within the EMU are missing, it is not justified 
from an economic viewpoint to speculate onto a Euro area exit and the accompanied 
depreciation of the new currency. However, termination of EMU membership can be 
caused by political reasons. In the end, each state is sovereign within the Eurozone to 
undertake such a step, if its citizens find that the associated costs are less than the 
benefits of staying within the EMU. The advantage of the TARGET2 mechanism lies in 
the fact that economic actors are able to transfer their capital across borders in such a 
situation of political uncertainty, without that this capital movement itself accelerates or 
enforces an exit from the EMU. The latter would be the case with ‘hard’ settlement 
obligations for the TARGET2 balances. The possibility of free capital transfers under 
all economic circumstances can rather be seen as a prerequisite for economic integration 
in a monetary union without enforced political cohesion. 
5.2.3 PROBABILITY OF EXIT FROM AND CAPITAL FLIGHT WITHIN THE EMU  
Implementing ‘hard’ settlement conditions for accrued balances in the cross-border 
payments system of the EMU basically mimics a system with fixed rates, where the 
obligation to intervene for stabilization rests unilaterally at the central bank whose 
jurisdiction has experienced net capital outflows (Burgold and Voll, 2012a, p.26). 
Depending on the design of the respective institutions and their credibility to maintain 
the underlying cross-border transactions, speculation against the membership of a 
country in this ‘settlement-EMU’ would be justified economically and politically, with 
both factors reinforcing each other. The economic rationale behind such capital flight 
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would follow currency crises models of Krugman (1979) or Flood and Garber (1984). 
Here, the prospect of an end of assets eligible for settlement forces market participants 
into rational speculation against EMU membership of a single nation. Political 
statements – like threats of exclusion or discussions about a unilateral declaration of exit 
from EMU - could be seen as trigger events to induce capital flight. These triggers 
could start the speculation on Eurozone breakup, despite the lack of fundamental 
economic factors, as for example, Obstfeld (1986) shows. The absence of any provision 
within the TARGET2 framework with respect to a settlement of payment balances 
ultimately prevents the – otherwise technically unavoidable - materialization of a 
balance of payments crisis like in the case of non-defendable fixed exchange rates. 
5.2.4 ORDO-ECONOMIC REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
PAYMENT SYSTEM BALANCES 
Aside from the technical necessity of an absence of settlement obligations for cross-
border payment flows in the EMU, it is still worthwhile to discuss this issue from a 
normative perspective. The starting point of such considerations could be an ordo-
economic viewpoint, in particular the principle of competence and responsibility: As 
single economic actors have the right to make autonomous decisions, they must bear the 
resulting risks from their activities. Based on this, two conflicting lines of argument 
with respect to the emergence of TARGET2 balances can be developed. 
From the first viewpoint, TARGET2 liabilities could be considered as a direct cause of 
the economic policies of the affected peripheral countries in the EMU. If we assume 
that the NCBs within the ESCB have sufficient autonomy in their monetary policy 
operations (e.g. through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance
28
), a compensation of 
TARGET2 balances is necessary. Kohler (2011) argues that otherwise the peripheral 
countries in the Eurosystem gain the same privileges as the reserve currency country in 
a system of fixed exchange rates. The need for a settlement of TARGET2 balances 
could withdraw this privilege again. Furthermore, a deferred implementation of 
necessary structural policy reforms to reduce real production costs and regain 
competitiveness in some of the peripheral countries could be interpreted as a strategic 
                                                 
28
  These ELA are possible from article 14.4 of the ESCB statutes, stating that such measures have to 
be undertaken at own accounts and can be rejected by a 2/3 majority of the ECB-council.  On 
March, 21
st
, 2013, the ECB-council has made the continuance of the Cyprus ELA dependent on its 
application in a formal EU/IMF credit progamme, for example. 
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decision which aims to reduce the burden of adjustment for the country and impose it 
onto the other members of the EMU (Fahrholz, Wojcik, 2010). As the success of this 
strategy is unknown for the peripheral government as well as for private economic 
actors, exit from the EMU is still an alternative. Therefore, this gambling strategy can 
be seen as a catalyst of capital flight and thus for the TARGET2 balances, thereby 
increasing the costs for the core countries in case of a breakup of the EMU and thus 
improving the bargaining situation of the periphery further. By this way, deferring 
recommended reforms is a means to obtain funds through a fiscal transfer mechanism 
from the other Euro members. From both points of view - the autonomous monetary 
policy decisions and the strategic delay of reforms - the financial risks of the core 
members contained in TARGET2 balances increase.  A settlement mechanism for 
TARGET2 balances with valuable assets could reduce these risks and could therefore be 
recommended. 
From the opposite point of view, it could first be argued that peripheral countries do not 
have enough control over monetary policy instruments to reduce TARGET2 balances. 
Furthermore, these TARGET2 balances are induced by exogenous shocks (i.e. not 
backed by the economic fundamentals). The domestic economic policy is not able to 
influence this capital flight in the necessary scale in such a case. Second, the cash 
outflows from the peripheral countries which cause the TARGET2 imbalances have to 
be refinanced through the commonly agreed monetary policy instruments of the ESCB 
(e.g. low collateral requirements and low interest rates) to avoid strong deflationary 
developments. It is not justified to assign the responsibility for these measures to the 
peripheral countries alone, because they rest on majority decisions with the ECB 
council (Kooths, van Royne, 2012, p. 6 -13). From this perspective, excessive 
TARGET2 balances are not a result of misguided economic policies of single countries, 
but rooted in the fact the EMU is not an optimum currency area. TARGET2 balances 
are therefore a sign of insufficient resilience of the EMU towards asymmetric shocks. 
Actually, the ESCB tries to compensate for this failure by (ordo-economic questionable) 
monetary policy measures: very low interest rates and increased risk for the portfolio of 
central bank assets. Introducing a settlement mechanism for TARGET2 balances and 
assigning the burden for compensation to the periphery would not only increase the 
tensions in a highly imperfect currency area, but are also not justified from an ordo-
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economic perspective. Independent of which of the above two lines of argumentation 
one is tempted to follow, proposals for a reform of TARGET2 accounting are worth to 
assess, if they are compatible with the necessities of a monetary union.  
5.3 ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF TARGET2 BALANCES 
5.3.1 BASIC KNOWLEDGE  
For the casual reader, the relevant hint for an understanding of the TARGET2 balances 
is the fact that money – book money as well as cash – is a liability from a central banks 
perspective. Therefore, it has to be backed by equally valued assets from a balance sheet 
perspective. If the money base rises within the jurisdiction of a central bank - either by 
money creation or by inflow of legal means of payment from other parts of the 
monetary union - this increase in liabilities must be backed by an equal increase in the 
central bank’s assets as follows from the simple principle of double-entry accounting. 
Between the ESCB members, TARGET2 balances form the balance sheet item which 
equalizes changes in the money base and the asset side caused by cross-border transfers 
of electronic money between the economic subjects of Eurosystem member states. 
TARGET2 balances are receivables (or liabilities, depending on their sign) of a national 
central bank in the Euro area against the entire Eurosystem. They are at first a purely 
technical result of the difference in incoming and outgoing cross-border payment flows 
between the financial institutes of the different Eurosystem member states. TARGET2 
liabilities occur, if the economic subjects of one country transfer more funds into other 
countries of the Euro area than are received from there. In the opposite case, TARGET2 
claims emerge. Figure 7 shows a simple example for the transfer of 100 Euro via 
TARGET2. If a French importer wants to make a payment to a German exporter, then 
its French commercial bank processes this payment via TARGET2. The deposits of the 
French commercial bank at her NCB (Banque de France) are then reduced by the 
amount transferred. The commercial bank of the German exporter is credited with the 
corresponding payment. Through this transaction, the Bundesbank inquires a balance 
sheet liability "deposit of a commercial bank" from the Banque de France and receives a 
TARGET2 claim as an offsetting entry on the asset side of its balance sheet. At the 
liabilities side of the Banque de France’s balance sheet, the commercial banks’ deposit 
is replaced with a TARGET2 liability instead.  
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Figure 7: Simplified example for emergence of TARGET2 balances 
 
A central bank creates (central bank) money by buying assets, including loans to 
commercial banks. Apart from other liabilities, the central bank’s equity corresponds to 
the difference between its assets and the central bank money created (banknotes and 
central bank deposits). In the Eurosystem, this money-creation process is distributed 
across all national central banks with the result that the corresponding assets are also 
distributed over the 17 NCBs of the Eurozone. 
If central bank deposits are now transferred across borders, a formal change of the 
debtor occurs. The claim of the commissioning commercial bank against its NCB in one 
country of the EMU changes into a claim of the receiving commercial bank against their 
NCB in another EMU member state. Without further accounting entries, the equity of 
the transferring NCB would increase, while that of the receiving NCB would decrease. 
To assure neutrality of electronic cross-border transactions with respect to the central 
bank’s equity positions, TARGET2 claims and liabilities are necessary. The equity of 
the NCBs thus remains unaffected from the flow of central bank deposits within the 
Eurozone. If this was not the case, the net payments receiving countries such as 
Germany would have to recapitalize continually their NCB. The NCB’s in the 
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peripheral countries could pay their governments correspondingly higher capital 
dividends. 
5.3.2 MAIN BENEFICIARIES ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE PERIPHERY COUNTRIES 
Accordingly, TARGET2 balances indicate whether the money base within the 
jurisdiction of a central bank has decreased (TARGET2 liabilities) or increased 
(TARGET2 claims), without active monetary policy operations of the national central 
bank. The steady increase of TARGET2 liabilities of some Euro member states simply 
shows that more payments from these countries have been made towards the rest of the 
monetary union than vice versa. It is important to note, first, that these balances are not 
caused by active transfers of central banks among themselves, but by action of 
independent, mostly private economic actors. Secondly, the balances are not bilateral in 
nature, but they are claims against the entire Eurosystem. 
 In the context of the current euro sovereign debt crisis, this is due to the fact that 
deposits are withdrawn because of the fear of bank failures, high taxation or forced 
conversion in case of an exit from the EMU. Another main driver of TARGET2 
liabilities of the periphery are loans falling due, which are not extended but requested to 
redeem by the creditors in the core countries (Buiter et al., 2011, p. 5). This can easily 
be seen from the dynamics in the structure of the financial account of Greece, Spain and 
Italy in Figure 6, and we will come back to this special point of capital flight by the 
financial sector in section 5.6.3.  
Without the EMU, comparable capital deductions would have provoked the devaluation 
of the crisis currencies, as could be seen with Hungary or Romania in 2009 in the 
European Union itself. This would have imposed large losses onto the former 
(predominantly private) creditors of the core countries. Depending on the currency of 
the individual credit contracts, either the nominal value of credit claims would have 
been reduced through devaluation, or the default risk of their borrowers would have 
increased because of an increase in the real debt burden due to depreciation. To 
conclude, the beneficiaries of the actual TARGET2 mechanism are primarily all 
economic actors which were able to withdraw their financial assets from the crisis 
countries without suffering devaluation losses. This includes wealthy investors in the 
periphery. But above all, the main beneficiaries are the foreign creditors in the former 
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capital exporting (core) countries that have financed investment and consumption and 
therefore the current account deficits in the periphery for years (Buiter et al., 2011, p. 4-
6; Dullien and Schieritz, 2012). 
Because of this fact it is unfortunate to speak of a financing of current account deficits 
by TARGET2, such as Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, pp. 34ff) do. It is of course true 
from the viewpoint of Balance of Payments accounting, but it mixes causes and 
consequences. Their statement implies that the current TARGET2 claims correspond to 
actual financing of consumption of the debtor countries. As long as the capital flows 
are, however, clearly crisis-driven (De Grauwe, Ji, 2012), the interpretation is more 
convincing that many years of mislead investments from actors in the core countries and 
other currency areas are withdrawn and the associated risks are passed on to the level of 
the whole monetary union. 
5.3.3 TARGET2 CLAIMS AREN’T CREDITS 
The common task of the Eurosystem, i.e. of the NCB’s and ECB, is the management of 
the common currency in accordance with the provisions of Article 127 (1) and (2) 
TFEU. As far as the NCBs are required to conduct the monetary policy measures on 
behalf of the Eurosystem, they also manage the resulting assets and liabilities on its 
behalf. TARGET2 positions arise inevitably with the common task. From this point of 
view, TARGET2 balances do not represent individual credit relations between the 
NCBs, but are accounting positions in a framework of internal accounts. Provisions to 
limit increases in the single accounting positions would hinder the Eurosystem in 
fulfilling its treaty obligations. 
The existence of the TARGET2 balances is caused by the design of the European 
Monetary Union, since the NCB are - regardless of the common task - organizationally 
and legally independent. If the Eurosystem had been built as a monolithic entity 
(without the legal autonomy of each NCB), these balances could not have been arising. 
With centrally conducted monetary policy and the NCBs in a role of simple 
subsidiaries, TARGET2 balances are not needed as balance sheet items. This supports 
the view that TARGET2 claims do not constitute credit from a legal perspective. Only 
in the external relationship - in transactions on the primary or secondary market - credit 
relationships arise for the NCBs or the ESCB. Further hints at the non-credit nature of 
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TARGET2 claims are given by the facts that there are no provisions for the due dates 
and that they are virtually non-interest bearing within the EMU (see section 5.4). 
To interpret TARGET2 entries equivalent to an overdraft credit of the government is 
also not correct if we consider the legal acts which induce the payment transactions. In 
general, the contracting parties are private economic agents, who settle their voluntarily 
agreed business relations by money transfers via the TARGET2 system. Even if the 
payments are financed by credit lines of foreign investors, the NCB is not a contracting 
party in this business. 
If we accept for this moment that TARGET2 claims is indeed credit by legal terms, the 
periphery countries could repay the debts by way of legal means of payments at any 
time, which is the Euro currency. But this is exactly the mechanism by which these 
claims have arisen, because the transfer of deposits leads to TARGET2 liabilities for the 
country from where the transaction is ordered. Paradoxically,  "redemption" with legal 
tender can therefore only be held if a creditor, for example, currently the Bundesbank, 
transfers money to a debtor, for example, the Bank of Greece. 
Other paradoxes arise when TARGET2 balances are added up with the national debt, 
which would be justified if TARGET2 liabilities are indeed loans taken as remarked in 
an early comment by Sinn (2011b): If, for example, the Greek government takes credit 
of 1 mn. Euro at the capital markets at home and buys goods or services in Germany, 
Greek government debt would increase by 2 mn. Euro. If, on the other hand, the Greek 
government buys domestic goods and services with credit from Germany in the same 
volume, Greek government debt would remain unchanged. Furthermore, this procedure 
would not be in accordance with the international conventions for calculation of the 
budget of the general government sector, in which central banks assets and liabilities are 
not included, for very good reasons. Note that including TARGET2 balances into the 
government financial accounting would also make the EMU core countries very happy, 
as TARGET2 claims would reduce the government debt there like it would increase the 
debt in the periphery. The conclusion of all the above cited arguments is that TARGET2 
claims do not individually constitute credit claims and TARGET2 liabilities do not 
constitute debt. They have to be seen as accounting entities which arise with the orderly 
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conduct of the tasks of the ESCB and serve to prevent fluctuations in the equity position 
of the NCBs caused by large volumes of cash transfers. 
5.3.4 EVASION OF ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS VIA CASH 
Rather than settling cross-border transfers via electronic money, payments can also be 
made in cash. The low importance of cash transactions for the trans-European trade is 
not least due to the fact that cashless payment works smoothly and with very low 
transaction costs in the whole EMU. In case of a significant interruption of the 
TARGET2 mechanism or a strong increase in transaction costs, an evasion to cash 
transports through cooperation of several major European banks would easily be 
possible. 
The issue of banknotes and their transfer to another Euro member state gives rise to the 
same problem for the equity situation of the NCBs as the creation of central bank 
deposits and their transfer via TARGET2. Since the border crossing of bank notes is not 
controlled and full control would be very costly, the ESCB has set provisions for 
compensation of nationally different volumes in the issues of banknotes. From the 
monthly creation of notes in the Eurozone, 92% are accounted for in the liabilities side 
of the NCBs balance sheets according to their ESCB capital key. The remaining 8% are 
assigned as a liability to the ECB. An NCB which gives fewer notes into circulation 
than would correspond to its calculated share in the total provision of notes, gets 
credited the difference in the balance sheet item "claims related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes in the Eurosystem”. NCBs which issue more notes than calculated out of 
their capital key receive corresponding liabilities. The development of this position for 
selected EMU member states can be seen in Figure 8 below
29
.   
  
                                                 
29
  At January, 1
st
 in 2004, 2007 and 2009 and on May, 1
st
, 2009, the capital keys and shares have been 
adopted. This explains some jumps in the graphs. 
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Figure 8: Intra-Eurosystem claims/liablities due to issuance of notes, Bn. of Euro. Source: NCBs 
 
Although the balance sheet items corresponding to the issuance of bank notes originate 
for the same reasons as the TARGET2 positions and are treated alike (unsecured and are 
seemingly interest-bearing with the main refinancing rate), they did not play a role in 
the TARGET2 discussion
30
.  An impairment of non-cash payments would certainly lead 
to an evasion to more cash payments. The supposed risks for the actual TARGET2-
claimants would remain unchanged, only the accounting positions within each NCB 
would change.  
The development of the Greek notes balance shows the fact that a banking crisis may 
reflect itself in the demand for and issuance of banknotes (Figure 8). A 
disproportionately large issuance of notes can be observed there since mid-2010, while 
the profiles of other Euro countries are unchanged. 
  
                                                 
30
  Whittaker (2011) as well as Bindseil and König (2011, p. 26) mention in one sentence each, that 
cash payments might be a substitute for electronic money transfers. However, they do not elaborate 
their arguments further. 
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
France Portugal Spain
Italy Greece
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Germany
91 
 
Table 11: Intra-Eurosystem claims and liabilities, Bn. of Euro; Source: NCBs; TARGET2: Westermann, 2014  
  end of Q4/2011 end of Q4/2013 
  
Intra-Eurosystem 
claims/liabilities 
from TARGET2 
Intra-Eurosystem 
claims/liabilities 
from issuance of 
notes 
sum 
Intra-Eurosystem 
claims/liabilities 
from TARGET2 
Intra-Eurosystem 
claims/liabilities 
from issuance of 
notes 
sum 
Germany 463 -170 293 510 -224 286 
France -80 78 -2 -34 76 42 
Portugal -61 22 -39 -59 29 -30 
Spain -151 26 -124 -213 47 -166 
Italy -191 -8 -199 -229 12 -217 
Greece -105 -18 -123 -51 -10 -61 
Ireland -124 -15 -139 -55 -16 -71 
 
Table 11 shows how the (net) intra-Eurosystem position (TARGET2 balance plus the 
balance of disproportionate issuance of notes) would change for some EMU members if 
Euro notes are considered. The German intra-Eurosystem claims are reduced by 30-40% 
as well as the Spanish Intra-Eurosystem liabilities, if we treat the adjustment items for 
notes issuance and TARGET2 similar. The French liabilities even convert into surplus 
by accounting for notes in 2014. To conclude this section, it is highly relevant to 
account for issuance of notes if one thinks of modifications to the TARGET2 
mechanism. At the one hand, the volume of Germany’s net intra-eurosystem position, 
and therefore the supposed balance sheet risk, changes if notes are considered. On the 
other hand, significant increases in the transaction costs for electronic cross border 
payments within the EMU as caused by the proposed modifications of the TARGET2 
mechanism can be circumvented by the economic actors by using cash. This would only 
change the balance sheet positions, but not the potential balance sheet risk of the core 
countries. 
5.4 DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BETWEEN ENCBS AND TARGET2 RISK 
5.4.1 DISTRIBUTION OF MONETARY INCOME AND LOSS SHARING 
As already mentioned in, no range of maturity is specified for TARGET2 liabilities. 
Since a repayment is also not envisaged, there is in principle also no risk of default, as 
long as the counterparty (from perspective of the ESCB: the individual NCB) exists. 
But as a TARGET2 claim is an asset, it nevertheless represents an economic value. In 
the balance sheet of the NCB which has received net payment transactions, TARGET2 
claims are claims against the ESCB to back up increased liabilities du to money creation 
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by the loans of other NCBs. The true risk of the Eurosystem and the TARGET2 
balances lies in these loans, as pointed out by the Bundesbank (2011). 
Losses arising from the conduct of common monetary policy will be shared by the 
individual NCBs according to their capital keys in the ESCB (European Union, 2012, 
Article 32). For the amount and distribution of losses it is irrelevant, whether the money 
created with a single asset now at risk has already left the country of origin through 
TARGET2 or not. If the loss concerns not an asset acquired in course of the common 
monetary policy, but for example for the purpose of emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA), the risk falls solely on this single NCB, again regardless of whether the so 
created money has left the country or not (European Union, 2012, Article 14.4) . 
Therefore, TARGET2 claims bear no risk during the ongoing operations of the EMU. 
Only if a country decides to leave the common currency, losses can arise. For such a 
case the complete risk contained in the balance sheets of the NCBs can be easily 
calculated. 
5.4.2 POTENTIAL ESCB BALANCE SHEET LOSSES IN CASE OF A EUROZONE BREAKUP 
Officially, there are no provisions on how to proceed in case of a breakup of the 
Eurozone with the balance sheet items of the ESCB. If we look at the Maastricht treaty, 
this is not surprising. The membership in the common currency area was seen as an 
essential part of EU membership, and permanent or infinite non-membership is seen as 
an exception. Consequently, Article 50 TFEU handles only the resign of membership in 
the European Union. Paragraph 2, sentence 2 provides that “the Union shall negotiate 
and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union”. 
It is thus a question of the exit negotiations or agreements made thereafter, whether - 
and if so, how - the withdrawing NCB would have to pay the remaining EMU members 
a compensation for accrued losses. 
If a country is to leave the euro, it will enact by law that as of now his new currency is 
legal tender, and all existing claims and liabilities by domestic borrowers and agreed 
upon under domestic law are legally enforceable only in the new currency. This legal 
view is rooted in the mutually accepted principle of international law known as “lex 
monetae”. This means that a sovereign country is free to choose its own currency and 
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therefore to determine the legal tender for all contracts agreed under the national law as 
well as its exchange value towards other currencies (Clark et al., 2013, p. 8).
31
 
Just before the exit from the common currency, the money base issued by the NCB is 
covered by four different balance sheet items. The value of issued Euro notes is 
accounted as in (1) a balance sheet item of notes allocated according to the capital key 
and (2) an item against the Eurosystem for volumes issued beyond, as shown in Figure 
8 above. Furthermore, the NCB holds (3) Euro deposits of commercial banks and (4) 
the discussed TARGET2 liability for the net transfer of commercial bank deposits into 
the other Euro area countries. Only the third item, deposits of commercial banks, is 
primarily a matter of national sovereignty. Large losses may arise out of the other three 
balance sheet items for the remaining members of the EMU. 
In addition to the intra-Eurosystem balances (TARGET2 plus disproportionate notes 
issuance), the remaining EMU members and the exiting NCB would have to agree on 
the treatment of the proportionally allocated Euro notes. Overall, the monetary losses 
are rather well quantifiable from the NCBs' balance sheets. Table 12 shows for different 
countries, how high these losses would have been, if the single country ceased EMU 
membership on January, 1st 2012 or January, 1
st
 2014. Had France then left the 
currency area, an agreement on 165 or 136 bn. Euro of liabilities of the France NCB 
would have been required. The exit of Germany, in contrast, would have left the EMU 
with considerable net gains. Note that in the total calculation of losses, in case of many 
countries the total value of both bank notes positions adds up to around 50% of the total 
risk for the remaining EMU. Therefore, ignoring notes in the discussion of risk 
emerging from TARGET2 balances and exit of single members is clearing misleading. 
  
                                                 
31
  However, there is a legal minority viewpoint challenging this view by stating that lex monetae 
holds only for a change in the national legal tender of which the country is the only sovereign. But 
as the Euro is a common currency and not the sovereign currency of a single nation, lex monetae 
does not hold if a member decides to leave the union (Clark et al., 2012, p. 8, FN 18).  
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Table 12: Potential balance sheet losses in case of an exit of a single member from the EMU. Source: NCBs 
  Exit on January 1st, 2012 Exit on January 1st, 2014 
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[1] [2] [3] 
[1] + [2] + 
[3] 
[1] [2] [3] [1] + [2] + [3] 
Germany 463 -170 214 -79 510 -224 230 -56 
France -80 78 163 165 -34 76 178 136 
Portugal -61 22 20 59 -59 29 22 52 
Spain -151 26 71 196 -213 47 57 223 
Italy -191 -8 141 340 -229 12 157 374 
Greece -105 -18 22 145 -51 -10 24 85 
Ireland -124 -15 13 152 -55 -16 14 85 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION OF CHANGES IN THE TARGET2 MECHANISM 
5.5.1 PURPOSE AND CATEGORIZATION OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO TARGET2 
In order to reduce or avoid the above calculated losses from TARGET2 balances in 
advance, basically there are three mechanisms thinkable: (1) penalty interest rates 
including a risk-premium, (2) mandatory limits to potential losses, and (3) pre-specified 
provisions for loss-sharing in the event of exit of an EMU member state. 
Penalty interests on intra-Eurosystem liabilities as proposed by Schlesinger (2011) 
follow the first mechanism. A binding loss limitation is introduced by the ideas for a 
cap on TARGET2 balances (Sinn, 2011c) or marketable debt rights as proposed by 
Fahrholz and Freytag (2012). Proposals for securitization with collateral or settlement 
of TARGET2 liabilities with valuable assets as proposed by Sinn and Wollmershäuser 
(2011) represent the idea of pre-specified determination of loss allocation. All potential 
variants have in common, that they try to shift the estimated costs of an exit unilaterally 
to the exiting economies. It is questionable whether all members of the EMU would 
decide in favor of such regulations.  
5.5.2 INTEREST RATE PENALTY 
Schlesinger (2011) suggests a limitation of the TARGET2 balances through a surcharge 
on the already accruing interest rate in height of the main refinancing facility. However, 
without changes in the actual calculation of monetary income, this would not be 
relevant. Interest income and expenses arising from intra-Euro-system liabilities are 
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treated as prepayments for the distribution of monetary income over all NCBs. The 
higher interest income of the TARGET2 claimants would therefore lead to a 1:1 
reduction of their share of monetary income of the Eurosystem
32
. The level of the 
interest rate for the TARGET2 balances is completely irrelevant in the actual case. 
To cause any effect, interest accruing on TARGET2 balances would have to be taken 
out of the calculation of the monetary income. The creditor NCBs could then receive a 
higher share of the monetary income of the ESCB and countries with TARGET2 
liabilities see a corresponding reduction, which will potentially show up in their 
remittances to the treasury or even require recapitalization of the NCB by the 
government. The main counter-argument against interest payments is that TARGET2 
balances would increase by the accumulated interest. The cause is that the NCBs with 
TARGET2 liabilities will transfer the interest in Euro via TARGET2 to NCBs with 
TARGET2 claims. Additional money flows out of the periphery and into the core 
economies – which is the cause for TARGET2 balances overall. Building up allowances 
for possible losses in case of an exit of countries from the Euro periphery is not possible 
in such a way. The collected “fund” itself consists of illiquid TARGET2 balances; their 
treatment in the event of a breakup is unclear. Therefore, we have to conclude that 
interest payments can not serve to mitigate the risk of TARGET2 claims. 
If the interest payments should provide direct incentives for NCBs in the Euro periphery 
to reduce their TARGET2 liabilities, it remains unclear how they could do that if we 
disregard violations of the TFEU by interventions into the electronic cross-border 
transfer of the common currency. However, the penalty interest rates reduce the equity 
of the NCBs in the countries with net cash outflows. Would any government be obliged 
to refund its NCB to ensure a minimum volume in equity, TARGET2 interest rate 
payments would be a drain on the government budget and could strengthen the political 
interest to combat the root causes of capital flight. One might argue that this brings 
general incentives for an investor and market-friendly economic policy of a member 
state, but a fast response of TARGET2 balances to the “right” reforms seems to be 
unlikely.   
                                                 
32
  A more detailed explanation for the calculation of monetary income can be found in Burgold and 
Voll (2012), p. 24f. 
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5.5.3 CAPS FOR TARGET2 LIABILITIES 
Beside the above analyzed mechanism of penalty interest rates for TARGET2 liabilities, 
all three other known proposals for a reform of the TARGET2 mechanism are special 
cases of a caps/ceilings for TARGET2 liabilities, as Sinn (2011c) demanded it in an 
early comment on TARGET2 imbalances. If these pre-defined regulations are not met 
anymore, like shortage of eligible assets as in the case of settlement or lacking debt 
rights, the payment transfers via TARGET2 has to be capped. Therefore it is reasonable 
to analyze the potential consequences in general. 
From a macro-viewpoint, the advantage of ceilings for TARGET2 liabilities would be 
that capital flight could be contained or delayed in times of crisis , as a cap on 
TARGET2 balances works like capital controls and limited convertibility of a currency. 
The downsides are increased transaction costs and payment risk in cross border 
payments, which could significantly hamper EMU economic integration, convergence 
and growth. Aside from considerations on the working of the EMU, capping is difficult 
because TARGET2 is a gross payment system, i.e. the actual balances will only be 
available at the end of each working day. For a reasonable cap, however, information 
about the real-time balances would be required, to stop outgoing transactions within a 
second if necessary. TARGET2 would have to be converted into a net payment system. 
If the critical range of the cap is reached, outgoing payment transfers would then be 
executed only to the extent that equivalent ingoing payments are received.  
Furthermore, regulations have to be found to prevent economic actors from exploiting 
the discrimination of payments to the order sequence, because early payments have a 
time advantage over later ones
33
. This gives incentives to transfer higher amounts than 
necessary to accounts in the core countries, which slows the settlement of later orders 
and puts the early payers at the same time in a position to offer payment services in the 
core countries themselves. As long as all market participants are convinced that 
remitting deposits from Germany to Greece is handled in five minutes, while it may 
conversely take several weeks, they also have the incentive to transfer and invest as 
much as possible in Germany, making the reaching of a cap more likely. Such a 
                                                 
33
  Note that TARGET2 is a real time payment transfer system. Payments are processed according to 
their order sequence and not collected and processed later but simultaneously. 
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mechanism would mimic the model setup used by Krugman (1979) and induced panic 
and capital flight itself. 
But above all, the capping of TARGET2 balances should be accompanied by a capping 
of issuance of Euro banknotes. Otherwise, cross-border payments could be carried out 
in (unlimited) volumes with cash money. The risk for the core countries would migrate 
from the TARGET2 claims into the balance sheet item representing claims against the 
Eurosystem due to disproportionate notes issue in the periphery. The downside of a 
restriction of notes issuance is that cash is limited at the one hand, but could settle the 
intra-EMU transactions. This would cause deposits and cash as no longer being of 
equivalent value and result in price premiums on non-cash transactions and a hoarding 
of notes. This behavior is well know from currency arrangements based on bimetallism, 
where the more valuable coins (usually gold) have been hoarded and used for 
“important” transactions and the less common coins (usually silver) have been used for 
the simple daily transactions. Citizens in the former GDR know this from their usage of 
the Deutsche Mark. 
In the cross-border economic transactions, problems would arise when companies from 
the periphery have indeed enough funds and deposits, but can not pay their liabilities in 
the core countries because the TARGET2 cap is reached. This would result in potential 
for serious legal conflict. The real value of different balances and bank notes in a crisis 
country would naturally radiate to other members of the monetary union. Exports from 
the crisis country would preferably be paid in cash, because it would entail substantial 
discounts or simply onto bank accounts in the core country. Electronic cross-border 
payments via TARGET2 would come to a halt or be considerably reduced, which 
corresponds to a disintegration of the financial market with the monetary union. 
Overall, the consequences show clearly that cross-border payments are significantly 
disturbed. This is clearly against the statutes of the ECB, (European Union, 2012, 
Article 3.1), stating that one of the four tasks is to enable the smooth functioning of 
intra-European payments. 
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5.5.4 TRADABLE DEBT- OR PAYMENT TRANSFER CERTIFICATES 
Fahrholz and Freytag (2011) propose a market for tradable debt certificates for 
TARGET2 liabilities. For this purpose, a European agency has to be created which 
determines the annual amount of credit growth for the entire Euro area and allocates 
corresponding debt certificates among the Euro area members. Fahrholz and Freytag 
(2011, p.23) give the annual amount of credit growth as an example, but note that 
“Whether such a regulation would be technically feasible, politically desirable and 
legally allowed, is an open discussion”. We will discuss these issues in short below. We 
see three basic institutional levels that could be target of debt certificates: 
• The lending of each individual NCB should be limited with certificates to avoid 
disproportionate money and credit growth. Further liquidity demand of the 
corresponding domestic financial sector should then be satisfied over the intra-European 
(interbank) markets. This corresponds to limiting base money growth in the whole EMU 
by using nationally different limits. But this means that tradable certificates would not 
be needed. It shares furthermore all advantages and risks of a monetary strategy 
targeting the amount of money supply only. Note that in this case, regional liquidity 
crisis or a regional systemic financial sector crisis could not be supported by monetary 
policy measures, which means that the central bank could not perform one of its 
historical main functions as the lender of the last resort (Goodhart, 1988, p. 85ff). 
• The lending of commercial banks is target of the debt certificates. To be 
different from the bidding process for central bank money as the basis for lending of 
commercial banks, the debt certificates would have to be allotted according to specific 
criteria. This allotment instead of the market oriented bidding process for central bank 
money corresponds to the idea of credit ceilings in monetary policy, of which France 
has made extensive use within its concept of “encadrement de credit” with ambivalent 
results during the 1980s. The German Bundesbank has rejected this idea in the 1972s 
(von Hagen, 1998, p. 450ff).  
• Public sector borrowing could be addressed by these debt certificates, which 
seems to be the background of Fahrholz and Freytags’ idea, as they refer to Casella 
(1999) who explicitly addresses certificates for government bonds as a way to reach the 
goals in the Maastricht treaties. If TARGET2 liabilities are indeed added to government 
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debt (despite the objections in section 5.3.3), they would of course be limited by the 
certificates, too. Besides this, buying foreign debt certificates means additional 
TARGET2 liabilities, as money has to be transferred into the TARGET2 claimant 
countries from the periphery. If a member state runs out of debt certificates, it results in 
the same consequences as reaching the transfer limit implemented by a cap on the 
TARGET2 balances. Furthermore, it is unlikely, that free market prices will emerge 
from inter-governmental exchanges of the debt certificates. Their transfer would be 
subject to various political intentions, so that the instrument of “tradable” debt 
certificates seems unnecessary.  
Burgold and Voll (2012, pp. 117ff) argue that instead of a market for tradable debt 
certificates, a market for tradable transfer rights for the TARGET2 system could be an 
alternative. But depending on the detailed provisions, this could either have no effect on 
TARGET2 balances or an adverse effect if the willingness to pay is very high in 
countries with TARGET2 deficits. A credible implementation would further need a 
delay of intra-European payments or work like a cap if sufficient debt certificates are 
missing. It therefore shares all of the critiques for TARGET2 caps. Any form of debt 
certificates for TARGET2 balances would further be an organizational complex facility, 
significantly increasing the transaction costs in cross-border electronic payments within 
the EMU and would therefore work like an import tax between the members of the 
EMU.  
5.5.5 TARGET2-SETTLEMENT WITH „EUROPEAN STANDARD BILLS“  
The proposal of Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, pp. 48ff) for a settlement of 
TARGET2 balances with European Standard Bills (ESB) is the most widely conceived 
idea to solve the problem of TARGET2 imbalances. Sinn and Wollmershäuser state that 
their idea is a parallel to the settlement of Interdistrict Settlement Accounts (ISA) in the 
Federal Reserve System (Fed) of the USA. According to the authors, ESB are 
standardized, short-termed government bonds, ideally with first rank and secured with 
claims on parts of the national tax income or other real values (gold, real estate). The 
proximity to the "gold certificates" of the U.S. Treasury is obvious in the latter case 
(Federal Reserve Board, 2012, pp. 352f). ESB should be used for an annual settlement 
of TARGET2 balances to reduce them periodically. This would reduce the financial risk 
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for central banks with TARGET2 claims in the event of the dissolution of the current 
EMU. Furthermore, Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, p.48) argue that a NCB receives 
incentives to reduce the TARGET2 liabilities, as it has to buy the securities if necessary.  
The first question is how a NCB with TARGET2 liabilities can get into possession of 
ESB and which effects does this have itself on the TARGET2 balances. If the NCB 
acquires ESB from foreign capital markets, the outgoing transfers of money from the 
periphery to the core accompanying these purchases would lead to additional 
TARGET2 liabilities. Therefore, the desired clearing is only possible by net exports of 
domestic ESB, which makes it necessary that the NCB in the periphery would have to 
buy domestic ESB at the domestic capital markets. A direct purchase at the primary 
market is in clear contradiction to the prohibition of monetary financing of governments 
(Art. 123 TFEU). 
On the secondary market, NCBs could buy ESB from the domestic financial sector. 
ESB would be more attractive than other, unsecured government bonds because of its 
priority over other government debt, its collateral and the demand of the NCB leading to 
higher liquidity and thus price stability. In order to reach a sufficient volume of ESB for 
TARGET2 clearing, the NCB would have to offer much more favorable refinancing 
conditions. At last, the financial sector has the possibility to speculate against its own 
central bank and theoretically force the central bank to provide highly favorable 
refinancing conditions by (temporary) capital flight. In the same way, speculation 
against the continuance in the EMU, a stop of intra-European money transfers or a stop 
of TARGET2-settlement is possible (be it for political or economic reasons). 
A more practical problem seems to be the most likely very low volume of ESB 
available for settlement in the whole EMU. ESB would then take the same role as Gold 
or the USD in the Bretton Woods System, from where the Gold and Dollar shortage are 
well known causes for Balance of Payments crisis during this period (Bordo, 1993). If 
we compare the volume of short-term financial obligations of the states (of which ESB 
could potentially only be a fraction) with their TARGET2 liabilities as done in Table 
13, it can be seen that, except for Spain between 2008 and 2010, settlement of 
TARGET2 balances would have failed solely for the reason that the available volume of 
short-term government debt securities is too low. The Greek central bank for example 
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would have been able to settle only a maximum of 22% of the accrued TARGET2 
liabilities in recent years, even if it had been in possession of 100% of short-term debt 
instruments of the Greek state
34
. If the amount to be settled is calculated as the daily 
average value of TARGET2 balances (like the ISA-calculation in the U.S.) the 
settlement volume would amount to about 17, 40 or 80 bn. Euro in 2008-2010, 
respectively. The total short-term government debt securities in these years amount to a 
volume of 6.5, 11 and 9 bn. Euro for the Greek government. In both cases – settlement 
of TARGET2 balances to a reference date or for average daily values over the last year - 
the settlement should have been stopped already at the first signs of the financial crisis.  
Table 13: Short term government debt obligations relative to TARGET2 liabilities. 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece 18.5% 22.2% 10.7% 14.2% 18.5% 
Italy . . . 68.5% 59.4% 
Ireland 44.7% 43.3% 25.4% 35.2% 49.4% 
Portugal 86.7% 87.1% 34.8% 18.2% 17.7% 
Spain 184.2% 250.6% 281.8% 117.7% 75.2% 
Sources: Bank of Greece (Central Government liabilities, short term securities) Irland and Spain: Eurostat (Series 
gov_dd_gdd, 1 to 5 years); Italy: Banca D'Italia (The Public Finances, various years: Public Borrowing 
Requirement, Table 4, Series S571730M) Portugal: Banco del Portugal (BP-statistics portal, series: general 
government gross debt, short term securities excl. financial derivatives); TARGET2 balances: Westermann, 2014: 
www.Eurocrisismonitor.com 
Italy: 2008-2010 TARGET2 claims, therefore not reported 
 
Second and apart from the problem of an insufficient total volume of available eligible 
assets, settlement through ESB could also lead to unwanted interactions with the fiscal 
policy sphere. First, this could lead to a higher amount of short-term securities, which 
would be necessary for the TARGET2 settlement only. It would increase the funding 
risk if a larger part of governmental debt is financed by short term instruments. In times 
of crisis and panic this fact alone could induce capital flight – away from the short term 
bonds of the ‘risky periphery’ countries towards the core countries of EMU and increase 
TARGET2 balances over this channel. Second, the additional demand of the NCB for 
ESB would work like a subsidy for short term government securities, making short term 
                                                 
34
  In contrast, the FOMC restricts the purchase of securities to 70% of a single tranche in total and 
reduces the sales volume already with a volume of 30% in holdings to small amounts in general to 
avoid too strong influences on the market price and available remaining maturities at the bond 
market. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013, p. 6f). 
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funding more attractive toward the government than it should be from a markets 
perspective.  
At third, the decentralized implementation of monetary policy in the ESCB (as will be 
described in section 5.6.2 as an important prerequisite for the smooth working in the 
Fed ISA settlement) could hinder a smooth settlement through ESB. Since the domestic 
central banks do not automatically get ownership of ESB with their undertaking of the 
regular monetary policy operations, ESB would have to be bought from the domestic 
financial sector. This means, that the NCB has to undertake open market operations 
which are not justified by monetary policy considerations in the first case and might 
therefore interfere with the objectives of monetary policy in general. As it shows, the 
idea that TARGET2 balances could be settled by ESB is therefore deceptive. 
Even if we assume that TARGET2 balances have been settled at one date by ESB, the 
TARGET2 liabilities would yet arise automatically and in the same amount again at 
maturity of the ESB: the repayment involves the transfer of Euro-deposits from the 
periphery to the core via the TARGET2 system, which is the mechanism how 
TARGET2 claims and liabilities emerge. Since the ESB are intended to have a short 
duration, redemption of the maturing ESB will be necessary in relatively frequent 
periods. 
The clearing of the risky and illiquid TARGET2 claims converts the latter for a limited 
time into supposedly more liquid and less risky government bonds (ESB). The 
correctness of this thought is based on the assumption that access to the collateral 
securing the bonds is enforceable. However, it is a strong assumption that promised tax 
increases to the benefit of foreign nations (the holders of the ESB after TARGET2 
clearing) could be enforced even against the will of the current government of the 
debtor country. From this perspective, ESB are not necessarily less risky and more 
valuable than TARGET2 claims for the Eurozone core members. 
Even with real assets as collateral, like gold, silver or real estate, the payment 
obligations caused by ESB could be converted into the new national currency in case of 
an exit of the periphery country from the Euro area (as long as the new government can 
refer to the lex monetae). Since the NCB is virtually unlimited solvent in its new 
103 
 
currency, recourse to the collateral could be avoided. The main "success" of the ESB 
solution from the viewpoint of the actual TARGET2 claimants would therefore be, that 
a predetermination of the distribution of losses from the balance sheet item “balances 
from intra-European transactions” is implemented. The losses would then fall in full 
volume onto the exiting country and would not be allocated via the capital key onto all 
ESCB members. However, this could be achieved by means of an intergovernmental 
agreement without creating a new assets class, without the necessity for a clearing 
mechanism for TARGET2 balances and without the problems occurring while the 
periphery NCBs try to purchase ESBs. 
 
5.6 PRINCIPLES OF ISA-SETTLEMENT OF THE US FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM  
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, p. 28) get their idea for settlement of TARGET2 with 
ESB from the example of ISA settlement in the U.S. Particularly, they write that “[…] 
If such a system were introduced in the Eurozone, the NCBs of the GIIPS would no 
longer have an interest in overexerting their money-printing presses […]. As in the US, 
no Target balances would be piling up.” According to our above argumentation, such 
settlement should not work smoothly, not even in the U.S. The main questions are 
therefore, why it works in the U.S. system (relatively well), what the detailed 
institutional provisions of ISA settlement are, how the way of conducting monetary 
policy influences the settlement process and which are the differences that prevent an 
adoption of such settlement in the EMU actually. I try to answer these questions below. 
5.6.1 SETTLEMENT OF INTERDISTRICT SETTLEMENT ACCOUNT BALANCES  
The system settling the transfer of book money for economic agents between different 
Fed districts in the U.S., is the system of Interdistrict Settlement Accounts (ISA). The 
incoming and outgoing transfers are recorded in these accounts for each ‘district-Fed35’ 
and balanced at the end of the day. In April of each year, the average daily ISA balance 
of each district-Fed is determined and settled against the corresponding share of the 
common open-market portfolio  (SOMA portfolio: System of Open Market Accounts). 
                                                 
35
  With this term, we denote the 12 single Federal Reserve Banks of the Federal Reserve System of 
the USA. 
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Figure 9shows a simplified example of the functioning of the settlement of the ISA 
balances in the U.S. 
Figure 9: Example for ISA settlement according to paragraph 40.40 (S.136ff) of the Federal Reserve 
Accounting Handbook (Federal Reserve Board, 2013) 
 
Negative balances are settled by, first, balancing the average daily ISA account against 
the amount of U.S. treasury gold certificates. At this first step, a - preliminary - 
settlement of the balance with gold takes place. At the second step, the gold certificate 
account is increased (with funds from the other district-Feds) to the extent that the 
amount of Federal Reserve Notes with gold certificates equals the average in the entire 
Fed-system. Counterintuitively, the district-Fed in question receives now a gold inflow 
by ISA settlement, if gold coverage of banknotes is insufficient compared to the other 
districts. In the third step, this inflow of gold certificates is offset by a reduction in the 
districts share of the SOMA portfolio. If the stock of outstanding notes did not change 
in a Fed district over the curse of a settlement period, the ISA balances are ultimately 
assumptions
other assets 10 notes 100
gold-certificates 1 deposits of commercial banks 800
loans to commercial banks 0 ISA 100
SOMA share 989
1000 1000
Step 1:
other assets 10 notes 100
gold-certificates -19 deposits of commercial banks 800
result: loans to commercial banks 0 ISA 80
SOMA share 989
980 980
Step 2:
other assets 10 notes 100
gold-certificates 10 deposits of commercial banks 800
Result: loans to commercial banks 0 ISA 80
SOMA share 960
980 980
- average gold coverage of cash in the Fed-system is 10%
- the average daily value of the ISA account for FED1 is '-20'
Assets Liabilities
District-FED 1
Assets Liabilities
District-FED 1
Caculation of average daily ISA account 
balance against the volume of gold certificates
Increase in the amount of gold certificates and 
offsetting by reduction of the SOMA shares 
ISA balances are in fact compensated with 
SOMA shares, not gold certificates
Simplified balance sheet of FED1 
before settlement
Assets Liabilities
Shortage of gold certificates as coverage for 
notes in circulation
District-FED 1
105 
 
settled exclusively by the shares in the SOMA portfolio, without any change in the 
stock of gold certificates (Federal Reserve Board, 2013, pp. 136ff).  
By settling the average daily ISA balances once a year, imbalances are not equalized 
completely at the settlement date. Rather the increase of the balances is attenuated. The 
unsettled overhang is carried forward as a fixed amount to the settlement in the next 
year. Then it enters completely into the settlement calculation, such that smoothing of 
an ISA balance occurs in fact over two years. 
However, the described settlement procedure is legally not binding, but is at the 
discretion of the Federal Reserve Board. Section 16(4) of the Federal Reserve Act 
provides that "The Board of Governors [...] shall make and promulgate from time to 
time regulations governing the transfer of funds and charges...among Federal Reserve 
Banks." Therefore, the Federal Reserve Board is able to suspend the settlement for 
individual district-Feds, if after compensation, their solvency or ability to provide 
payment services would be at risk. Subsequently, the provisions governing ISA 
compensation have been circumvented by voluntary loans among the Reserve Banks or 
by forced loans based on Article 11(b) of the Federal reserve Act, for example in the 
years 1917-1921 and 1933 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1921, p.6; Hackley, 1973, 
p. 164ff). Eichengreen et al. (2014) show further, that this mutual assistance between 
the single Fed districts was common in case of liquidity needs, involving transfers of 
large volumes in gold certificates between the single district-Feds. This sharing of 
reserves has been essential in maintaining the cohesion of the Fed system between 1913 
and 1960, with the largest assistance happening between 1945 and 1960 and not during 
the turbulent 1920s or the Great depression. In 1975, (daily) compensation by means of 
gold certificates on the Gold Settlement Fund (the predecessor of the ISA) was changed 
into the current practice of yearly SOMA settlement. In reaction to the latest financial 
crisis, the ISA compensation was suspended from 2008 to 2010 (Koning, 2012). 
These measures show that the ISA settlement procedure has been constantly developed 
in the U.S., especially when it came to financial crises in individual districts or across 
the U.S. as a whole. It indicates that the purpose of settling ISA balances by means of 
the SOMA portfolio is aimed at the allocation of profits and losses arising from 
monetary policy operations proportional to the money in circulation within each district 
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(Federal Reserve Board, 2013, p 136) rather than their purpose as a precautionary 
arrangement for the breakup of the Dollar currency area, as it is the background in the 
discussion about settling the European TARGET2 balances. 
5.6.2 ELEMENTS OF US MONETARY POLICY ARRANGEMENTS INFLUENCING ISA-
SETTLEMENT 
5.6.2.1 Settlement with all assets used for monetary policy purposes 
In addition to the possibility of suspending the settlement procedure if required, many 
balancing mechanisms and regulations exist within the U.S. system to prevent a 
possible insolvency or stop of dollar payments by single district Feds as a consequence 
of settlement. A leading role is played by the centrally conducted monetary policy in the 
United States. The U.S. prime interest rate (Federal Funds Rate) is usually controlled 
through outright transactions of securities by the New York Fed on behalf of the Federal 
Open Market Committee. The corresponding securities are held in the System of Open 
Market Accounts (SOMA) portfolio, which is also managed by the New York Fed on 
behalf of all district-Feds (Federal Reserve Board, 2013, p. 128). As argued in the 
previous section, the SOMA shares are used for the calculation of the profit and loss 
distribution to the individual district-Feds. At the same time, the shares also serve as 
assets for the compensation of ISA balances. That is to say that settlement of Dollar 
transactions between the different Fed districts is undertaken by means of all assets used 
in the regular monetary policy operations. With the example of the ISA balances of the 
Richmond Fed in 2008, the relevance of this point for the function of ISA settlement 
can be illustrated: The volume of the Richmond Fed’s shares at the SOMA portfolio 
amounted to USD 210 bn. at the end of 2008, ISA liabilities were approximately USD 
164 bn. (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 2010) and the corresponding average 
daily balances to be settled in April 2009 amounted to approximately
36
 USD 33 bn. 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2013, series D5WAISAL). To that extent, even this 
historically high compensation would have had no impact on the effective functioning 
of settlement. But if only a fraction of assets used for monetary purposes is accepted as 
eligible, for example the gold certificates which were used as before 1975, the stock of 
USD 875 mn. in gold certificates of the Richmond Fed would have been much too little. 
                                                 
36
  The average daily values have been calculated from a weekly basis, as daily values are not publicly 
available. 
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In the Fed-system (almost) the entire volume of the assets used for monetary policy 
operations is available for the settlement of interdistrict payment balances through the 
usage of the SOMA portfolio. This is also a mandatory precondition for the credibility 
of such a compensation mechanism and its compatibility with maintaining the 
interdistrict payment flow. A too low volume of generally available eligible assets could 
result in a suspension of the settlement even in normal economic conditions, with 
corresponding effects on the suspected disciplining effect for money creation of a single 
Fed district. Incidentally, it was this limitation of the volume of gold certificates as 
eligible assets which led to the introduction of the current practice of yearly settlement 
with SOMA shares in the U.S. in 1975 (Federal Open Market Committee, 1975, p. 
40ff). Thus, the definition of the type of eligible assets plays an outstanding role in the 
smooth functioning of any settlement mechanism. 
What are the differences between the Dollar area and the Euro area, which prevent a 
successful adoption of the ISA-settlement by the ESCB? In the Eurosystem, the 
common money creation is undertaken primarily through loans of the single NCBs to 
eligible counterparties residential in their country. In return, the counterparties have to 
deposit certain assets as collateral
37
 (European Central Bank, 2011, p. 15ff). Thus, the 
claims from these loans represent the majority of assets in the NCBs balance sheets. 
Because individual loans are not comparable or tradable with each other and their value 
is at risk in the case of an exit from the EMU (because of devaluation and default), these 
credit claims can not be seen as more secure than the existing TARGET2 claims in the 
event of a break-up of the current Euro area. This makes a settlement of TARGET2 
balances by means of the assets actually used for monetary policy purposes difficult and 
is an important aspect which prevents the adoption of the ISA settlement procedure in 
the EMU.  
Necessary for the credibility and the viability of any "European ISA settlement 
mechanism" is that all (or at least a large part of) the claims and assets that get into the 
ownership of the ESCB through the monetary policy operations can be used for 
settlement of the payment balances, as it is the case in the USA since 1975. The actual 
                                                 
37
  Further minimum requirements exist depending on the kind of monetary policy instrument. They 
are uniform across the EMU (European Central Bank, 2011, p.15) 
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design of monetary policy instruments in the Euro area does not guarantee this 
important fact. 
5.6.2.2 Federal character of underlying assets, term structure and rollover of US-
debt 
If money is created in the Fed-System, usually U.S.-treasury securities are being 
purchased outright
38
. This has the advantage that the settlement medium in the U.S. has 
a federal character and is therefore not linked to the risks of national (regional) 
economic development and financial stability. Furthermore, it is traditional and regular 
policy of the Fed to prolong expiring U.S. treasury securities from the SOMA portfolio 
and replace them with new ones, if not otherwise need for influencing the Federal Funds 
Rate (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009, p.8). This prevents the emergence of 
(temporary) ISA balances when the securities fall due. Would the bonds in the SOMA 
yet be repaid, there would still no systematically negative ISA balances occur – which is 
in contrast to the situation in the Euro area and lies in the fact that the SOMA portfolio 
contains mainly assets from the federal level, whereas in the Euro area each NCB has a 
regional asset portfolio from the loans given to the national counterparties. 
The underlying mechanism can be understood easily: If a European NCB buys 
securities from other EMU member states (private or government) for settlement of 
TARGET2 balances, this central bank would incur an additional TARGET2 liability as 
a result of the necessary payment flow in this transaction. This TARGET2 liability 
would again have to be settled. Therefore, a central bank would have to buy domestic 
securities at the domestic capital market and hand them over to the other national central 
banks to prevent a TARGET2 liability to emerge at first hand. But when these securities 
fall due, the interest and principal payments will cause payment flows out of the country 
with the (settled) TARGET2-liability and into the country with the former and now 
settled TARGET2-claims, causing the TARGET2 balances to reemerge. The advantage 
in the use of federal bonds like in the U.S. or "real" values, such as gold and real estate 
in the balancing procedure, lies thus in its neutrality with respect to the origin of 
payment transfer balances itself. The interest and principal payments of U.S. treasury 
                                                 
38
  During the subprime crisis, the Fed has also given large volumes of loans against collateral to 
different financial institutions, which have expired during the year 2012. Since 2008, the Fed holds 
also securities of the government sponsored enterprises, which had maturities below 5 years in 
2013 and will not be revolved. 
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securities are financed through taxes collected from all districts in the U.S., therefore the 
repayment of treasury securities causes net ISA-liabilities for all Fed-districts (but the 
New York, where the SOMA is located) according to their share in national tax revenue 
but not one large liability for one particular Fed district. 
Additionally, the current instruments of monetary policy in the ESCB (European Union 
2012b, Annex I, Chap. 1.3) are too short in their duration to allow consistent TARGET2 
settlement in the Euro area. The Main Refinancing Operations and the Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations of the ESCB have a regular term of one week and three months, 
respectively
39
. If the assets backing these refinancing facilities (claims against the 
counterparties) are used for settlement of TARGET2 balances, the balances would 
reemerge each week with the end of the refinancing operations. Suitable eligible assets 
which do not systematically cause TARGET2 balances itself to reemerge with their 
maturity would therefore be commodities, real estate or "real" Euro Bonds by means of 
debt instruments of the European Union as a whole, funded by the (still to be granted) 
right of taxation for the European Union. Euro Bonds would have the advantage, that at 
maturity, money from taxes from all EU countries would be transferred to the holders of 
Euro Bonds without debiting individual countries systematically with new TARGET2 
liabilities (especially the ones with former negative, but now settled TARGET2 
balances). Alternatively, any kind of security is conceivable, which can be prolonged or 
has very long time to maturity, like eternal bonds, for example. None of these assets is 
currently part of the monetary policy instruments of the ESCB. As a conclusion, we 
have to say that not only the total available volume of assets eligible for settlement of 
TARGET2 balances is crucial for a time consistent settlement procedure, but also the 
maturity and the national (or inter-regional )character of the assets in use. 
  
                                                 
39
  The duration of the Long-term Refinancing Operations of the ECB has been extended for up to 36 
months during the height of the sovereign debt crisis in 2012, but the ECB has returned to its usual 
duration. 
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5.6.2.3 Benefits of centrally conducted monetary policy for the stock of eligible 
assets at single district-Feds and the emergence of ISA balances 
The central implementation of monetary policy in the U.S. ensures that each district-Fed 
gets automatically into ownership of a certain volume of eligible assets used for ISA-
settlement. Through the purchase of government bonds and other marketable assets by 
the Fed system, each district-Fed is allocated (daily) a volume proportionate to their 
previous share of the SOMA, independent of the fact that the created money flows to 
the financial institutions in their own district or not (Federal Reserve Board, 2013, pp. 
133ff). So as long as monetary policy in the U.S. does not reduce the money supply and 
thereby the volume of the SOMA portfolio, each district-Fed obtains an amount of 
eligible assets for ISA-settlement approximately equivalent to their proportion of total 
central bank money during the last year.  
At the logical second of money creation (before these funds are eventually transferred 
into other districts), each district-Fed would be allocated a share of the additional value 
in the SOMA. ISA liabilities arise always and automatically for each single district-Fed 
as the balance sheet counterpart to the allocation of SOMA shares in the course of 
money creation (with the exemption of the New York Fed, which has an ISA-claim, 
Federal Reserve Board, 2013, p. 136). Because the SOMA and the eligible 
counterparties (allowed to take part in the monetary operation of the Fed-system) are 
each located in the Fed district of New York, the transfer of newly created money to 
another account of any bank in another Fed-district, the other Fed district’s ISA account 
is credited with the corresponding value. But their overall (net) ISA balance is lower 
because of the earlier net liabilities from the SOMA assignment in the first step. The 
sum of the increase in the SOMA volume and the ISA claims arising from the transfer 
of the newly created money corresponds to the new liabilities resulting from the 
creation of money in the accounts of the particular district-Fed. An illustration with a 
simple example is given in Appendix A. 
The logic behind this bookkeeping is simple: As the financial institutions in a district re-
finance their business with the sale of eligible assets to the Fed-system (through the 
eligible counterparties), this decreases the aggregate assets of all financial institutions in 
the district. The commercial banks in a district are shareholders of their district-Fed 
(Federal Reserve Act, Section 9). From a consolidated perspective, the district would 
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lose financial wealth if its financial institutes sell assets to the Fed-System to refinance 
their business, because their district-Fed gets only allocated a fraction of this newly 
created money in form of higher volumes in the SOMA
40
. These are equal to the 
calculated SOMA share at the beginning of the actual settlement period and do therefore 
not take account of additional money created with the assets of this districts’ financial 
sector. Between two ISA-settlement dates, the missing wealth of the district is 
compensated by ISA-claims. The ISA claims therefore serve as a balancing item for the 
loss of assets eligible for monetary policy operations from the perspective of the 
consolidated financial sector of each district. As a result, the financial wealth of the 
consolidated financial sector in the district remains ultimately unaffected from the act of 
money creation. 
As long as the newly created money stays within a single district, the remaining districts 
have net ISA liabilities towards the former. In April of the following year, the 
remaining district-Feds have to transfer a portion of their SOMA-share so that the 
central bank money circulating within the district with ISA claims and the shares in the 
SOMA approximately match again. Before compensation in April, there is now a 
situation in which this district-Fed has less "real" assets from the SOMA portfolio than 
in a decentralized organization of monetary policy. This is exactly the same situation as 
the ESCB system with unsettled TARGET2 balances. That is to say, as long as money 
creation by regular monetary policy operations is higher for one Fed district than in the 
other districts of the Fed-System (and this money stays inside this district), the money 
base there is backed with proportionally less marketable assets than it is the case in the 
ESCB. In both systems of central banking, it does not matter in normal circumstances. 
Contrary to the description of Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, p.49) the single district-
Fed can not and must not purchase eligible assets from the financial institutions in their 
district or the capital market in general to achieve ISA compensation if the district-Fed 
is too low on SOMA-shares for settlement. Independent from the provisions in the 
Federal Reserve Act, this would obviously be in contrast to the common monetary 
policy objectives of the Federal Reserve System. First, it would undermine the position 
                                                 
40
  Note that the deposits received in exchange for the eligible securities are an asset for commercial 
banks and liability for the district-Fed, which cancels out each other from the consolidated 
perspective of the financial wealth of the district.  
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of the FOMC as monopolistic supplier of central bank money and second, drive the 
price and therefore the interest rates for assets used for monetary purposes into different 
directions or out of the interest rate boundaries targeted by the FOMC. The lack of 
autonomy in the acquisition of eligible assets for every single district-Fed can risk the 
smooth functioning of ISA-settlement at the one hand. On the other, this corresponds 
with the FOMC as monopolistic supplier of central bank money and the lack of 
influence on the ISA-balances itself. 
The above described practice of money creation is in strong contrast to the process in 
the Euro area. Although the rules and guidelines of monetary policy are determined 
centrally, implementation and conduct is done on the national level by the respective 
NCBs themselves (European Union, 2012, Article 12.1 and 14.3). Thus, assets which 
get into ownership of the ESCB in course of monetary policy operations are booked 
only in the balance sheet of the NCB in which the creation of money takes place. The 
balance sheets of other central banks in the Eurosystem are, in contrast to the Fed 
system, not affected. An automatic inflow of general eligible assets for settlement with 
corresponding offsetting entries in the form of TARGET2 liabilities does not take place. 
The consequences of this agreement on the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area 
in case of a ‘European ISA settlement mechanism’ must be viewed in the context of the 
current monetary policy instruments : First, most assets backing the created central bank 
money are not usable for TARGET2-settlement, as described in section 5.6.2.2 above. 
Second, because of the decentralized implementation of monetary policy in the Euro 
area each, NCB would have to purchase the specific assets eligible for TARGET2-
settlement, and consequently compete for those assets with other NCBs (in case of 
“federal” assets) and the private capital market. This would lead to deviations from the 
provisions of the common monetary policy, i.e. offering of better refinancing conditions 
for those assets relative to other assets or relative to the neighboring central banks. This 
is also contrary to the goal of unification of monetary policy in the Euro area. Therefore, 
it is an essential condition for a successful TARGET2 settlement mechanism that NCBs 
can use the assets acquired under the conduct of the common monetary policy to settle 
TARGET2 balances and without requiring them to purchase on their own expense. 
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5.6.2.4  Risk-pooling through SOMA participation and adjustment of the capital 
shares 
The aim of recommendations for a TARGET2 settlement mechanism is to use safe 
assets as settlement means. This should limit the potential losses for the countries with 
TARGET2-claims in case of a breakup of the Eurozone. The example of the ISA 
compensation in the U.S., however shows that the general assessment of SOMA 
securities as ‘secure collateral’ and equalization of this aspect with ‘overall less risk’ is 
not convincing. At first, there is insurance for the purely hypothetical case of a district-
Fed leaving the Dollar area, as the assets in the SOMA portfolio tend to be federal in 
nature. Therefore, SOMA losses from devaluation for the remaining Fed-districts do not 
exist. But in return, the district-Feds with (settled) ISA-claims get allocated a higher 
share of potential losses out of monetary policy operations in normal economic 
circumstances, because gains and losses are allocated in relation to the SOMA shares. 
As the SOMA shares rise for the districts with ISA claims, their potential balance sheet 
risk does also rise
41
 (see section 5.6.2.3). With the monetary policy measures of the Fed 
in reaction to the financial crisis of 2008-2010, additional asset classes were purchased 
for the SOMA portfolio to stabilize the financial markets. These assets were mostly of 
low value from the markets perspective, so that at this point one can not necessarily 
assume these were ‘secure’ assets by any means (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2009). This could also explain why the ISA settlement was exposed from 2008 to 2010: 
First, district-Feds with high ISA-liabilities could conserve on their SOMA shares and 
their asset side of the balance sheet. But second, they would have had to bear larger 
parts of the potential losses from the crisis measures undertaken collectively by the 
whole Fed system, because their SOMA share remained higher than it would otherwise 
have been. The logic is straightforward: Especially the financial institutes located in the 
districts with ISA-liabilities have profited from the crisis programs and second, 
potential losses appeared to be high at least from the short run perspective of ever 
falling market values for asset backed securities and mortgages.  
                                                 
41
  Note that, in contrast to the ESCB, the commercial banks of each district are the shareholders of the 
District-Fed. However, their shares are capitalized with a fixed 6% interest rate per year. In the 
ESCB, the shareholders of the single national central banks participate directly on the gains and 
losses of their central bank in full heights. 
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Applied to the case of the EMU, this means that Germany, with a share of the money 
supply in the Eurozone from currently about 35 percent (Bundesbank, 2012; European 
Central Bank, 2013B) would also get allocated a higher share of potential gains and 
losses than today, if a settlement mechanism similar to the ISA system of the Fed exists. 
The capital share of Germany in the ESCB is currently at about 18 percent, so that the 
Bundesbank gets a lower share of profits or losses allocated (18%) than corresponds to 
its share on the overall money base (35%, as its share of the liabilities side of the 
ESCB). As a consequence, the current TARGET2-system reduces potential gains and 
losses for the Bundesbank whenever Germany holds a larger share of European money 
supply than would be ‘entitled’ by is capital key in the ESCB. In the actual situation, the 
most part of money creation takes place in the Euro-periphery and is backed with risky 
assets, the Bundesbank and therefore the German taxpayer is better off without an ‘ISA-
like’ TARGET2-settlement - under the condition that EMU will remain in their current 
form. This aspect is usually overlooked in the discussion for risks emerging from 
TARGET2 balances. 
5.6.3 EQUILIBRATING FORCES FOR ISA-BALANCES APART FROM THE US MONETARY 
POLICY 
5.6.3.1 There is no exit-risk for single Fed-districts 
As was argued in section 5.2.3, the existence of a settlement mechanism for payment 
transfer balances could increase the risks of individual Euro members for an exit from 
the currency area from the perspective of capital market. This exit-risk does simply not 
exist for a single Fed district because of too high ISA balances. Firstly, several U.S. 
states would have to decide over an exit (which is also the exit from the United States, 
which means political secession), as most Fed districts are responsible for several U.S. 
states. On the other hand, the primary task of the Fed-system is to secure the flow of 
Dollar payments between all districts free of discounts. This task precedes the 
provisions from the Federal Reserve Act concerning the settlement of payment balances 
(Federal Reserve Act, Art.16 (3)). Therefore, there is no rational for holders of Dollar 
funds in one district to reallocate their money wealth through capital flight to other Fed 
districts in fear of exit, interruption of interdistrict payments or devaluation. In contrast, 
the exit of a country from the EMU can not be excluded in general and depends highly 
on the set of policy options negotiated over by Eurozone governments. The possibility 
115 
 
of massive capital flight in response to the uncertainty over the results of this political 
process is a very rational and likely act. Any mechanism for the settlement of 
TARGET2 payment transfer balances must take this difference to the Fed-system into 
account. 
The European government debt crisis has shown that massive capital flight due to 
uncertainty of the political outcome has very strong destabilizing forces from an 
economic and political viewpoint. The reallocation of Euro funds from the periphery to 
the core during 2010 to 2013 came from three groups: First from investors within the 
Euro area, which did not extend their credit lines after 2010 (whether for their own 
liquidity needs or by adjusting the risk assessment). Cecchetti et al. (2012, p. 8) estimate 
this amount for German commercial banks alone to about 282 bn. Euros
42
. The second 
group comprises non-EMU financial institutions that have shifted their funds from the 
GIIPS to Germany and the core to counteract potential devaluation losses in case of an 
exit of one of the crisis countries from the Euro area. For British banks alone for 
example, figures show more than 100 bn. Euro in 2012 in reduced credit (Ceccheti et 
al., 2012, pp. 10f). The third group includes citizens and companies of the GIIPS 
countries themselves, who wanted to bring their liquid assets into safety. 
The capital flight from the GIIPS countries that started already in 2007 was initially re-
financed by the ECB’s crisis measures (especially the extended duration for the Long 
Term Refinancing Operations beginning in 2008). The Greek and Irish national central 
banks additionally backed their financial institutions with credit through the Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA) beginning in 2011. The main reason was, that in the wake 
of the sovereign debt crisis the financial institutions in both countries did not have 
enough securities eligible as collateral in the main refinancing operations of the ECB 
(European Central Bank, 2012), or they have been accepted as collateral only at very 
large discounts
43
 (European Central Bank, 2013a, Annex I) which limited the overall 
available volume of refinancing too much. Therefore, the NCBs provided - formally on 
                                                 
42
  In reduced credit lines to debtors in the GIIPS, which also includes depreciations for expected 
losses in general. 
43
  For example, AAA reated bonds with remaining maturities are accepted with a discount of 0.5% on 
their value as collateral, whereas BBB-rated bonds of the same maturity are accepted with 6% 
discount. Discounts are rising sharply with remaining maturity, so that bonds with 10 years residual 
time to maturity have 5 to 13% discount, depending on their rating. 
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their own account and risk - funding via the means of ELA to different conditions. As 
the NCBs now took the role of the lender of last resort, these loans prevented the 
collapse of government finances and national financial systems. They allowed on the 
other hand the increasing capital flight. As the financial institutes and the NCBs never 
lost their ability to repay their debt in Euros, the fears about an exit from the Euro area 
were motivated by political reasons. The simple introduction of a European ‘ISA-
settlement mechanism’ without establishing other balancing forces will provide 
additional economic arguments for capital flight instead by limiting liquidity of the 
financial sector and thus destabilize the cohesion of the monetary union artificially in 
times of financial turmoil. 
5.6.3.2 The Fed-system as lender of last resort 
The facility of Emergency Liquidity Assistance in the EMU has a parallel in the Fed 
system. Each district-Fed has the legal right and the tools to fulfill the role of the lender 
of last resort for the state banks in its district and provide additional liquidity beyond the 
centralized monetary policy in the United States (Federal Reserve Act, Articles 10A and 
10B).
44
 However, this is subject to very precisely specified constraints. These 
limitations ultimately prevent a district-Fed to provide emergency liquidity for 
commercial banks in their district over an extended period (over 120 days a year). 
Therefore, it will effectively prevent that the role as lender of last resort of one district-
Fed can lead to sustained high ISA balances at the one hand and make settlement of ISA 
balances impossible. Consequently, the Fed system does not leave the responsibility for 
emergency liquidity provision and stabilization of the financial institutes in the hands of 
the single Fed-districts, if the liquidity crisis hits more than a single institute within. As 
the Subprime-crisis has shown, the Fed-system takes the role of lender of last resort as a 
whole, even if the provided liquidity measures particularly benefit some financial 
institutions in a few Fed districts. At the same time, the U.S. federal government and the 
national Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, a nationwide, privately funded 
                                                 
44
  Federal Reserve Act, Sec. 10A and 10B specify the requirements and constraints. Conditions for 
such loans are either a joint liability of several banks in the district in case of collective loans or 
that the head of the bank certifies the bank is viable in general. Such credit is provided only over 
short term (max. of 60 to 120 days) and against collateral with maturity below 4 weeks. Another 
case is that the institution is critically undercapitalized and insolvent, in which case the federal 
deposit insurance (FDIC) will be involved. Furthermore, the federal level gets involved in case of 
such emergency loans and potential losses in form of extensive reports to the Congress, too. 
117 
 
deposit insurance) supported rescue operations and took over market price and solvency 
risks in this process (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009, pp. 15f, pp. 23-27). 
This relieved the district-Feds from their responsibility to provide emergency liquidity 
for the financial institutes in their districts. For example, even if the Fed district 
Richmond provided 75 bn. USD in emergency loans in 2008 and the New York Fed 300 
bn. USD, both district-Feds could reduce their involvement in the following year to 
about 1.1 bn. (Richmond) and 77 bn. USD (New York), because the crisis measures of 
the Fed-system took over theses these risks. 
These now centrally conducted measures had a direct impact on the ISA balances: The 
purchase of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities through the open 
market policy of the Fed system
45
 , for example, led directly to ISA-claims of the 
District of Richmond at the Fed-system. Where the emergency loans from the 
Richmond Fed in the amount of approximately U.S. $ 75 bn. have led to ISA-liabilities 
in the amount of about 160 bn. USD in 2008, the outright purchases of these securities 
for the SOMA (total height 160 bn. USD on bonds, 980 bn. of Agency MBS) have been 
associated with ISA-claims of the Richmond District to the Fed-system of USD 111 
billion in 2009 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York , 2008, 2009; Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond, 2008, 2009 ). In the same manner one can explain the development 
of ISA-claims of the district New York against the Fed-system, since all major 
investment and commercial banks in the U.S. are located there. These have benefited 
significantly from the general liquidity measures of the Federal Reserve System as well 
as of institutions specific measures (the Maiden Laine LLC’s etc).46 
If we transfer these considerations on the assignment of the crisis measures in the Fed 
system and the impact of central money creation on the ISA balances (as described in 
section 5.6.2 above) onto the Eurosystem, it must be concluded that the interaction of 
central liquidity provision and central conduct of monetary policy has had a 
                                                 
45
  Securities of Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, Ginnie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks as well as 
ABS on their loans portfolio. 
46
  A financial crisis comparable to the Eurozone debt crisis in case of the regional structure is the 
savings and loan crisis in the U.S. beginning in the mid 1980’s and lasting to the early 1990’s. This 
case shows, that financial aid from federal levels was a logic and natural step even as most of the 
mortgages financing institutions have been active on the regional level only. For a detailed analysis 
of the regional drivers of the crisis and the inter-regional payment flows see Warf and Cox, 1996. 
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significantly dampening effect on the ISA-balances. By contrast, the assignment of 
financial stability as a national task and the decentralized implementation of monetary 
policy in Europe have to be seen as drivers of TARGET2 balances already from the 
purely technical point of bookkeeping, leaving insecurity over national actions and 
abilities to bail out the banking sector aside. It is therefore hard to imagine that a 
TARGET2 settlement mechanism could be feasible without that the ESCB as a whole 
would have to adopt the role of lender of last resort even in case of regional financial 
crisis. 
A targeted purchase of bonds and loan portfolios from vulnerable financial institutions 
or on markets by the whole ESCB itself or by all NCBs in concerted action according to 
their capital key, similar to the central measures of the Fed-system, would have had a 
significantly dampening effect on the TARGET2 balances in the early stages of the 
European sovereign debt crises. This applies to the purely technical bookkeeping 
perspective (loans and liquidity supply from ESCB would form the opposite flow of 
funds to the TARGET2 liabilities caused by capital flight) as well as a clear signal to 
the financial markets, that the lender of last resort function will be fulfilled and a break-
up of the Euro area would not take place. Ultimately, the announcement of the Outright 
Monetary Transactions in August 2012 can be seen as a voluntary assignment of crises 
policy to the level of the ESCB as a whole. As a result, the TARGET2 balances began 
to decline (see the development of the TARGET2 balances on a monthly level, for 
example Westermann, 2014). It can be concluded that within a monetary union it is not 
possible to leave the responsibility for liquidity provision in case of severe regional 
financial crisis in hands of the NCBs, if at the same time a settlement mechanism for the 
payment transfer balances is wished. The perfect integration of payment systems 
promotes capital flight, making settlement impossible. If a TARGET2 settlement should 
be introduced similar to the ISA settlement in the U.S., the European crisis policy 
should also be willing to relocate substantial liquidity and solvency risks on the inter-
regional level as in the U.S., with corresponding effects on the risk positions of the 
individual NCBs, as has been discussed in more detail in section 5.6.2.4. 
  
119 
 
5.6.3.3 Financial market integration and ISA-balances in the US 
Whereas a single financial market is still a target in the Eurozone, it is a fact in the U.S. 
If the banks of one Fed district are undercapitalized or near insolvency, they are 
potential targets for mergers or acquisitions for institutes from other Fed districts, which 
can take over the whole institute, or parts thereof. Necessary liquidity is provided by 
this (either already in advance of a possible insolvency of the single institution or 
subsequently in the management of the nationwide FDIC
47
) and at least parts of the 
potential losses and risks are shared. The mergers guarantee continuation in credit 
supply, guarantees and covers the deposits and other debts of the troubled institutions. 
Most importantly, the district-Fed has not to take the role as LoLR and emergency 
liquidity provider (Koning, 2013), which could otherwise drive ISA liabilities. 
During the U.S. subprime crisis, the number and volume of district-wide bank 
acquisitions in comparison to prior years have significantly increased (Adams, 2012, 
p.30). In Europe in contrast, the opposite development could be observed since 2007 
(Council of Economic Advisors, 2012, pp. 153f). The already comparatively weaker 
integrated European financial market has further defragmented. First, the assets of the 
financial institutions became increasingly focused on their home countries (Allen et al., 
2011, p.24). Second, despite increased mergers activity, no cross-border bank mergers 
could be observed. The main reasons are different corporate cultures, market conditions 
and still large differences in the legal framework of the different countries. This 
increases the transaction and integration costs in the event of a takeover by other banks 
and therefore makes mergers and acquisitions more costly and less likely in the EMU 
than in the U.S. (Buch, 2000; Buch and de Long, 2001). 
A major step towards less costly cross-border acquisitions of illiquid financial 
institutions could be the EU-Commission's proposals for financial market regulation and 
the so called ‘banking union’. An essential part of this are so-called ‘resolution plans’ 
(European Commission, 2012, Sect. 5), which contain among other elements pre-
specified plans for a separation into a ‘should-be-healthy’, or solvent, part of an institute 
and illiquid or insolvent parts which should be liquidated. The healthy parts of an 
                                                 
47
  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Founded in 1993 with the Glass-Steagall Act, it is a 
privately financed, nationwide deposit insurance at the one and but is also responsible for 
management and resolution of financial institutions in insolvency or in danger of insolvency. 
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institution are potentially rewarding takeover targets for other financial institutions. Due 
to the obligation to prepare the resolution plans and the involvement of the regulatory 
authorities in this process, the informational disadvantage of potential buyers with 
respect to associated risks could be significantly reduced and the willingness for 
acquisitions increased. Furthermore, there are plans for a common fund to finance the 
resolution of unviable parts of distressed financial institutions if the national resources 
are insufficient (European Commission, 2012, Article 97). Both factors can relieve the 
NCBs of the Euro area from their LoLR and are therefore likely to prevent the rise of 
large TARGET2 imbalances in the future in case of turbulence in the national financial 
sectors. 
5.6.3.4 Further aspects 
Outside the sphere of monetary policy, there exist many equilibrating institutions and 
regulations in the USA which attenuate the accumulation of excessive ISA-imbalances. 
First, the ESCB is still nationally organized, so that each national central bank processes 
the inter-European payment flows for its jurisdiction. In the U.S., in general one Fed 
district comprises several states. This relaxes the connection between ISA balances and 
regional business and economic crises, the debt of the individual U.S. states and 
regional capital flight. In its trivial form, this argument was used several times even in 
the discussion about the risks of TARGET2 balances (see, e.g. Neumann, 2011, p.27) 
and has been discussed as an independent idea for reforms of the TARGET2 mechanism 
itself (Burda, 2013). 
In addition to pure accounting effects from such consolidation of different economic 
areas and the consequences on TARGET2 balances of merging regions with potentially 
different business cycles, the expectations of market participants about an exit of a large 
European Central Bank district would be low. Would national jurisdictions and 
European Central Bank districts be separated, and therefore fiscal policy and monetary 
policy be unbundled even more than today, the subjective probability of an exit of a 
whole central banking district comprising a number of member countries will be greatly 
reduced. Capital flight out of this district would be less severe, TARGET2-liablities 
would rise less and their settlement would not be impossible from the beginning. This 
will have again recursive effects on the expected probability of an exit. 
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At second, a strong equilibrating force for ISA balances in the U.S. exists in form of the 
fiscal transfers from the federal level and other autonomous flows of funds in the USA. 
These are opposed to possible capital outflows from a district and reduce its (net) ISA 
liabilities. Transfers from the federal level for the benefit of the individual federal states 
amounted to approximately USD 607 bn. in 2011, or about 4% of U.S. GDP. In 
addition, there are regular payments for federal agencies such as the FBI, Armed Forces, 
Border Patrol etc., so that we can assume an autonomous redistribution from the federal 
level amounting to approximately 16 % of U.S. GDP without interest payments 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2013)
48
. Some of these payments can be seen as 
automatic stabilizers in terms of business cycle policy, and they will not disappear out 
of a Fed district in case of a regional crisis immediately and reduce the emergence of 
ISA-liabilities. Compared to the U.S., the autonomous cash flows within the EU due to 
redistribution from the federal budget are much lower. They amounted in 2012 to about 
147 bn Euro or approximately 1.1 % of total EU output of about 12.9 bn. Euro. The 
equilibrating effect from such transfers onto TARGET2 balances will therefore be much 
lower than it is the case in the U.S.. 
At third, a key point in the resolution of the subprime crisis was the readiness of the 
U.S. government to support the financial markets with federal funds. The transfer of 
such direct federal aid ultimately reduces emergence of ISA liabilities outside the New 
York Fed district. The most significant examples are the nationalization of the two 
government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as the conduct 
of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). While the two companies were provided 
each with USD 100 bn. (a cost estimate is not yet possible), the loans contained in the 
TARP portfolio are about 431 billion USD, with an estimated actual cost of about 24 
bn. (Congressional Budget Office, 2012, Table 1). A similar instrument in EMU since 
2012 is the possibility of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to lend to countries 
to recapitalize domestic financial institutions (European Union, 2012, Article 15). First, 
this relieves the NCBs from an extension of their role as a LoLR (and the danger to 
refinance so called zombie-banks). Second, it directly reduces TARGET2 liabilities: If 
the ESM issues bonds in Frankfurt (Germany) or other EMU core countries and the 
corresponding funds are subsequently transferred to the periphery, Germany incurs 
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  The biggest share have grants for the health system, income support and education. 
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(gross) TARGET2-liabilities, whereas the receiving countries get (gross) TARGET2 
claims. If the ESM issues the bonds in the periphery itself, private capital would flow in 
and reduce TARGET2 balances again. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
Before we come to this chapters’ conclusion, a short brush up of the main results of this 
part of the thesis is appropriate. We have seen that TARGET2 liabilities arise in an 
EMU member state, if foreign and domestic capital leaves the country and the NCB 
takes its role as a lender of last resort. TARGET2 balances emerge in this case 
automatically and within the orderly functioning of the monetary union. They can even 
be seen as the stabilizing element, enabling cohesion of the EMU. However, TARGET2 
balances are one part of the monetary risk arising if one country decides to leave the 
Eurozone. But it is too narrow to focus only on TARGET2 balances, as the additional 
risk from bank notes in circulation can increase or even decrease the costs by 30-50%, 
depending on the exiting country. Taking account of cross-border cash payments is also 
necessary, if we look at the proposals for a reform of the TARGET2 mechanism. No 
proposal is actually able to mitigate the risks from TARGET2 balances without 
interrupting the cross-border payment flows, which is against the treaties of the EU. 
Interestingly, the Fed system of the USA seems to provide an example of an easily 
working compensation mechanism for the risk coming from interdistrict payment 
transactions. The simple answer, why this system is working relatively smoothly is: The 
US system is higher centralized with respect to its monetary policy operations, the 
financial market is much more integrated, financial stability is a matter of federal and 
not regional economic policy and federal transfers to the regional levels have much 
higher dimensions in the US than the EMU. Last but not least, the Fed-system takes its 
settlement procedure not as a binding constraint, if liquidity needs endanger cohesion of 
the Fed system. This is not a political decision, but a historical practice since the 
foundation of the Fed system in 1913. For the successful implementation of a settlement 
mechanism for cross-border payment flows within a monetary union, three basic 
questions are ultimately decisive. 
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1. Is it ensured that there exists always a sufficiently large volume of assets 
eligible for settlement, be it in normal economic circumstances and times of 
turmoil as well? 
2. Can the central banks get ownership of such assets in the course of their 
regular monetary policy operations? 
3. Is it ensured that the financial sector does not have to rely on the national 
(regional) central banks as their lender of last resort (in times of systemic 
financial crisis) over an extended period of time? 
These basic questions are supplemented by considerations on general factors 
influencing the emergence of excessive payment transfer balances. The analysis of the 
institutional arrangements in the Federal Reserve System shows that here, on the one 
hand, all assets used in monetary policy operations of the Fed-system can also be used 
to settle potential ISA imbalances. This greatly reduces the problem of a too low 
volume of eligible assets limiting the ability to settle transfer balances. Secondly, any 
district-Fed automatically acquires ownership of these eligible assets in the wake of the 
monetary policy operations and does not have to purchase them independently for 
settlement purposes only. Third, in the United States exist the necessary institutional 
conditions to relieve the individual district-Feds from the role as lender of last resort for 
their regional financial institutions. These are the provisions in the Federal Reserve Act, 
the Federal State Deposit Insurance and the single financial market in the USA. 
Furthermore, a far-reaching willingness to provide emergency liquidity at the federal 
level and to take over essential solvency risks - from both sides of the entire Federal 
Reserve System and the Federal Government - have continued to reduce the ISA 
balances in the U.S. fast during 2008 to 2010. To sum up, all three basic questions 
formulated in the above paragraph are answered positively in case of settlement of the 
ISA balances within the Fed-system. 
In the European case, the introduction of the ESM (European Union, 2012a) and the 
discussed reforms in the area of financial market regulation (especially the so called 
‘banking union’, see European Commission, 2012), can help to relieve the national 
central banks from their role of emergency liquidity provider in times of regional 
financial crisis. Therefore, the answer for the third basic question tends to be positive 
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for the introduction of a TARGET2 settlement mechanism in the future. However, the 
concept of decentralized conduct of monetary policy measures, undertaken through 
secured loans to eligible commercial banks, makes the introduction of a settlement 
mechanism almost impossible. The monetary assets can hardly be used to settle 
TARGET2 balances, as they are not standardized, comparable or easy tradable. A 
possible remedy could be at this point, to enforce a greater centralization of monetary 
policy similar to the Fed System - in one district, by a common open market portfolio. 
First, a common open-market portfolio ensures that all assets related to monetary policy 
operations could be used for settlement of TARGET2 balances, because not individual 
assets, but shares of this portfolio could be used for settlement. Second, the single 
national central banks will receive these eligible assets regularly through the monetary 
policy operations without a need for own initiative. On the other hand, however, this 
would require far-reaching steps in the transformation of monetary policy instruments 
and limit the national central banks remaining autonomy. The introduction of a 
settlement mechanism within the TARGET2 system therefore requires far more 
innovations than copying the Fed’s settlement procedure for ISA balances. By contrast, 
a modification of the most fundamental parts of the ESCB would be required for a 
smooth functioning of TARGET2 settlement even in times of economic turmoil. 
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6 CONCLUSION FOR THE THESIS 
This dissertation intends to add understanding to two fields in international economics: 
First, it seeks to provide a deeper insight into the influence of economic institutions on 
the dynamics of the Balance of Payments. Second, it highlights important prerequisites 
for the necessary detailed provisions regarding organization of federal monetary unions.  
In chapters 2 and 3, I survey the literature and partially provide own evidence on the 
influence of institutions on components of the Balance of Payments as well as the 
domestic savings-investment decision. Therefore, the argumentation and findings are 
more of a basic research character. First, better institutions encourage aggregate 
investments, increasing domestic capital and output. Second, foreign private capital 
inflows seem to react strongly to the quality of institutions in the target country, with 
FDI reacting more sensitive than portfolio investment into shares and securities or bank 
loans. Foreign financing in general and FDI in particular seem to have remarkable 
effects on export performance, especially in boosting the complexity and value of 
exported goods. Third, the trade literature concludes that countries with better domestic 
institutions are more integrated into the world economy and export goods with higher 
complexity. Finally, there are some findings in the empirical literature that national 
(private) savings are also positively influenced by improvements in the institutional 
setting, a finding which is supported by the research presented in chapter 3. All these 
elements in the literature can, if interpreted in a dynamic way rather than a static one, be 
seen as fitting into the idea of a beneficial debt cycle. The quality of domestic 
institutions is from this viewpoint one element in determining the success of a 
development strategy relying on foreign financing and trade integration for sustained 
long term growth and successful economic transformation.  
However, large questions remain to be answered. Surveying the literature with mostly 
static models and squeezing them into a dynamic one – however plausible this 
interpretation may be – is not finally conclusive. It would be nice to have a unified 
dynamic model within the accepted model family of intertemporal models on the 
Balance of Payments that can take account of the differential influence of institutions on 
trade, savings, domestic and foreign investment. Furthermore, my empirical results on 
institutions and aggregate savings formation need additional theoretical research and 
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empirical validation for a broader acceptance as general conclusion. Both aspects 
require hard work in the future and I hope that the reader will follow these 
developments with some questions from this thesis in mind in the next years. 
In chapter 5, my main focus was on the working of detailed provisions concerning 
cross-border transfers of money in a currency union. This issue came up with the 
discussion on TARGET2 balances and has found increased attention in the scientific 
and public community. Arguments and findings are therefore more important for 
discussion or application in applied economic policy. The first conclusion is that 
payment transfer balances arise inevitably in a federally organized monetary union, as 
the examples of the EMU and the Fed system both show. The normative necessity for a 
settlement of such balances can be discussed. The main argument in this thesis is, that 
for a smooth functioning of a monetary union, not only provisions for a settlement of 
such balances must be found. Rather the whole process of money creation, allocation of 
assets eligible for settlement and the role of central banks as LoLR must be carefully 
recognized and implemented in accordance with such a settlement regime. Only if some 
crucially questions can be answered positively, a federal monetary union with 
settlement and compensation for regionally disproportional money creation can be 
designed. 
In this more applied field of research, direct research questions following from the 
above findings are few. However, the whole problem of designing a common monetary 
union is rich on questions how certain provisions – like a common interest rate, 
decentral implementation of monetary policy, regulations for acceptance of collateral 
according to the needs of only some financial regions – influence the incentives of 
economic actors to the better or the worse in the EMU. Monetary policy in the EMU 
will certainly develop and change in these areas. I hope that the reader will follow these 
developments with large interest and some questions from this thesis in mind. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY LITERATURE OVERVIEW FOR CHAPTER 2 
Table A 1: Literature overview on exports, imports and institutions 
Study Main findings: better institutions… Method Period Country Sample 
Institutional 
Indicator 
Anderson 
Marcoullier 
(2002) 
-  increase domestic imports OLS on bilateral trade 1997 
58 developing and 
industrial 
GCR 
Berkowitz et al. 
(2006) 
- domestic institutions influence imports and exports 
pooled OLS on bilat. 
Trade flows according 
to goods classifications 
1982-1992 
55 developing and 
industrial 
ICRG 
  - but exporting country institutions matter more for bilateral trade flows       
  - exporter institutions have a positive effect on imports of complex goods       
  
- international institutions can act as substitute for domestic institutions if 
imports are concerned 
      
de Groot et al. 
(2004) 
- influence bilateral trade positively, exports as well as imports OLS on bilateral trade 1998 
100 developing and 
industrial 
WGI: Kaufmann et 
al, 2002 
  - exports stronger affected         
  - even if accounted for common language, colonial origins, common border etc.         
  - but countries with similar institutional levels trade more with each other         
Faruq (2011) 
- countries with better institutions have higher export prices, even within the 
same industry as low institutional quality countries 
OLS, 2SLS 1996 
US import data at industry 
levels on 58 countries  
IEF: Heritage, 
World Bank Doing 
Business; TI: CPI, 
WGI 
Francois and 
Manchin (2013)  
- would increase bilateral trade flows of low-low and low-middle income 
countries, effect larger in low-high income trade' 
FE Panel 1990-2003 
94, developing and 
industrial 
EFW, TI:CPI, WGI 
(2005) 
  
-importer and exporter country institutional quality influences trade; export 
matter slightly more' 
        
Jansen and 
Nordas (2004) 
- lead to higher trade openness'  OLS on bilateral trade 2002 
144, developing and 
industrial 
WGI: Kaufmann et 
al, 2002 
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  - tariff reform has higher effect if good institutions'         
Levchenko 
(2007) 
- exporter country institutions matter for complexity of exports OLS 1998 
U.S. import data on 116 
countries and 389 
industries 
WGI (1996-2000 
average) 
Meon and Sekkat 
(2008) 
- increase exports of manufactures 2SLS on exports 1990-2000 
60 developing and 
industrial 
WGI: 1999 
  - and non-manufactures are larger in countries with low quality institutions         
Nicolini and 
Paccagnini 
(2011) 
- no Granger-causality of institutions on bilateral trade if regional heterogeneity  
is accounted for 
Maximum Likelihood 1976-2004 
bilateral trade on 197 
countries 
FH: Political rights 
and civil liberties 
Nunn (2007) 
- lead to specilization of countries on complex products which need complex 
intermediaries 
OLS, 2SLS, propensity 
score matching on 
output and exports in 28 
different industries 
  
70-146  developing and 
industrial countries, output 
and exports in 28 different 
industries 
WGI (2000), EFW, 
WBdBI 
  - are therefore a source of comparative advantage   
Ranjan and Lee 
(2007) 
- importer and exporter country institutions matter 
 ML Tobit treshold 
model for bilateral trade  
1997 
79-83 developing and 
industrial EFI (1992); WGI, 
ICRG (1992) 
  
- for trade in complex goods, exporter country's institutions are more relevant 
in explaining trade flows 
      
Rodrik et al. 
(2004) 
- lead to higher growth 2SLS 1995 79-137 developing and 
emerging economies 
WGI: Kaufmann et 
al, 2002 
  - through higher integration into the world economy     
2SLS: 2 stages least squares; 3SLS: 3 stages least squares; OLS: ordinary least squares; ML: maximum likelihood; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects; HP: Hodrick-Prescott filter for cyclical 
data; Poisson qMLE with FE: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood with fixed effects  
BI: Business Intelligence (The Economists' Business Intelligence Unit) EFI: Economic Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation, see Holmes et al, 1998); EFW: Economic Freedom of the World 
(Fraser Institute, see Gwartney and Lawson, 2009, 2013 and other years); FH: Freedom House (Freedom House Organization, various years); GCR: Global Competitivesness Report (World 
Economic Forum, various years); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, New York); IP: Institutional Project Database (Bertolier et al. 2003) Polity IV: Polity IV Project 
(Marshall, Jaggers, 2000); TI:CPI : Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (various years) WBdBI: World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et al, various co-authors, various years) 
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Table A 2: Literature overview on savings, investments and institutions 
Study Main findings: better institutions… Method Period Country Sample 
Source of 
institutional 
Indicators 
Aizenman et al. 
(2007)  
- are associated with higher stability domestic savings OLS 1981-2004 
37-49 developing and 
emerging 
ICRG (2004) 
Aysan et al. 
(2008) 
- political institutions itself not significant 3SLS 1970-2002 
60 developing and 
emerging 
ICRG; Freedom 
House   - but have impact on private investment over human capital formation       
  - rule of law affects private investment directly       
Campos et al. 
(1999) 
- paradox of countries with high investment rates and high corruption values 
can be explained 
OLS 1981-93 
67 developing and 
industrial self constructed; 
World Development 
Report 1997 
  - if accounted for predictability of corruption       
  - if corruption is unpredictable, investment is negatively affected       
Ca'Zorzi et al. 
(2012) 
- institutional indicators are consistent in explaining CA balances, with low 
coefficients, usually negative and significant 
Meta-Study various various various 
Chinn and Ito 
(2005) 
- high institutional quality regimes expirience decreasing savings rates if 
financial sector deepens 
5-year averages 
(FE), yearly, HP-
filtered data 
1971('84)-
2004 
89 developing and 
industrial 
ICRG 
  
- low institutional quality regimes expierience increases in savings, if financial 
sector develops 
        
Chinn and Ito 
(2007) 
- no influence on CA in industrial countries 
5-year averages 
(FE), yearly, HP-
filtered data 
1971('84)-
2004 
89 developing and 
industrial 
ICRG 
  - associated with CA deficits in developing and emerging economies         
  - but interaction with financial deepening         
Dawson (1998) - economic freedom is associated with higher investment 
OLS, FE, 5 year 
averages 
1975-1990   Gastil; EFW (1996) 
  - but political/civil liberties are not         
Dawson (2003) - are associated with higher levels of investment 
Granger Causality 
test 
1970-2000 
83 developing and 
industrial 
EFW (2001) 
  - but no sigificant results for property rights as subgroup         
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de Haan and 
Siermann (1998) 
- no siginficant relationship between indicators of economic freedom and 
investment 
extreme bound 
analysis, total 
average over years 
1975-1993 
78 developing and 
industrial 
EFW(1996), Scully 
and Slotje (1991) 
de Haan and 
Sturm (2000) 
- no siginficant relationship between indicators of economic freedom and 
investment 
extreme bound 
analysis, total 
average over years 
1975-1990 
78 developing and 
industrial 
EFW (1996) 
de Santis and 
Lührmann (2009) 
- are associated with CA deficits/lower CA surplus RE, FE 1970-2003 
72-13 developing and 
industrial 
FH: Civil Liberties 
Everhart and 
Sumlinksi (2001) 
- corrpution has negative effect on quality of public infrastructure RE, pooled OLS 1970-1999 
100 developing and 
emerging 
ICRG 
  
- in corrupt environments, public investment crowds out private investment to a 
larger degree 
        
Grigoli and Mills 
(2011) 
- public investment is larger in countries with ailing institutions System GMM 1984-2008   ICRG, DPI 
  - economies with ailing institutions have more volatile public investments         
  - better institutional quality is associated with better quality in infrastructure         
Gruber and 
Kamin (2008) 
- are associated with lower CA surplus/higher deficits 
OLS, 5-year 
averages 
1980-2004 
84 developing and 
industrial countries 
WGI (2005) 
Gwartney et al. 
(2006) 
- affect investment positively, in LDCs as well as in economies 2SLS 1980-2000 
94 developing and 
industrial 
EFW (2006) 
  - affect productivity of investment positively         
  - private investment is more productive than public investment         
  - improvements in economic freedom increase investment over the longer term         
  - causality runs from improvements in EFW to investment and growth         
  - but not from growth to EFW         
Keefer and 
Knack (1995) 
- significantly associated with higher real private investment rates for economic 
freedom indicators 
OLS on total 
average 
1974-89 
97 developing and 
industrial 
ICRG(1982), 
BERI(1971) 
  - but indicators of political institutions and stability are not         
Keefer and 
Knack (2007) 
- public investment is larger in countries with ailing institutions OLS,  2SLS 1974-1998 
51-114 developing and 
industrial 
ICRG, DPI 
  
- this holds if public investment is measured as fraction of national income or 
of total investment 
        
Kerdrain et al. 
(2011) 
- more market liberal order on product markets is associated with passivization 
of CA 
FE, FE Vector 
Decomposition 
1993-2008 
30 - 117 developing and 
industrial 
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Mauro (1995) - higher levels of corruption lower total investment OLS, average over 
all years available 
1960-85 30-68 developing and 
industrial 
BI 
  - independent of efficiency of bureaucracy     
Swaleheen 
(2008) 
- countries with higher corruption have lower gross national savings System GMM 1994-2004 
53-100 developing and 
industrial 
TI: CPI 
Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) 
- corruption increases amount and size of public investment projects OLS 1980-1995 42-95 developing and 
industrial 
BI: 1980-1993; 
ICRG: 1982-1995 
  - corrupt practices are associated with poor quality of public infrastructure     
2SLS: 2 stages least squares; 3SLS: 3 stages least squares; OLS: ordinary least squares; ML: maximum likelihood; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects; HP: Hodrick-Prescott filter for 
cyclical data; Poisson qMLE with FE: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood with fixed effects  
BI: Business Intelligence (The Economists' Business Intelligence Unit) EFI: Economic Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation, see Holmes et al, 1998); EFW: Economic Freedom of the World 
(Fraser Institute, see Gwartney and Lawson, 2009, 2013 and other years); FH: Freedom House (Freedom House Organization, various years); GCR: Global Competitivesness Report (World 
Economic Forum, various years); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, New York); IP: Institutional Project Database (Bertolier et al. 2003) Polity IV: Polity IV Project 
(Marshall, Jaggers, 2000); TI:CPI : Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (various years) WBdBI: World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann et al, various co-authors, various years) 
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Table A 3: Literature overview on the financial account and institutions 
Study Main findings: better institutions… Method Period Country Sample 
Source of 
institutional 
Indicators 
Albuquerqe (2003) 
- if country credit rating is used as control, institutional variables are not 
significant in explaining FDI flows 
OLS 1975-1997 not reported ICRG 
Alfaro et al. (2008) - are associated with higher foreign capital inflows OLS 1970-2000 
56-81 developing and 
industrial 
ICRG (2001) 
Benassy-Quere et 
al. (2007) 
- ailing institutions reduce FDI 
Poisson qMLE 
with IV 
1985-2000, 5 
year 
averages 
not reported IP; EFW 
- institutional distance between countries decreases FDI     
- the authors find relatively large coefficients for institutions, indicating that 
they are one of the main drivers 
    
Faria and Mauro 
(2009) 
- equity-type investment as share of foreign capital stock are higher in 
countries with better institutional quality 
OLS, 2SLS 1996-2004 
94 developing and 
industrial 
WGI (2006) 
  
- the share of loans in foreign capital stock is higher in countries with low 
institutional quality 
        
Garibaldi et al. 
(2002) 
- property rights are the only significant explantory variable for portfolio 
investment flows 
OLS 1991-1999 25 transition economies WDR 1997 
  - FDI react to better institutions and other controls         
Hausmann and 
Fernandez-Ariaz 
(2000) 
- countries with lower quality in institutions hafve lower inflows in foreign 
capital 
descriptive 1997 not reported WGI (1996) 
  - but the share of FDI is higher         
  - natural resources abundance is one driving explanation for this         
Li and Resnick 
(2003) 
- political institutions can not explain FDI flows alone 
OLS with 
PCSE 
1982-1995 53 developing PolityIV 
  - rather property rights protection exerts a strong influence on FDI inclows         
Morrissey and 
Udomkerdmongkol 
(2011) 
- total private investment is higher in better institutional quality System GMM 1996-2009 46 developing WGI (2010) 
  - FDI is higher in better institutional quality         
  
- FDI crowds out domestic private investment, this effect is greater with better 
institutions 
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Pappaioannou 
(2009) 
- institutional quality is main explanatory of international bank lending 
FE , OLS, 
2SLS 
1984-2002, 
anual and 
quarterly 
40-150 developing and 
industrial 
ICRG (2001) 
Wei (2000) - corruption affects volume and structure of capital imports 
OLS, RE, 
2SLS 
1994-1996, 
total average 
country pairs, 13 lending, 
85 borrowing countries 
GCR, WDR, TI: CPI 
  - corruption lowers capital imports         
  - c. reduces the share of FDI         
  - increases the share of loans         
Wei (2000a) - FDI stocks are lower in host countries with higher corruption 
OLS, FE, 
2SLS, Tobit 
1993 
country pairs, 12 lending 
ant 45 borrowing 
countries 
BI, ICRG, TI:CPI 
Wei (2001) - FDI flows are lower into countries with higher corruption OLS, 2SLS 
1994-1996, 
total average 
13-15 lending, 53-85 
borrowing; overall: 103 
max. 
GCR, WDR 
  - but loans are higher into countries with higher corruption         
Wei and Wu 
(2000) 
-results above are confirmed 
OLS, RE, 
2SLS 
1994-1996, 
total average 
13-15 lending, 53-85 
borrowing; overall: 103 
max. 
GCR, WDR 
  
- but the authors have additionally controlled for policies targeted at attracting 
FDI in the host economies 
        
  - high corruption is associated with higher loan-to-FDI ratio         
  - higher corruption is associated with higher portfolio-to-FDI ratio         
2SLS: 2 stages least squares; 3SLS: 3 stages least squares; OLS: ordinary least squares; ML: maximum likelihood; FE: fixed effects; RE: random effects; HP: Hodrick-Prescott filter for 
cyclical data; Poisson qMLE with FE: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood with fixed effects  
BI: Business Intelligence (The Economists' Business Intelligence Unit) EFI: Economic Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation, see Holmes et al, 1998); EFW: Economic Freedom of the 
World (Fraser Institute, see Gwartney and Lawson, 2009, 2013 and other years); FH: Freedom House (Freedom House Organization, various years); GCR: Global Competitivesness 
Report (World Economic Forum, various years); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, New York); IP: Institutional Project Database (Bertolier et al. 2003) Polity IV: 
Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, 2000); TI:CPI : Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (various years) WBdBI: World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: 
World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al, various co-authors, various years) 
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APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3 
Gross national savings to GDP: taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook 2012 
database. 
Government savings (deficits): we use the ratio of general government net lending to 
GDP from the IMF World Economic Outlook database as a proxy for governmental 
budget deficits. We dropped 14 observations, for which deficits exceeded -25% of GDP, 
as extreme outliers.  
Private savings: gross national savings minus government savings. We dropped one 
case wherein private savings exceeded 150% of GDP as an inconsistent or extreme 
outlier. 
Actual inflation: consumer price inflation taken from the World Development 
Indicators. We truncated inflation values above 50% (which is the defined border for 
hyperinflation) and set all values above 50% to this. That truncation was applied to 325 
of 4512 observations in the basic dataset. 
Three-year average inflation: inflation average over the last three years before the year 
under consideration. 
Real interest rates: taken from the World Bank Database and truncated to -10% to 50%, 
which replaced 190 values below -10% and 34 over 50% out of 3534 observations. 
Real GDP per capita, log: the log of the variable ‘rgdpch’, taken from the PWT 7.0. 
This is the real GDP, chain-linked series in PPP prices with 2005 as the base year. 
Real GDP growth: the variable ‘grgdpch’ taken from the PWT 7.0, which is the real 
growth rate of the ‘rgdpch’ series. 
Domestic credit to the private sector to GDP (also: broad money to GDP, M2 and quasi-
money to GDP, credit supplied by the banking sector to GDP): taken from the World 
Bank database. Values of zero were treated as missing observations.  
Old age (youth) dependency ratio: ratio of people over 65 (below 15) years to working 
age people between 15 and 65. Data are from the World Bank database. 
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Population: population in millions was taken from PWT 7.0. Countries with populations 
of less than one million people were dropped to avoid problems due to large capital 
account-based transactions in so-called tax havens such as the Bahamas. 
Oil trade balance: the ratio of volume of oil exports minus oil imports to GDP, taken 
from the World Economic Outlook database 2011. In one country, imports were 
counted as a negative entry in the dataset, which we corrected. 
EFW-indices: the interpolated chain-linked versions taken from Gwartney and Lawson 
(2009). As the institutional data are available only in five-year intervals from 1970 to 
2000 and annually thereafter, we do linear interpolations between two data points where 
necessary for our yearly estimations. Such a procedure has been applied previously by, 
for instance, de Soysa and Neumayer (2005). As institutions develop slowly over time, 
a linear estimation comes close to capturing the gradual development inherent in the  
evolution of institutional quality. Furthermore, as the indices are constructed from 
different sources, including surveys, the normal measurement error and errors caused by 
linear interpolation are two sides of the same coin, leading us to the conclusion that our 
error can be tolerated given the long time span and wide country coverage of our 
sample.  
IMF capital account openness: we use the Chinn and Ito (2008) index based on the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER) in its 2012 version. 
Trade openness: the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP in 2005 constant prices, the 
variable openk taken from the Penn World Tables 7.0. 
Freedom House – PolityIV: the ‘imputed revised combined polity2’ score from 
Hadenius and Teorell (2005) is a combination of the Freedom House civil liberty and 
political rights as well as the p_polity2 score of the PolityIV project. Overall, this index 
tries to capture the degree of democratic participation in a country. It ranges from 0 to 
10, with higher values indicating more democracy. 
PolityIV: chief executive constraints: measure of the power of the highest executive 
body in a country and the system of checks and balances against it. The measure takes 
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values between one and seven, equal to one if the chief executive has unlimited power 
and seven if his/her power is balanced by the controls available to other political actors. 
ICRG: quality of governance: is the aggregate indicator from the International Country 
Risk Guide of the Political Risk Group, which we have taken from Teorell et al. (2011).  
List of countries in our baseline models: 
Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Macedonia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam.
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Table A 4: Descriptive statistics 
variable   mean 
std. 
dev. min max observations variable   mean 
std. 
dev. min max observations 
gross national savings 
rate 
overall 21.2 10.5 -6.5 52.4 N 904 
inflation rate, current 
overall 10.7 11.6 -23. 50 N 866 
between 
 
8.99 4.18 45.6 n 56 between 
 
7.92 1.54 34.0 n 54 
within   4.78 -0.9 42.5 T-bar 16.1 within   8.57 -18. 48.9 T-bar 16.0 
private savings rate 
overall 23.4 9.22 -8.4 52.7 N 904 3 year average inflation 
rate, excluding actual 
year 
overall 11.9 12.3 -11. 50 N 852 
between 
 
7.65 9.25 42.6 n 56 between 
 
9.58 1.63 42.4 n 54 
within   4.76 -0.4 52.8 T-bar 16.1 within   8.18 -13. 45.8 T-bar 15.7 
government savings (./. 
deficit) 
overall -2.2 4.42 -22. 18.7 N 904 
PolityIV: constraints on 
chief executive 
overall 4.54 1.92 1 7 N 848 
between 
 
2.97 -7.7 9.84 n 56 between 
 
1.76 1.18 7 n 54 
within   3.15 -21. 13.9 T-bar 16.1 within   0.84 1.08 7.74 T-bar 15.7 
real GDP per capita, 
ppp, 2005 prices 
overall 7.91 1.09 5.77 10.7 N 904 
Freedom House/ 
PolityIV: imputed score 
overall 5.67 2.76 0.25 10 N 861 
between 
 
1.08 5.96 10.4 n 56 between 
 
2.58 0.51 9.57 n 54 
within   0.17 6.93 9.01 T-bar 16.1 within   1.13 0.64 9.93 T-bar 15.9 
oil trade balance 
overall -0.9 7.61 -19. 49.2 N 904 
EFW: property rights 
overall 4.83 1.50 1.43 8.63 N 730 
between 
 
7.79 -10. 37.9 n 56 between 
 
1.37 2.77 8.35 n 48 
within   2.55 -14. 12.1 T-bar 16.1 within   0.63 0.59 6.66 T-bar 15.2 
young age dependency 
ratio 
overall 63.5 21.7 17.4 106. N 904 international country 
risk guide: quality of 
governance 
overall 4.89 1.46 0.55 9.16 N 768 
between 
 
22.4 21.6 100. n 56 between 
 
1.20 2.52 8.52 n 49 
within   5.92 43.5 84.9 T-bar 16.1 within   0.83 1.92 7.34 T-bar 15.6 
old age dependency 
ratio 
overall 8.57 4.39 4.16 25.1 N 904 
EFW: size of 
government 
overall 6.53 1.37 2.62 10 N 732 
between 
 
4.99 4.24 23.9 n 56 between 
 
1.22 4.20 9.21 n 48 
within   0.50 6.22 10.5 T-bar 16.1 within   0.68 4.11 8.97 T-bar 15.2 
domestic credit to the 
private sector, % of 
GDP 
overall 32.9 32.2 1.54 168. N 889 
EFW: overall markets 
regulation 
overall 5.60 1.22 1.49 8.78 N 734 
between 
 
31.9 4.22 149. n 56 between 
 
1.17 1.94 8.44 n 48 
within   9.56 -16. 79.7 T-bar 15.8 within   0.47 4.24 7.93 T-bar 15.2 
growth rate of real 
GDP per capita 
overall 2.65 5.48 -23. 37.6 N 904 
financial reform index 
overall 0.56 0.26 0 1 N 562 
between 
 
2.46 -1.4 8.74 n 56 between 
 
0.21 0.14 0.97 n 39 
within   4.94 -21. 35.5 T-bar 16.1 within   0.14 0.16 0.96 T 14.4 
        
World Bank 
governance indicator: 
rule of law 
overall -0.3 0.66 -1.6 1.79 N 462 
        
between 
 
0.64 -1.4 1.63 n 54 
        
within   0.16 -0.8 0.94 T 8.55 
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Table A 5: Difference-in Hansen-test statistics 
H0: instrument subset is exogenous 
table 
No. 
model 
No. 
explanatory instrument subset (selection) 
probability, 
that > Chi2 
3 
2 
gross national savings 
GMM instrument set for levels 0.627 
GMM for LDV gross national savings (lag 1) 0.262 
GMM for real GDP growth, government savings (lag 2) 0.301 
GMM: inflation rate (lag 2) 0.936 
GMM: 3-year average inflation (lag 2) 0.712 
GMM: domestic credit to the private sector to GDP (lag 2) 0.412 
exogenous variables: old age/youth dependency, oil trade balance 0.128 
4 GMM: real GDP per capita(lag 2) 0.203 
6 
private savings 
GMM instrument set for levels 0.653 
GMM for LDV gross national savings (lag 1) 0.454 
GMM for real GDP growth, government savings (lag 2) 0.239 
GMM: inflation rate (lag 2) 0.403 
GMM: 3-year average inflation (lag 2) 0.195 
GMM: domestic credit to the private sector to GDP (lag 2) 0.787 
exogenous variables: old age/youth dependency, oil trade balance 0.827 
8 GMM: real GDP per capita (lag 2) 0.263 
4 
9 
gross national savings 
exogenous variable:  constraints on the chief executive 0.737 
10 exogenous variable:  democratic participation 0.524 
11 
private savings 
exogenous variable:  constraints on the chief executive 0.202 
12 exogenous variable:  democratic participation 0.027 
5 
13 
gross national savings 
exogenous variable:  EFW: property rights quality 0.265 
14 exogenous variable: country risk: quality of governance 0.606 
15 exogenous variable:  World Bank governance indicators: rule of law 0.123 
16 
private savings 
exogenous variable:  EFW: property rights quality 0.862 
17 exogenous variable: country risk: quality of governance 0.182 
18 exogenous variable:  World Bank governance indicators: rule of law 0.189 
6 
19 
gross national savings 
exogenous variable: EFW: size of government 0.393 
20 exogenous variable: EFW: overall markets regulation 0.003 
21 exogenous variable: financial reform index 0.013 
22 
private savings 
exogenous variable: EFW: size of government 0.05 
23 exogenous variable: EFW: overall markets regulation 0.209 
24 exogenous variable: financial reform index 0.102 
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Table A 6: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
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gross national savings rate 1                                   
private savings rate 0.885 1                                 
government savings (./. 
deficit) 0.436 -0.03 1                               
real GDP per capita, log 0.400 0.233 0.411 1                             
oil/fuel trade balance 0.200 0.127 0.185 0.223 1                           
youth dependency -0.49 -0.43 -0.22 -0.73 -0.16 1                         
old age dependency 0.107 0.080 0.076 0.545 0.019 -0.73 1                       
domestic credit to the 
private sector, % of GDP 0.673 0.584 0.318 0.413 -0.11 -0.38 0.020 1                     
real GDP, growth 0.349 0.280 0.207 0.121 0.012 -0.34 0.301 0.147 1                   
inflation rate -0.14 -0.13 -0.05 -0.11 0.300 0.159 -0.05 -0.39 -0.10 1                 
3 year average inflation, 
excl. actual year -0.23 -0.23 -0.04 -0.08 0.302 0.140 -0.03 -0.43 -0.13 0.700 1               
PolityIV: constraints on chief 
executive 0.093 0.121 -0.03 0.177 -0.02 -0.16 0.141 0.074 0.078 0.045 0.034 1             
Freedom House/PolityIV 
imputed democracy score -0.25 -0.22 -0.10 0.385 0.013 -0.30 0.352 -0.20 -0.04 0.006 0.026 0.282 1           
EFW: property rights quality 0.442 0.354 0.264 0.410 -0.24 -0.40 0.249 0.557 0.229 -0.26 -0.24 0.059 -0.09 1         
country risk: quality of 
governance 0.429 0.353 0.241 0.458 -0.08 -0.33 0.189 0.509 0.124 -0.21 -0.18 0.109 0.004 0.755 1       
EFW: size of government -0.06 -0.19 0.247 0.188 -0.08 0.023 -0.07 -0.07 -0.16 -0.15 -0.17 -0.03 0.351 -0.17 -0.09 1     
EFW: domestic market 
regulation 0.270 0.148 0.296 0.511 -0.24 -0.30 0.177 0.385 0.118 -0.33 -0.36 0.074 0.254 0.48 0.432 0.292 1   
financial reform index 0.028 -0.12 0.298 0.605 0.056 -0.32 0.355 0.122 0.025 -0.25 -0.22 0.057 0.427 0.229 0.282 0.304 0.491 1 
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Table A 7: Other aspects of economic freedom: Freedom of choice on markets 
  (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
dependent variable: GNS GNS GNS PrSav PrSav PrSav 
lagged dependent variable 
0.596*** 0.583*** 0.606*** 0.488*** 0.485*** 0.503*** 
(0.0757) (0.0757) (0.133) (0.117) (0.115) (0.130) 
youth dependency 
-0.122*** -0.110*** -0.0740 -0.137** -0.120** -0.114* 
(0.0430) (0.0414) (0.0578) (0.0581) (0.0536) (0.0689) 
old age dependency 
-0.386*** -0.356*** -0.172 -0.437** -0.396** -0.237 
(0.137) (0.130) (0.168) (0.190) (0.176) (0.213) 
real GDP growth 
0.0649 0.0478 0.244** 0.0229 0.00192 0.129 
(0.0608) (0.0656) (0.120) (0.109) (0.109) (0.164) 
government savings 
(./.deficit) 
0.274*** 0.252** 0.0354 -0.154 -0.200 -0.257 
(0.0983) (0.107) (0.129) (0.160) (0.177) (0.223) 
oil/fuel trade balance 
0.183*** 0.201*** 0.220** 0.196*** 0.217*** 0.164 
(0.0519) (0.0448) (0.0950) (0.0655) (0.0606) (0.119) 
domestic credit to the 
private sector, % of GDP 
0.0275 0.0288 0.0415** 0.0479 0.0474 0.0431 
(0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0195) (0.0321) (0.0308) (0.0284) 
inflation rate 
0.181*** 0.182*** 0.0929 0.0905 0.105 0.0705 
(0.0550) (0.0566) (0.0609) (0.0678) (0.0709) (0.0616) 
3 year average inflation, 
excl. actual year 
-0.114*** -0.104** -0.107** -0.0437 -0.0607 -0.122** 
(0.0438) (0.0416) (0.0516) (0.0549) (0.0536) (0.0487) 
EFW: size of government 
-0.619**     -0.793**     
(0.264)     (0.375)     
EFW: overall markets 
regulation 
  0.417     0.479   
  (0.448)     (0.611)   
financial reform index 
    -2.061     -3.983*** 
    (1.476)     (1.465) 
observations 652 625 654 475 781 652 
countries 43 43 43 37 54 43 
min. years 8 6 9 7 9 8 
max. years 25 25 25 23 25 25 
av. years 15.16 14.53 15.21 12.84 14.46 15.16 
AR(1)-test, probability 0.00363 0.00419 0.00285 0.00769 0.000535 0.000970 
AR(2)-test, probability 0.158 0.280 0.170 0.807 0.803 0.0747 
Hansen-test statistic, prob 0.279 0.303 0.294 0.242 0.544 0.452 
number of instruments 42 42 42 42 42 42 
1) constant not reported 2) bold values indicated 99% and 95% significance levels. 3) ***(**)(*) indicate 99% (95%)(90%) 
significance values. 4) Numbers in brackets are the corresponding  z-values 5) sys-GMM: System GMM estimation, panel specific 
heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors 
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APPENDIX C: SIMPLE EXAMPLES FOR THE INFLUENCE OF FED MONETARY POLICY ON ISA SETTLEMENT 
 
Figure 10: Example of the relation of open market operations, ISA balances and SOMA shares on ISA settlement procedure 
Fed system: volume of SOMA portfolio: 1000 USD; 3 Fed-districts with shares: 50-30-20% each; 1:1 coverage of gold and notes;   
District-FED1 holds and manages the SOMA on behalf of the FED-system (corresponding to the New York Fed)       
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 530   gold certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 320   gold certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 210 
loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0 
SOMA 500       SOMA 300       SOMA 200     
  630   630     370   370     230   230 
                            
01. September: Commercial bank in District 2 sells assets to the FED-system in their open market operations in volume of 200 USD.   
Fed-System: volume of SOMA now 1200 USD; distribution is still 50-30-20 between the districts; FED2 gets credited 60 USD in SOMA, for example 
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 530   gold certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 320   gold certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 210 
loans to com.banks 0 ISA 100   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 60   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 40 
SOMA 600       SOMA 360       SOMA 240     
  730   730     430   430     270   270 
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In the same second, the commercial bank from district 1 gets credited this amount as a deposit in her account at District-FED2.    
This leads to ISA claims in height of 140 USD for FED2, which are shared between FED1 and FED3 as their relation in the SOMA (50:20)   
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 530   gold certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 520   gold certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 210 
loans to com.banks 0 ISA 100   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 40 
SOMA 600       ISA 140       SOMA 240     
  730   730   SOMA 360         270   270 
            570   570           
                            
01. October: Commercial banks from District 3 pay credit lines in District 1 in volume of 150USD; com.b's there deposit this at their District FED1 
FED3 incurs additional ISA liabilities of 150 USD, FED1 incours claims, leading to net ISA claims of 50 USD       
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 680   gold certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 520   gold certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 60 
loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 190 
ISA 50       ISA 140       SOMA 240     
SOMA 600       SOMA 360         270   270 
  780   780     570   570           
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In April of the following year, settlement is conducted:                  
                            
FED 1: 1 month ISA -100; 3 months ISA +50  = 4.17                 
FED 2: 4 month ISA-balance of +140   = 46.67                 
FED 3: 1  month ISA -40, 3 months ISA -190 = -50.83                 
                            
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities   Assets Liabilities 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 680   gold certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 520   gold certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 60 
loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 0   loans to com.banks 0 ISA 139.2 
ISA 45.83       ISA 93.3       SOMA 189.2     
SOMA 604.2       SOMA 406.7         219.2   219.2 
  780   780     570   570           
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Figure 11: District-Fed as LoLR and ISA-settlement failure 
Our simplified FED-system at the end of settlement in April as above:             
                            
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Aktiva Passiva   Aktiva Passiva   Aktiva Passiva 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold-certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 680   gold-certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 520   gold-certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 60 
loans to com.b's 0 ISA 0   loans to com.b's 0 ISA 0   loans to com.b's 0 ISA 139.17 
ISA 45.83       ISA 93.33       SOMA 189.17     
SOMA 604.17       SOMA 406.67         219.17   219.17 
  780   780     570   570           
                            
Commercial banks in District 3 need refinancing at September, 1st;                
For example in volume of 150 USD to pay credit lines from the financial sector in District 1 and 2 (with shares 50:50)    
Deposits and ISA-claims increase in Districts 1 and 2, decrease in District 3             
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Aktiva Passiva   Aktiva Passiva   Aktiva Passiva 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold-certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 755   gold-certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 595   gold-certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 60 
loans to com.b's 0 ISA 0   loans to com.b's 0 ISA 0   loans to com.b's 150 ISA 289.17 
ISA 120.83       ISA 168.33       SOMA 189.17     
SOMA 604.17       SOMA 406.67         369.17   369.17 
  855   855     645   645           
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Settlement of ISA in April of the following year:                  
                            
FED-1: 9*45.83+4*120.83 74.6                     
FED-2: 9*93.33+4*168.33 126                     
FED-3: 9*139.17+4*289.17 201                     
                            
District-FED 1   District-FED 2   District-FED 3 
Aktiva Passiva   Aktiva Passiva   Aktiva Passiva 
other assets 30 notes 100   other assets 20 notes 50   other assets 10 notes 20 
gold-certificates 100 deposits of com.b's 755   gold-certificates 50 deposits of com.b's 595   gold-certificates 20 deposits of com.b's 60 
loans to com.b's 0 ISA 0   loans to com.b's 0 ISA 0   loans to com.b's 150 ISA 88.40 
ISA 46.18       ISA 42.23       SOMA -11.60     
SOMA 678.82       SOMA 532.77         168.40   168.40 
  855   855     645   645           
                            
                            
--> Settlement is not possible, SOMA volume of FED3 is too low.               
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APPENDIX D: OVERVIEW ON PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED IN THE THESIS 
This dissertation includes, in full length or reworked and translated parts of, the 
following publications: 
1. Voll, S. (2014) Institutional determinants of Balance of Payments dynamics: A 
first literature survey. Unpublished working paper, University of Jena. 
2. Freytag, A. and Voll, S. (2012) Institutions and savings in developing and 
emerging economies. Public Choice, Vol. 157(3-4), pp. 475-509 
3. Draper, P., Freytag, A. and Voll, S. (2011) Global financial crisis, protectionism 
and current account deficit: South Africa on the brink? World Economics, Vol. 
12(2), pp. 129-152. 
4. Burgold, P. and Voll, S. (2012) Begrenzung von TARGET2-Risiken – ein 
kritischer Überblick. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol.13, S.103-121. 
5. Voll, S. (2012) ISA vs. TARGET2 - Ein Vergleich der Voraussetzungen für den 
effektiven Ausgleich von Zahlungsüberweisungssalden, Working Papers on 
Global Financial Markets No. 51, University of Jena 
Of publications No. 1) and 5), sole contributing author is Sebastian Voll. Publications 
No. 2) and 4) are joint work of the mentioned authors. Sebastian Voll’s contribution to 
publication 4) is solely section II of the cited paper, of which parts have been used for 
this thesis. For details, see the table below. 
Thesis chapter/section Published as Contributing author(s) 
for the parts in the 
thesis (contributions as 
shares in %) 
Chapter 2  Unpublished working paper Sebastian Voll 
Section 3.1, 3.2, 3.7 Freytag, A. and Voll, S. (2012) Institutions 
and savings in developing and emerging 
economies. Public Choice, Vol. 157(3-4), 
pp. 475-509 
Andreas Freytag, 
Sebastian Voll (50-50) 
Sections 3.3 - 3.6 Freytag, A. and Voll, S. (2012) Institutions 
and savings in developing and emerging 
economies. Public Choice,. Vol. 157(3-4), 
pp. 475-509 
Sebastian Voll 
Chapter 4 Draper, P., Freytag, A. and Voll, S. (2011) 
Global financial crisis, protectionism and 
current account deficit: South Africa on 
the brink? World Economics, Vol. 12(2), 
pp. 129-152. 
Sebastian Voll 
148 
 
 
Section 5.2.1 Burgold, P. and Voll, S. (2012) 
Begrenzung von TARGET2-Risiken – ein 
kritischer Überblick. Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol.13, S.103-121. 
 
Peter Burgold , Sebastian 
Voll (90-10) 
Sections 5.2.2 - 5.2.4 Voll, S. (2012) ISA vs. TARGET2 - Ein 
Vergleich der Voraussetzungen für den 
effektiven Ausgleich von 
Zahlungsüberweisungssalden, Working 
Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 
51, University of Jena 
Sebastian Voll 
Section 5.3 Burgold, P. and Voll, S. (2012) 
Begrenzung von TARGET2-Risiken – ein 
kritischer Überblick. Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol.13, S.103-121. 
 
Peter Burgold, Sebastian 
Voll (60-40) 
Section 5.4.1 Burgold, P. and Voll, S. (2012) 
Begrenzung von TARGET2-Risiken – ein 
kritischer Überblick. Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol.13, S.103-121. 
 
Peter Burgold, Sebastian 
Voll (90-10) 
Section 5.4.2 Burgold, P. and Voll, S. (2012) 
Begrenzung von TARGET2-Risiken – ein 
kritischer Überblick. Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol.13, S.103-121. 
 
Peter Burgold, Sebastian 
Voll (60-40) 
Section 5.5.1-5.5.4 Burgold, P. and Voll, S. (2012) 
Begrenzung von TARGET2-Risiken – ein 
kritischer Überblick. Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol.13, S.103-121. 
 
Peter Burgold, Sebastian 
Voll (50-50) 
Section 5.5.5 Burgold, P. and Voll, S. (2012) 
Begrenzung von TARGET2-Risiken – ein 
kritischer Überblick. Perspektiven der  
Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol.13, S.103-121. 
 
Voll, S. (2012) ISA vs. TARGET2 - Ein 
Vergleich der Voraussetzungen für den 
effektiven Ausgleich von 
Zahlungsüberweisungssalden, Working 
Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 
51, University of Jena 
Peter Burgold, Sebastian 
Voll (20-80) 
Sections 6.6-6.7  Voll, S. (2012) ISA vs. TARGET2 - Ein 
Vergleich der Voraussetzungen für den 
effektiven Ausgleich von 
Zahlungsüberweisungssalden, Working 
Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 
51, University of Jena 
Sebastian Voll 
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